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Abstract 
 
The thesis examines how elite perspectives on foreign aid affect the subsequent path of aid 
dependence.  The focus is on aid-seeking foreign policy change.  Two foreign policy change 
cases are examined for the study, which took place in Korea under Park Chung-hee and in 
Ghana under Rawlings through a lens of comparative historical analysis.  The thesis aims to 
make two original contributions to knowledge.  First, it explains recipient foreign policy 
using two different forms of mercantilism, and second, it reveals the dependent path created 
by the mercantilist oriented elite. 
 
Mercantilism in the thesis is used as dual-frameworked concept.  First, it is a lens to see state 
behaviour.  Despite the fact that mercantilism has been mainly used to explain a donor‘s 
behaviour, it can elucidate that of an aid-recipient state when the aid-seeking country is in 
dire need of the foreign aid for the survival of the state.   The thesis applies mercantilism to 
explain aid-receiving countries‘ behaviour.  Second, more importantly, mercantilism also 
explains elite perspectives.   The elite in aid receiving countries search for foreign aid not 
only for the wealth and power of their state, but also for the prosperity and survival of 
themselves.  Mercantilism is used as an ostensible principle in practicing the private search 
for advantages of the elite.  The thesis uses the dual-mercantilism idea to examine aid-seeking 
foreign policy in Korea and Ghana.  In Korea, the elite saw the key to their survival in 
industrialising the nation, and their search for foreign aid took place based on that raison 
d’être.  In Ghana, on the other hand, the elite found the way to their survival and prosperity in 
acquiring more foreign aid and the aid per se became the ultimate goal.  The thesis finds 
industrial mercantilism a useful framework to understand the elite perspective in Korea.  In 
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order to explain the elite perspective in Ghana, the thesis introduces the concept ‗indebted 
mercantilism‘. 
 
Explaining path dependence country behaviour linked to the diverse elite perspectives 
becomes the second contribution of the thesis.  In Korea, the industrial elite institutionalised 
industrial mercantilism and turned Korea‘s agriculture based economy to light industry and to 
heavy and chemical industry.  In Ghana, the ‗debt elite‘ practiced indebted mercantilism, 
opening an era of abdicating national autonomy in exchange for foreign aid.  The loss of 
autonomy as state‘s function to formulate and implement domestic policies without external 
intervention, began in the economic sphere and expanded towards the political sphere, 
resulting in continuous aid dependence.    
 
Based on the examination of the cases, the thesis suggests the following findings.  In Korea 
aid-seeking foreign policy change towards industrialisation was an outcome of consensus of 
the new elite, who did not have a vested interest in land or agricultural business.  In contrast, 
in Ghana, aid-seeking foreign policy was an outcome of fights against enemies within the 
regime resulting from checks and balances among the elite.  In addition, the industrialising 
elite in Korea designed national economic plans prior to embarking on aid negotiation, but 
the debt elite in Ghana went to aid negotiations first and economic plans were a product of 
the negotiations.  Also, the industrialising elite used autonomy to achieve their goal, but the 
debt elite gave up autonomy to achieve the goal.  The thesis also highlights the impact of the 
brain drain on the elite in the two countries.  In Korea, nationalistic technocrats were 
repatriated through systematic efforts led by the opportunistic military elite and became the 
foundation of continuous industrialisation.  However, in Ghana, chronic brain drain affected 
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not only the pool of competent technocrats but also the remaining elite perspectives on threat 
of their political position.  Lastly, the thesis finds that aid was given to Korea not for altruistic 
reasons, but out of the self-interest of donors in establishing sustained economic growth in 
Korea.  In Ghana, however, donors‘ political will or interest was less obvious. 
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On referencing and citation 
 
The referencing in this thesis abides by the Harvard style, but when an author with a Korean 
name was cited in the text, the full name was used (i.e. surname, given name, year of 
publication) since many Korean authors share common surnames and it may be confusing to 
some readers.  In addition, when name of Korean figures are referred in the text, surname comes 
before given name.  For instance, when a name ‗Park Chung-hee‘ was referred in the text, Park is 
his surname and Chung-hee is his given name.  The same principle is applied to referring to 
Korean authors in the text. 
Source titles from languages other than English were translated first, but the original title was 
also added.  In case where the author of a non-English publications did not provide an English-
translated title, the author of this thesis translated the title as close to the original title as possible.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1  Problem Statement 
1.1.1 Different paths of aid dependence 
This thesis examines two diverse paths of aid dependence.  One path begins with elite 
perceptions that see foreign aid as a means to an end and leads to aid independence.  The other 
path starts with elite perceptions that see foreign aid as an end in itself and leads to perpetual aid 
dependence.  The thesis finds the former path in South Korea (or Korea hereafter) and the latter 
in Ghana.  In the early 1960s Korea was ―suffering from all the ills associated with a typical 
developing nation [emphasis added]‖ (Sakong, 2004, p.7).  In contrast, in the 1960s, the extent of 
Ghana‘s development was ―untypical of the stereotype of an under-developed economy 
[emphasis added]‖ (Omari, 1970, p.100).  When Ghana became independent from Britain in 
1957, it was economically the most advanced nation in Africa apart from South Africa and had 
the most potential in Sub-Saharan Africa (Werlin, 1994).  Ghana had bigger foreign reserves than 
India, and did not have a pressing need to seek foreign aid at the time of independence 
(Thompson, 1969, p.xvii).  Its social and economic infrastructure, such as telecommunications, 
roads, health system, and education was far more developed than those of Korea where two-
thirds of the roads were destroyed during the Korean War.  Korea can be said to have had neither 
more wealth nor more potential than Ghana in the early 1960s.     
 
Fifty years later, in 2010, however, Korea joined the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which is also referred 
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to as ―the club of wealthy countries.‖1  The first DAC peer review report on Korea ―expressed 
genuine admiration for Korea‘s success in transforming itself from an aid recipient (as recently 
as 1995) to an important aid donor in such a short space of time‖ (OECD, 2012, p. 11).  In 
contrast, Ghana became a member of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs)2 and Ghana‘s 
aid dependence rate to gross domestic capital is still above 25 per cent.   As the World Bank 
avers, the two countries followed two disparate paths of economic growth: 
In 1965, for example, incomes and exports per capita were higher in Ghana than in Korea. 
But projections proved to be far off the mark. Korea‘s exports per capita overtook 
Ghana‘s in 1972, and its income level surpassed Ghana‘s four years later. Between 1965 
and 1995 Korea‘s exports increased by 400 times in current dollars. Meanwhile, Ghana‘s 
increased only by 4 times, and real earnings per capita fell to a fraction of their earlier 
value (World Bank, 2000b, p. 20). 
 
In 1962, Korea‘s gross national income per capita was $110 and Ghana‘s was $190 ($ always 
refers to US dollar).  However, as Figure 1-1 shows, a half century later, in 2012, Korea‘s gross 
national income (GNI) per capita has multiplied by more than two hundred times to $22 670, in 
contrast to Ghana‘s, which has multiplied by only eight times since 1962 to $1 550 (World Bank, 
2013).   
                                                 
1 The DAC has 29 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Union, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and 
United States (OECD, 2014).  
 
2 In 2013, 39 countries are identified as HIPCs.  They are Afghanistan, Benin, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d‖Ivoire, Guinea, Republic of Congo, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Níger, Rwanda, São Tomé Príncipe, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia (World Bank, 2012b) 
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Figure 1-1. Changes in Gross National Income per Capita in Korea and Ghana 
Unit: $  
 
Source: The World Bank, World Indicators database (2013) 
 
However, looking at the figure of foreign aid received, one can find almost an exactly reversed 
result.  Figure 1-2 shows the net foreign aid received by capita in Korea and Ghana across time 
and the trajectories of the graphs are reversed from those in Figure 1-1, which shows the 
economic growth of the two countries.  Ghana‘s total external debt3 in 2010 was $ 8 368 billion 
which was 27.2 per cent of GNI of Ghana (World Bank, 2012a, p. 362).  Ghana is receiving net 
official development assistance (ODA) of $1.582 billion in 2010 which means per capita 
Ghanaians received $66 in the year and 5.5 per cent of GNI and 24.7 per cent of gross capital 
formation of Ghana depended on foreign aid (World Bank, 2012a, p. 374).   
                                                 
3 According to the World Bank definition, total external debt is ―debt owed to nonresident creditors and repayable in 
foreign currencies, goods, or services by public and private entities in the country. It is the sum of long-term external 
debt, short-term debt, and use of IMF credit. Debt repayable in domestic currency is excluded.‖ (World Bank, 
2012a, p. 365) 
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Figure 1-2.  Net ODA received by capita 
Unit: $ 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Indicators database (2013) 
 
The diverse economic growth of the two countries intrigued scholars and commentators.  To 
name a few representative schools, an economic liberalist perspective in the 1980s finds the free 
market as being a causal factor for positive economic performance.  The World Bank was at the 
vanguard of this perspective and produced a number of famous publications such as Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (1981) which is better-known as the Berg Report, and 
Trends in Developing Economies (1990).   However, this stand point was soon refuted by a new 
wave of approaches that highlight the role of government intervention in economic growth 
(Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Kim & Leipsiger, 1993).  The emerging economies of East Asia, 
the so-called Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) or Four Tigers (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore 
and Hong Kong), served as supporting cases for this state-centric thought.  
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Some writers found that ‗soft‘ factors such as culture account for different speeds of economic 
performance in the third world.  Confucianism, or the lack of Protestantism in Asia, which was 
blamed as the foundational factor of economic backwardness by Max Weber (1930) began to get 
attention as a positive contributing factor for the economic growth of the East Asian tigers along 
with the unexpected economic growth of the region more broadly.  Initial works focused on 
frugality, diligence, educational zeal, and discipline of Confucianism as contributing factors (Tu, 
1988; Dai, 1989).  The simplistic assumption of the influence of Confucianism on economic 
growth was criticised in later works such as Kwon O Yul (2011) and Power (2010); those 
contemporary thinkers on culture and economic development tend to focus on an operational 
intermediary between these variables, such as culture‘s role in transaction cost, social capital, or 
investment in practice.  Not all thinkers, however, agree that Confucianism was even a 
contributing factor.  Kim Hyeong-A (2004, p.4), for instance, argues that the contributing cultural 
factor for Korea‘s economic development was post-Confucianism rather than Confucianism. 
 
Rather than just examining the case of a single country some thinkers have focused on 
comparative studies of Korea and Ghana.  Among those, Moss (2003) expresses the view that 
policies rendered the difference.  Werlin (1994), on the other hand, asserts that the commitment 
of leaders to economic development was the dividing factor between Korea and Ghana.  
However, it would be fatuous and risky to identify just one specific contributing factor to 
economic growth or stagnation.  Single-factor explanations are too simplistic to account for the 
complexity of economic growth as economic development depends on a multiplicity of factors 
including not just industrial policy but also international political economy, local culture, history, 
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and geographical conditions, to name just a few.  There are many intertwined variables involved 
besides seemingly direct causes of economic success or failure.  Stein (1995, pp. 32-33) also 
elaborates why one should be careful in comparative interpreting, namely usually there exists in 
the respective cases: (1) a unique international environment that surrounds a specific nation at a 
specific time; (2) unique historical economic circumstances; (3) cultural or social values that 
reduce the transaction costs; and (4) a structure of social or political classes relating to promoting 
a set of policies.   
 
Looking at the cases of Korea and Ghana within the framework of these four factors identified 
by Stein, the following can be observed.  First, the international market was friendly towards 
Korean export-driven economic growth.  However, Ghana has suffered from relatively less 
favourable terms of trade than Korea.  Secondly, relating to the historical economic factors, 
massive aid, which Korea received after the end of the Korean War, did not happen in Ghana.  In 
fact, between 1956 and 1962, 80 per cent of gross domestic investment in Korea was foreign aid.  
Thirdly, the Confucianism in Korea which emphasises frugality, diligence, education and 
discipline reduced the transaction cost in Korea‘s economic development.  But in Ghana, it was 
not easy to find the societal attributing factors to its economy as Confucianism did in Korea.  
Finally, in terms of the peculiarity of political alignment, authoritarian regimes were possible in 
Korea but regimes in Ghana were less autonomous; Korea‘s strong regimes were possible 
partially because the land reform shrunk the basis of rural elites, but Ghana did not go through a 
similar process.   
 
Understanding the uniqueness of the two countries, this thesis does not seek any single or even 
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any major factor that made the difference in the paths of economic growth in Korea and Ghana.  
There are multiple direct and indirect factors and it is impossible to pick one under the 
assumption of ceteris paribus in a study of economic growth of two different countries.  In 
addition, the thesis does not have an intention to find ‗lessons‘ from Korea‘s economic 
development and aid independence for Ghana either.  As mentioned above, every country has 
unique historical, international, demographic and geographic conditions and therefore it is not 
feasible to share lessons between the two countries.
4
   
 
Instead this thesis focuses one of the most critical factors that affect the effect of foreign aid. 
Excluding the issue of quantity of aid, aid can affect the economy of recipient countries through 
three different routes: government procurement, exchange rate, and expenditure (Choi, 2005).  
The first two have been studied relatively frequently especially by economists, partially because 
these are easier to measure using a numeric index.  However, despite its importance, the third 
route of aid affecting the economy has been less discussed since the causal link is relatively 
difficult to measure.  This thesis examines the third route: expenditure. To find the route, instead 
of tracing complex numeric data on expenditure, this thesis focuses on the intention of 
expenditure.  Any decision on expenditure depends on what the elite perceive as the purpose of 
foreign aid.  Thus, the thesis examines elite perspectives of the purpose of foreign aid underlying 
                                                 
4 Nevertheless, there have been numerous attempts to apply lessons from economically successful cases to less 
successful ones, most of which, unfortunately, have been proven invalid.  Many such attempts have been made and 
are still being made between successful Asian cases and less successful Latin American and African ones.  Debates 
on developmental states are one of those.  However, as Wade (2009), one of the pioneers of the study of emerging 
East Asian economies, rightfully points out, it is impossible to learn how to pick winners in an overarching 
developmental state from East Asia when there is no ground for forming developmental states and no winners to 
pick.  
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aid-directed foreign policy.   
 
Most of the colonialized countries in Africa and Asia became independent after World War II and 
at first, ideology or political concerns drove the foreign policy of the newly independent 
countries.  At some point, however, the new states came to realize that political independence did 
not necessarily mean economic independence and subsequently began to redefine their foreign 
relations with a fresh economic perspective: this was the realisation that they could and should 
get more economic benefits from abroad in order to survive politically (Rothstein, 1976).  
Nevertheless, a far-reaching redirection of foreign policy is not an easy task for any government 
and is even more difficult for newly independent countries.  Thus when a government steers its 
foreign policy from ideology towards economic gains such as foreign aid, there should be 
significant grounds to explain the redirection.   
 
In fact, foreign policy always changes to correspond to any changes in the goals of a state; after 
all, the term ―foreign policy‖ means ―a goal–oriented or problem-oriented program by 
authoritative policy makers (or their representatives) directed toward entities outside the policy 
maker‘s political jurisdiction‖ (Hermann, 1990, p.5).  Far-reaching or fundamental redirections 
in foreign policy most often take place upon the replacement of an old regime by a new one with 
a different political philosophy.  Mostly, foreign policy can be expected to be more or less stable 
within a regime (Moon, 1985, p. 312).  However, foreign policy can change within an existing 
regime and this change is different from a foreign policy redirection that coincides with a regime 
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change.5  In executing such a change within a regime, a government risks its political life or 
legitimacy.  At the domestic level, a regime‘s positions on political conservativeness, balance-of-
payments and trade openness are central issues which identify the regime.  It is the same for the 
competing political groups.  In other words, those central issues differentiate and legitimize the 
regime, and therefore cannot easily be altered.  Foreign policy is closely linked to critical 
domestic policy such as political alliances or free trade agreements with strategic international 
partners.  Because of this, foreign policy is not expected to be fundamentally redirected until the 
regime is replaced by a new government with different political and economic perceptions.  Also, 
at the international level, drastic changes in foreign policy within a regime reshape the world 
alliance map, which can range from adjusted economic cooperation to wars between the nations 
affected (Hermann, 1990).   Therefore, when a country changes its foreign policy from ideology 
to economic gains of foreign aid, the benefits from foreign aid should be big enough to offset the 
domestic and international risks which might result from the foreign policy change.  In addition, 
the reasons for the change are frequently discussed and openly expressed by the political elites 
and also by the public, and this disclosure helps researchers to determine the underlying intention 
behind the foreign policy change.   
 
For those who took power in an unconstitutional way, any change to foreign policy within a 
regime is more challenging than for those who were elected through legitimate procedures.  
Coup leaders legitimize themselves by denying the previous regime and differentiating the new 
                                                 
5 According to Hermann (1990), there are four levels of changes depending on the significance of the change: first, 
adjustment changes that only affect the level of quantity of existing foreign policy; second, programme changes that 
include the means of foreign policy, for example, from diplomatic negotiation to economic sanction; third, 
problem/goal changes which refer to a change in the ends of foreign policy; and fourth, international orientation 
changes which include a shift in alignments. 
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regime from the toppled one.  Therefore, far-reaching policy changes during the tenure of the 
new regime dilute those differences and cast doubt on the legitimacy of the principle or stance of 
the coup regime.   When a coup regime takes over a pro-West administration, blaming its foreign 
policy direction, a new military regime naturally seeks to change foreign policy towards anti-
West direction in an attempt to legitimise the coup.  In this sense, the regimes of Korea‘s Park 
Chung-hee and Ghana‘s Jerry John Rawlings are two interesting and similar but contrasting 
cases to examine.    It examines the prima facie similar but essentially different cases of foreign 
policy redirection toward foreign aid: case one by Park in Korea and case two by Rawlings in 
Ghana.   
 
 
1.1.2 Foreign policy reversals in Korea and Ghana  
Korea became independent from Japan in 1945 and along with independence the diplomatic 
relationship between the two countries was severed.  When Park took power through a coup in 
1961, the population in Korea were still suffering from the trauma of Japanese oppression, and 
so, when Park‘s regime announced normalising the severed relations between Korea and Japan in 
1963, the government faced extreme resistance that threatened not only its legitimacy but also 
the existence of the regime.   
 
Diplomatic normalisation between Korea and Japan has been a long process since the Treaty of 
San Francisco which was signed in 1951.6  The negotiations for normalising the broken relations 
                                                 
6 According to the Treaty, Japan was asked to ―enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each of the Allied 
Powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and 
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had been in progress since the first Republic of Korea, and after fourteen long years of 
negotiations since the Treaty, the two governments finally exchanged instruments of ratification 
of the Japan-Korea Treaty and Agreements on December 18, 1965.   Korea received a total aid 
package valued at $800 million in return for the restoration of those relations.  At the time of 
ratification, the diplomatic normalisation was seen as an outcome of American manoeuvres, and 
this perception led to much anti-Americanism in Korea (Mobius, 1966, p.241).  In addition, for a 
long time, political scientists have focused on the role of the United States of America (US) in 
their study of the normalisation.  However, it is insufficient to explain the diplomatic 
normalisation between Korea and Japan by having a skewed focus on American pressure.  Such 
pressure was put in place for fourteen years during the first and the second administration in 
Korea.  Nonetheless, it was the third administration of Park which aggressively embarked on the 
normalisation, in contrast to the previous two regimes.  Along with the external factors, internal 
elements should be examined to explain why the normalisation took place at that particular time.  
Only recently, a few scholars began to examine internal factors to explain the diplomatic 
normalisation.  Even though there were a few attempts to investigate domestic roles, most of 
them focused on President Park himself and his pro-Japan inclinations or his experience in 
Japanese military schools.  Recently, however, a group of scholars, mostly in the field of History, 
began to examine elements other than his personal character.  Yoo Byong Yong (1991) suggests 
that normalisation was the fruit of mutual benefits for Korea and the US and therefore one needs 
to look at both internal and external surroundings to understand fully the normalisation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
friendly basis‖ (Article 12).  Korea was not a member of the Allied Powers but was still subject to the Article 12 
through the terms of Article 21 stipulating the inclusion of ―Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the 
present Treaty.‖  
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Turning to Ghana, Rawlings‘s regime also went through a far-ranging and unpopular foreign 
policy redirection similar to that of Park‘s.  Rawlings took power by military coup in 1981 
overthrowing the civilian Limann administration whose foreign policy had been skewed toward 
the West.  The nationalist and socialist Rawlings regime redirected Ghana‘s foreign policy 
toward the Communist East as soon as Rawlings took office and the rhetorical war against neo-
imperialist Western countries was raised.   America‘s Reagan administration was regarded as 
resurgent ―old demons‘ (West Africa, 1982, p. 967).  In contrast to Western countries that used a 
policy of ―wait-and-see how well Ghana was doing‖, countries in the Eastern bloc emerged as 
new friends of Ghana.  The new Foreign Minister Obed Asamoah argued that ―in the past, we 
have tended to lean more to the Western countries and to ignore the possibilities of fruitful co-
operation with the countries of the East.  Now we are going to explore those possibilities‖ (West 
Africa, 1982, p. 1754).  He began to build relations with socialist countries such as Cuba, Libya, 
and Eastern Europe. Rawlings visited Libya, Nicaragua and Cuba and deported US diplomats 
from Ghana to which the US replied with a similar action and with an aid blockade on Ghana.  
However, in 1983, Rawlings made a drastic foreign policy change away from the Eastern bloc to 
the West.  Despite the original political positions, most analysts agreed, ―autocrat Jerry Rawlings 
bet heavily on ties to the West, positioning his government as a model economic reformer in the 
1980s‖ (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 300).  Why did he and Ghana‘s political elite make such a 
drastic change which some predicted as ―politically suicidal‖ (Jeffries, 1990, p. 159)? 
 
The foreign policy changes under Park in 1963 in Korea and under Rawlings in 1983 in Ghana 
divide the history of foreign policy in those two respective countries.  In Korea, before Park, 
foreign policy was driven by political ideology, and since the diplomatic normalisation with 
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Japan, Korea‘s foreign policy has been driven by economic gains rather than political ideology.  
The same applied in Ghana.  Before Rawlings‘s foreign policy shift in 1983, foreign economic 
policy was the ―second fiddle to traditional foreign policy concerns‖ (Boafo-Arthur, 1999, p.73).   
However, in both countries, foreign economic policy emerged as the ultimate goal of foreign 
policy since the shifts.  The foreign policy changes in 1963 in Korea and 1983 in Ghana were 
primarily based on economic calculations risking ideological or political legitimacy under 
military regimes.  What is more meaningful in the foreign policy changes in Korea and Ghana is 
that the changes became the critical junctures for following paths of economic diplomacy and 
economic growth.  With foreign policy focusing on economy or foreign aid, Korea indulged in 
repeated aid-seeking and so did Ghana.  Given the seemingly similar aid-oriented redirection of 
foreign policy by Korea and Ghana, and following the same path of aid-seeking, a question must 
be asked: how did those two countries, sharing the same aid-seeking foreign policy, fall onto 
different paths of economic growth?  In elucidating the origins of different economic growth, 
understanding how a critical juncture shapes the path is of importance.  The juncture is a 
―double-edge sword‖; on the one hand it can break the cycle of lending and servicing, but on the 
other hand, it can also create or intensify the vicious cycle (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).  In the 
critical juncture, the initial small differences matter.  This thesis finds the difference in elite 
perceptions of mercantilism. 
 
 
 
1.2 Conceptual contribution  
This thesis examines elite perspectives of the purpose of foreign aid and the consequent 
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economic development paths that Korea and Ghana followed.  In order to identify those elite 
perceptions, the thesis focuses on aid-oriented foreign policy changes and aid diplomacy since, 
as Clapham (1996, p. 45) notes, ―foreign policy of any state reflects the way in which its 
government defines its own mission.‖  As mentioned above, the foreign policy changes of the 
two regimes are particularly noteworthy since they were the first redirections from an idealistic 
foreign policy to a pragmatic one since their independence in 1945 in Korea and in 1957 in 
Ghana.  In that sense, the foreign policy changes of the two countries can be understood to have 
been driven by mercantilism or economic nationalism.   
 
Mercantilism first emerged in the 16th century in Europe when feudalism was demising and 
nations began to be formed in the continent.  New states sought wealth in order to protect or 
expand their territory, and such mercantilist drives became the dominant governing philosophy 
of the time.  Even though the meaning and applications have evolved over time, according to 
Viner‘s (1958, p.286) definition of mercantilism, which is most widely used, mercantilism has 
the following propositions: (1) wealth is essential to power; (2) power is essential to wealth; (3) 
both wealth and power are the ultimate ends of national policy; and (4) there is long-term 
harmony between these ends.   
 
Mercantilism has been commonly applied to understand a state‘s behaviour and the thesis also 
applies mercantilism in understanding the abovementioned foreign policy change in Korea and 
Ghana.  However, in the thesis, mercantilism is not used to understand foreign policy behaviour 
of a state only.  Mercantilism, in the thesis, is a framework to analyse the ruling elite as well.  As 
Foucault (1991b, p. 97) insightfully notes, mercantilism is ―rationalisation of the exercise of 
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power as a practice of government.‖  In mercantilist philosophy and policy, a state claims to be 
and plays a role of a ―savior‖ of people, but in fact, mercantilism is just ―a tactic of government‖ 
or, in the thesis, a tactic of the governing elites (Foucault, 1991b, p. 97).   A mercantilist drive in 
Europe between the 16th and 19th century brought the wealth and power of the country.  
Nevertheless it was by no means bigger than the wealth and power that the ruler achieved using 
the mercantilist tactic (Foucault, 1991b, p. 98).  The ultimate winner or beneficiary of 
mercantilist policy is not a state; it is the mercantilist elite.  Applying Foucault‘s (1991a, p. 79) 
viewpoint that ―practices don‘t exist without a certain regime of rationality [emphasis original]‖ 
to the cases of the foreign policy change in Korea and Ghana, the ruling elite in Korea and 
Ghana manipulated the ‗rationality‘ of mercantilism to carry out the ‗practices‘ of aid-oriented 
foreign policy changes in search of the wealth and power of the elite on behalf of the wealth and 
power of a state.  In sum, in the thesis, mercantilism means a foreign policy of a state practiced 
in search of the wealth and power of a nation, but, at the same time, it is the elite‘s tactic to gain 
the wealth and power for the ruling class.  The thesis examines the duality of mercantilism in 
Korea and Ghana and studies the impact of it on aid dependence.   
 
Looking through the lens of the duality of mercantilism, seemingly the same mercantilist foreign 
policy changes of Korea and Ghana are, in fact, fundamentally diverse.  At the level of state, they 
can be referred to as the same mercantilist foreign policy, but in terms of elites one can find a 
critical diversity.  Elites in Korea found the road of their survival in restructuring the national 
economy from agriculture to manufacturing, and foreign aid was sought after as a means of 
industrialisation.  Thus, aid-seeking was driven by industrial mercantilism.  Elites in Ghana, on 
the other hand, saw foreign aid as a means to their survival and therefore financial aid itself 
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became the ultimate ends of aid-seeking foreign policy.  Such type of mercantilism resulted in 
state behaviour of searching foreign aid in order to pay back outstanding sovereign debt so that 
the state can maintain a proper fiscal status for potential foreign aid or international borrowing. 
This thesis names this type of Ghanaian foreign policy and elite perspectives as indebted 
mercantilism: the philosophy or the policies of indebted developing countries directing their 
foreign policy towards foreign aid in order to pay back previous debts and, ultimately, to 
maintain their balance-of-payment sheet in better shape  for securing more future aid, i.e. more 
indebtedness.   
 
There are a few routes how indebted mercantilism causes a growing level of indebtedness.  First, 
foreign aid in itself causes indebtedness.  Foreign aid is not free of interests.  At its broadest, 
foreign aid includes all resources transferred to recipient countries from donors (Riddell, 2007, p. 
17).   In International Relations, foreign aid refers to an exchange between states7; Krueger, 
Michalopoulos and Ruttan (1989, p. 1) define foreign aid as ―an instrument used by a 
government to strengthen the economy of another country.‖  From a more pessimistic view, it is 
only the ―compulsory transfer of taxpayers‘ money to foreign governments‖ which is likely to 
obstruct the economic progress of recipients (Bauer, 1971, p. 95).  However, a technical 
definition of foreign aid, which most contemporary scholars have been using, is more specific 
than political definitions of foreign aid.   According to the OECD-DAC, foreign aid means 
official development aid (ODA).  ODA includes loans and grants and it ODA has to meet three 
                                                 
7 Comparing to the definition of foreign aid in economics and developmental studies, in political studies and 
international relations, it is a more value-loaded concept.  However, the definitions of foreign aid are, in most cases, 
donor oriented. 
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criteria.  First, assistance should be ―provided by ofﬁcial agencies, including states and local 
governments, or by their executive agencies‖; second, the aid transaction should be 
―administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing 
countries as its main objective‖; and third, it should be ―concessional in character and conveys a 
grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)‖ (OECD, 
2008, p. 1).   Based on the latter criterion, foreign aid becomes debt; ODA or foreign aid is 
concessional, which means it is transferred ―on terms substantially more generous than market 
loans‖ (IMF, 2003, p. 249).  The concessionality, i.e., the more generous terms, can be achieved 
through two ways, ―either through interest rates below those available on the market or by grace 
periods, or a combination of these‖ (IMF, 2003, p. 250).    Thus, even though foreign aid is still 
cheaper than borrowing from a commercial sector, it is by no means given for free, which means 
recipient countries should pay it back in future with added interests, no matter how much the 
interests is.   Even when foreign aid is transferred in the form of grants, either economic or 
political returns to donors are anticipated, which, as shown in many cases including Ghana, 
could do more harm to the autonomy of the recipient country than mere paying back with added 
interest.  In short, foreign aid is debt. 
 
Secondly, foreign aid causes indebtedness through moral hazard of elites.  In fact, foreign aid is 
more dangerous than loans inasmuch as elites in recipient countries find foreign aid with a longer 
grace period more attractive than commercial loans with a shorter or no grace period.  The longer 
grace period of foreign aid exempts elites from concerns of paying it back.  They can just focus 
on borrowing or receiving as much foreign aid with a long grace period as possible without 
planning how to pay it back; probably they might not be in office when they have to pay back the 
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aid.   Servicing the debt is a job for next one in office or the next generation of a state.   
 
A history of foreign capital in Ghana shows how foreign aid increased indebtedness over time.  
Looking at general characteristics of foreign aid given to Ghana over time, Ghana‘s external debt 
was $577 million and it mainly consisted of loans in 1982.  However, in the mid-1990s, the type 
of monetary support to Ghana began to shift from loans to foreign aid, which was concessional 
in character, and in 2000, external debt of Ghana reached $6 billion (Bank of Ghana, 2009, p. 9).  
During this period, ODA was the equivalent of 9.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
1990 and rose to 10.4 per cent in 2005 (Geddes, et al., 2009, p. 3).  Foreign aid results in 
growing indebtedness.  Indebted mercantilism is unhealthy to any economy because of growing 
indebtedness resulting from repetitive borrowing and servicing.  However, the fundamental 
damage does not lie in the exacerbating fiscal repetitions.  Indebted mercantilism causes aid-
supremacy.  Conditionality8 tagged to aid does not occupy the top priority in the mind-set of the 
indebted mercantilist elite.  As a result, indebted mercantilist elites choose foreign aid over 
anything else and this includes state autonomy, which is the main concern of the thesis regarding 
indebted mercantilism in Ghana. 
 
In order to set the scene for the thesis, it is important to understand what ‗autonomy‘ means in 
the thesis.  Autonomy in the thesis refers to state autonomy as a principle of Westphalian 
sovereignty which means ―to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of other states‖ 
(Krasner, 2004, p. 88 & 108).  Conventional sovereignty has three elements: international legal 
                                                 
8 Discussing aid conditionality, Stokke (1995, p. 2) explains conditionality as ―not an aim in itself but an instrument 
by which other objectives are pursued‖ and has ―the use of pressure‖ as the key defining element (p.12). 
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sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, and domestic sovereignty.  International legal sovereignty 
gives a state international recognition of a juridically independent territorial entity in which a 
state can voluntarily enter into an international agreement with other state entities.  On the other 
hand, domestic sovereignty means the extent to which a state is able to keep order within a 
state‘s boundaries.   Lastly, Westphalian sovereignty, as a principle of autonomy, includes a 
state‘s function to formulate and implement domestic policies without external intervention.  
Even though some scholars use all the three elements of sovereignty to measure the level of 
autonomy (Stephan, 1978; Trimberger, 1978; Skocpol, 1985), the thesis limits the application of 
autonomy only to Westpahian sovereignty: a state‘s capacity or willingness to formulate and 
implement domestic policies without the intervention of external entities. 
 
This thesis will examine the similarities and differences of these two cases of aid-driven foreign 
policy change and economic growth in Korea and Ghana.  By doing so, it aims to make some 
distinctive contributions to the existing literature.  First, even though mercantilism is a prominent 
theoretical framework in International Political Economy, there has been no comprehensive 
study, as far as this author is aware, which applies mercantilism to explain the aid-seeking 
behaviour of recipient countries.  This thesis attempts to fill this gap.  Mercantilism is a powerful 
and useful tool that can account for the behaviour of the state and perceptions of the elite in most 
countries, both strong and weak.  However, the dominant body of literature on mercantilism 
focuses only on Western countries.  There have been almost no attempts to apply mercantilism to 
Asian countries before the rise of Japan and the so-called Asian Tigers.  Johnson (1982), Evans 
(1995), and Leftwich (1995) are representative pioneers who link industrial mercantilism to 
examples of East Asian countries.  These writers developed a new concept of the ―developmental 
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state‖ through the special application of industrial mercantilism to East Asian countries.  
However, in the case of Latin American and African countries, attempts to apply mercantilism 
have been almost non-existent.  Most aid-recipient countries became independent from imperial 
powers after World War II, and almost all of the newly independent states were poor.  For most 
new states, development and independence were ―two over-riding priorities‖ (Rapley, 2007, p. 
20).  Economic impoverishment and political instability were the most basic and the most crucial 
problems for most new states (Haynes, 2008).  In the sense, mercantilism or economic 
nationalism, which has been mostly used to explain strong countries‘ behaviour, can be a useful 
explanatory and theoretical framework that explains aid-seeking behaviour of the newly 
independent states.  
 
Second, the thesis examines diverse perspectives behind the same mercantilist foreign policy.  In 
studies of perceptions of elites, most researchers cite diverse beliefs and perceptions of the elite 
to explain contradictory political behaviour.  In foreign policy studies, different perceptions have 
been used as an explanatory factor for different foreign policy outcomes.  For instance, Crichlow 
(1998) exposes differences in the personal history of two Israeli Prime Ministers, Shimon Peres 
and Yitzhak Rabin, to account for different foreign policy dispositions in Israel.   However, 
limited attempts have been made to examine different perceptions behind the seemingly similar 
foreign policy behaviour.   
 
Thirdly, the thesis deals with economic foreign policy which has been rarely studied in relation 
to the elite and their motives.  Even though human factors in foreign policies such as goals, 
motives, personalities, foibles and beliefs have been of interest to a group of scholars in 
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International Relations, almost all literature has studied foreign policy decision makers regarding 
foreign military policies (Rivera, 1968).  For instance, Byman and Pollack (2001) contend that 
individual leaders played a critical role in International Relations and they refute system-oriented 
accounts as represented in for example Man, the State and War by Kenneth Waltz (1959).  They 
point out that a desire for theoretical generalisation has been a major impediment to human-
centred analysis in International Relations.  However, these writers‘ focus on the role of leaders 
is also inclined to the foreign military policy as one can see in the five cases they offer to support 
their argument: Hitler; Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II; Napoleon 
Bonaparte; Saddam Hussein and Hafiz al-Asad; and, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the war in 
Iran.  On the contrary, the motives of the elite behind foreign economic policy have rarely 
received attention.  Foreign economic policy has been regarded as a ―sober‖ undertaking with 
less room for human engagement than foreign military policy which allows bigger latitude to 
political leaders‘ emotions, such as being greedy, vain, or ambitious.  
 
Throughout such contributions, the thesis aims to fill an empirical gap in the literature of aid-
recipients‘ foreign policy.    However, even though this thesis aims to focus on the intention of 
elites in recipient countries, it cannot simply ignore the intention of aid donors.  The donors‘ 
intentions in giving aid critically affect the responses of recipient elites.  Therefore, the donors‘ 
intentions should be treated as one of the factors affecting the recipient elites‘ perspectives on 
foreign aid.  Rather, the focus of the thesis goes to the recipients‘ viewpoint on foreign aid.  The 
thesis studies how elites in aid-receiving countries see mercantilism and how it affects the path of 
economic growth. 
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1.3 Methodology  
In order to examine how the elite perceptions of industrial mercantilism and indebted 
mercantilism affected the path of economic growth, the thesis examines the two cases of Korea 
and Ghana through a lens of comparative historical analysis with a theoretical framework of path 
dependence. Comparative historical analysis refers to a mode of investigation that meets the 
three criteria of, first, ―a concern with causal analysis‖; second, ―an emphasis on process over 
time‖; and third, ―the use of systematic and contextualised comparison‖ (Mahoney & 
Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 6).  It was a leading mode of investigation when social science began to 
emerge as separate disciplines in the early 20th century (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 3).  
Even though there was a slight decline in its popularity as an investigating tool in social science 
in the mid-20th century, since the late 1970s, a number of critical works have been produced 
using comparative historical analysis in order to explain macro-level questions such as formation 
of states (Tilly, 1990), economic development (Evans, 1995; Wade, 1990), causes and 
consequences of national identities (Marx, 1998), and emergence of a democratic or authoritarian 
regimes (Collier & Collier, 1991).  Those comparative historical analysts seek to explain such 
questions within the historical context and do not pursue universalising knowledge since they 
think that the historical details from past experiences offer more lessons than ahistorical 
universal knowledge does to the concerns of the present (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 9).     
 
This thesis, adopting a comparative historical analysis, does not intend to identify the causes of 
all aid dependence in all regions and all areas.  Instead, it explores the specific factors that shape 
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divergent elite perceptions of foreign aid in Korea in the 1960s and in Ghana in the 1980s.  In 
order to establish the causal direction, the thesis conducts process tracing focusing on the 
development of aid diplomacy from the critical juncture of foreign policy change in 1963 in 
Korea and in 1983 in Ghana.  Studying the foreign policy change in Korea and Ghana from a 
framework of comparative historical analysis has a few meaningful strengths.  First, as 
mentioned above, they are the first foreign policy change from political idealism to pragmatism 
in each country.  Second, the two countries make for a good contrast regarding the role of foreign 
aid.  Ghana is a case country which started in a good economic shape but fell into aid-
dependence due to foreign aid.  The elite in Ghana had been ―highly suspicious‖ towards foreign 
aid, thinking foreign aid was inimical to economic independence and indeed, it had received an 
insignificant amount of foreign aid prior to 1983 (Kim, Jiyoung, 2013, p. 12).  It was since 1983 
that Ghana turned into an active aid-seeker and became aid-dependent and highly indebted.  In 
contrast, Korea received a huge amount of foreign aid after independence but made economic 
and political transition to economic and political independence despite of foreign aid.   As Figure 
1-3 shows, Korea received significantly more foreign aid than Ghana did in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Therefore, if foreign aid in itself becomes a primary cause of aid dependence, as some aid 
thinkers argue (Moyo, 2010), Korea, rather than Ghana, should be the country suffering in the 
trap of aid dependence.  The two countries, in this vein, become good cases of comparative 
historical analysis with major similarities and critical divergences. 
 
In addition, Ghana is an African country which has not suffered any recent large-scale political 
violence and thus, looking at Ghana, a researcher of aid effectiveness can control negative 
external effect relatively better than looking at other African nations (Geddes, et al., 2009).  
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Since the Rawlings regime took power in 1981, there has been no successful military coup or 
destructively violent conflict in Ghana.  In the thesis, selecting Korea as a case to examine aid-
independence was relatively clear; it is one of a few countries that transformed itself from aid 
recipient to aid donor.  In contrast, selecting a case that shows aid-dependence takes more things 
into consideration because of a number of externalities that affect the causal links between elite 
perceptions to aid-dependence.  In this sense, Ghana is a good case in which the thesis can 
control other critical external factors relatively well based on the abovementioned historical 
background.   However, it does not mean that, except elite perceptions on foreign aid, all other 
political, economic, social, international, geographical and historical factors/differences are 
perfectly controlled in the comparative examinations in the thesis. Acknowledging that economic 
development is an outcome of various factors, the thesis aims to investigate the political 
economy of elite perception of foreign aid and its impact on aid dependence.   
Figure 1-3. Total ODA and Official Assistance Received 
Unit: $ Million 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Indicators database (2013) 
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As most comparative historical analyses, this thesis adopts a qualitative and inductive approach. 
The question of the thesis begins with quantitative evidence of the alleviated and aggravating aid 
dependence in Korea and Ghana, respectively, and the thesis finds the answer through a 
qualitative approach of examining the elite perceptions.  Qualitative methods are richer in 
meaning and suitable for investigating elite perceptions.  A statistical description of a large 
population does not become a means of examining perceptions of a small number of elites who 
were engaged in foreign policy making.  On the contrary, qualitative approaches are based on the 
philosophical belief ―that truth is relative and that knowledge is constructed by human beings‖, 
and that ―our understanding of the world is a product of our personal assumptions, biases and 
prejudices‖ (Bless, et al., 2013, p. 15).9   
 
As a part of qualitative study, the thesis relies on case studies with interpretive approaches.  The 
thesis begins by describing two different elite perceptions in Korea and Ghana and continues by 
examining the political economy of the elite perceptions.  Bevir and Rhodes (2003) note the 
importance of analysing the narratives and ideology of the elite as it helps one to understand any 
shifts in policy change.  Basically, finding elite perceptions requires interpretive approaches.  
                                                 
9 As a quantitative measure to study the political beliefs of leaders, a number of scholars in political psychology use 
operational code analysis and variances of its formula.  Schafer and Critchlow (2000) use it to analyze the 
predisposition toward the foreign policy of Bill Clinton, Dyson (2001) of Vladimir Putin, and Malici and Malici 
(2005) of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung.  Crichlow (1998) one of the outstanding thinkers in operational code 
anlaysis, uses the method to illustrate that it is possible for leaders to change their basic foreign policy orientation 
using the examples of two Israeli leaders, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres.  Operational code, however, is more 
suitable for examining a leader‘s fundamental predispositions regarding the nature of foreign policy rather than 
analysing perceptions behind a specific foreign policy decision.  It is one of the most prominent quantitative 
methods, but in many cases, operational code is used as a supplementary approach to double-check the qualitative 
analysis of predispositions of leaders instead of being used as the sole method.   
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Elite perceptions of foreign aid can be traced from the motivations behind aid-seeking foreign 
policy.  The hidden motivations, in some cases, are identical to those motivations expressed 
openly in speeches or in announcements by members of the elite.  In other cases, the actual 
motivations differ from what is claimed openly.  Pointing out the challenges, Zartman (1966, p. 
25) states that the ―quagmires of uncertainty‖ of motivational studies ask researchers to be 
―psychoanalyst, father confessor, divine or simply frustrated hair-splitter.‖ For interpretive 
research, particular attention is paid to speeches and announcements made by the political 
leaders, foreign policy decision makers, and economic policy decision makers during the period 
of the significant foreign policy change.  It is not always easy for a researcher to talk to or 
interview political elites as they are not readily accessible.  This is especially true when an 
interview would concern events that took place in the distant past.  Thus, most analysts use ‗at-a-
distance‘ content analysis of public speeches despite the potential drawback that public speeches 
are in many cases made with various political purposes in mind (Hermann, 1980; Winter, 2005).  
Investigations into elite perceptions primarily rely on memoirs and debates on foreign policy 
change, foreign aid, and national development.  Major newspapers‘ editorials and articles 
pertaining to the financial situation of the state are important sources.  Through this examination, 
the thesis aims to interpret the reality ―from the respondents [elites‘] frame of reference‖ (Bless, 
et al., 2013, p. 16). 
 
Searching for the different perceptions of members of the elite, however, is not the sole goal of 
the thesis.  It is a study of the political economic impact of elite perceptions.  The dynamics of 
situational, international, political, economic and historical factors surrounding the perceptions 
of the elite and the consequences are the subject of the thesis.   Data from this part of the 
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research was derived both from secondary sources of existing literature and from primary 
sources.   The categories of literature consulted in the thesis include International Political 
Economy, Foreign Policy, Politics, Economic Development, History, Political Psychology and 
memoires of former government officials.  As primary sources, government documents and 
statistics, and interviews with scholars, researchers in think tanks, and personnel at the pertinent 
ministries were used.   
  
Two research trips were carried out for data collection and interviews.  The first research trip was 
conducted in Korea in September 2012.  The main purpose of the trip was collecting data, such 
as old periodicals and government documents which were archived in a form of micro-film in the 
Diplomatic Archive.  Examining the case of Ghana, on the other hand, called for an additional 
methodological approach due to the absence of reliable and substantial data.  Thus, the field trip 
to Ghana was carried out to conduct interviews in May 2013.  As De Swaan (2000) and Simon 
(1996) suggest, interviews are a useful method of data collection when searching for elite 
perceptions.  Notably, in exploring topics with multiple layers of meaning, a qualitative research 
interview is an ideal method (King, 2004, p. 21).   No standardised questionnaire was used since 
the subject of this thesis is not merited by a quantitative method of structured questionnaire.  As 
Babbie notes (2007, p. 276), the standardised questionnaire is not appropriate to the respondents 
from different backgrounds.  Instead, interviews were conducted in a qualitative manner as an 
open-ended conversational style.  Those who were engaged in the changes to foreign policy and 
to development policies were the top priorities for the interviews.  However, there was limited 
access to those individuals who were engaged in the foreign policy change in the 1980s in 
Ghana; consequently, use was made of scholars and experts in the field.  Those informants were 
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selected for their in-depth knowledge of economic development and foreign policy and for their 
experience in aid negotiations with donors.  Interviews lasted approximately an hour and were 
recorded by audio-recorder.  Even though they were extremely productive, it was unfortunate 
that brain drain in Ghana limited the depth of the research since most of the prominent former 
politicians and scholars who were engaged in the foreign policy changes in 1983 are now 
resident in the US or UK.  A field trip to those countries was beyond the time and budget of the 
author.  Therefore, the author tried to contact them through email but did not get any productive 
responses.  
 
There were relatively less difficulties researching Korea-Japan negotiations because a substantial 
amount of government data and records are open to the public and a large body of literature has 
been developed.  However, examining elite perceptions in Ghana had limitations due to the lack 
of data and records.  Even though there are primary data recording negotiation processes 
between Ghanaian elites and their counterparts in the IMF and the World Bank, these were not 
accessible to the author.  The IMF office in Ghana, visited by the author, refused to offer any 
records either.  Instead, interviews were conducted to fill the gap left by these limitations.   
 
 
1.3.1 An organising framework: Path dependence 
The thesis is about the ‗path dependence‘ which different elite perceptions initiate.  Path 
dependence is one of the modes of investigation used in comparative historical analysis.  In 
essence, it means that ―the past affects the future‖ (Mahoney & Schensul, 2006, pp. 458-459).  It 
also broadly means ―what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes 
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of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time‖ (Sewell, 1996, pp.262-3).  However, it 
does not simply mean that history matters.  Path dependence examines the temporal process 
through its own methodological and theoretical framework.  Path dependence is about the 
process in which ‗initial conditions‘ reach ‗critical junctures‘ through ‗self-reinforcing processes‘  
and/or ‗reactive sequences‘, and consequently the path is ‗locked in‘ (Pierson, 2000).   
 
At the centre of the path dependence framework, there is the notion of a critical juncture, which 
refers to ―the adoption of a particular institutional arrangement from among two or more 
alternatives‖ (Mahoney, 2000, p. 513).  A set of historical variables in initial conditions lead to a 
critical juncture.  ‗Initial conditions‘ is a rather controversial concept among path dependence 
theorists who debate whether the term means the beginning or before the beginning of path 
dependence.  Some scholars believe that policy outcomes are influenced to only a limited extent 
by initial conditions.  One analogy would be rolling a dice: the same initial conditions exist, but 
the outcome is not predictable every time (David, 1985; Arthur, 1994; Goldstone, 1998; 
Mahoney, 2000).  The term ‗initial conditions‘ means a situation or period which happened to be 
set temporally prior to the critical juncture.   What matters is that the critical juncture can be 
defined as the start of the path dependence sequence, whereas the initial conditions exist before 
the beginning; they do not have limiting power over path dependence.  However, initial 
conditions still matter since they influence and can often determine a policy outcome.  It is not 
just a question of rolling the dice (the critical juncture), but about the factors leading up to the 
decision that would make rolling the dice seem rational in the first play (the initial conditions). In 
the field of political economy, the political economic variables that affect a specific policy 
decision can be the initial conditions of the policy decision as a critical juncture that sets a 
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country on an economic path.  
 
Once a juncture is reached it is difficult to take a different path or to go back to the point where 
alternatives were available.  The path becomes solidified through a process of limiting alternative 
options, and can be a self-reinforcing process and/or a reactive sequence (Pierson, 2000).  Self-
reinforcing processes or self-producing processes in path dependence mean a given outcome 
reinforces itself over time and thus stabilizes the direction of the path, preventing conversion.   
Path dependence economists mostly use increasing returns to account for the sequences.  The 
increasing returns processes have three possible ends: ever-increasing returns, equilibrium, and 
decreasing returns.  In paths with ever-increasing returns, self-reproducing sequences grow 
continuously.  In contrast, the sequences shrink continuously in a path with ever-decreasing 
returns.  On the other hand, paths with equilibrium stop at a point where there is no further self-
reproducing processes (Pierson, 2000).   
 
Reactive sequences also develop path dependence but they do so in a different way from self-
reinforcement. Whereas self-reinforcement is that A reinforces A, reactive sequences are a chain 
of processes that reach to Z from A.  When one sees Z, it is not easy to think of A as a cause, but 
in path dependence there are reactive sequences that leads A to B, B to C, C to D, etc.… and 
finally Y to Z.  A precedent outcome becomes a cause of a subsequent event, and these chains 
connect to each other in a temporal manner.  Once the course is set via these processes, it is not 
easy to alter the course due to increasing returns and increasing transaction costs (Pierson, 2000; 
Levi, 1997).  Therefore the path becomes stable, inflexible, and dependent. 
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Despite some critiques claiming that path dependence is too deterministic, most writers on the 
subject of path dependence do not agree.  For the latter, path dependence is a matter of stability 
rather than of determinism (Kay, 2005).  According to North (1990, p. 99), path dependence is a 
methodology of conceptually narrowing the choice set through time, and thus it does not mean 
―inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future.‖  The critical choice does not 
determine the consequences but does affect following policy sets by constraining the possible 
options.   The stability does not mean that there shall be no policy change on the path for good.  
Instead, it means that the critical juncture limits alternative options.  In that sense, Putnam (1993) 
explains why some governments succeed in democratisation while others fail and he quotes the 
case of Italy using the concept of path dependence.  Putnam (1993, pp. 179-180) argues that 
―once development has been set on a particular course, organisational learning, cultural habits, 
and mental models of the social world reinforce that trajectory.‖  This idea becomes the 
foundation of institutions along with material ones and when they are shaken it opens 
possibilities for change (Thelen, 1999, p.397).   Path dependence is a temporal process that 
narrows down possible conceptual, behavioural and political choice sets.    
 
Path dependence, in the thesis, is a proper tool to explain the development of elite perceptions 
behind foreign policy decisions and their economic consequences.  Applying a path dependence 
framework in explaining foreign policy decision-making in this thesis is particularly effective 
with some reasons.  First of all, the initial period matters in foreign policy decision-making.  In 
most cases, foreign policy decisions do not address issues which pop up out of nowhere.  Foreign 
policy decisions are made to address latent issues.  For instance, Korea and Ghana had suffered 
lack of financial capital for more than decades until foreign policy elites finally made decisions 
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in 1963 and 1983, respectively.  Kuperman (2006, p. 538) also notes that ―starting to make a 
foreign policy decision requires making a decision to make a foreign policy decision.‖  The 
decision to make a decision takes place in the initial period in a path dependence framework.   
 
Secondly, the process of subsequent policy making after the junctures in Korea and Ghana shows 
the reinforcing and reactive sequences of path dependence.  The domestic problems which elites 
tried to address cannot be alleviated through a single event of foreign policy decision 
(Kuperman, 2006, p. 538).  Both in Korea and Ghana, the single foreign policy redirection did 
not alleviate scarcity of financial capital at once.  Instead, foreign policy decision makers 
reassessed the previous foreign policy outcomes and made a new decision in response to the 
reassessment.  Elites in Korea and Ghana also readjusted their foreign policy over and over but 
based on the outcomes of the previous foreign policy decisions.  This ever-increasing divergence 
between the two countries began from a small difference in critical junctures where no one 
expected the upcoming divergent paths. 
 
The aim of the thesis is to explain the link between elite perceptions of mercantilism behind aid-
oriented foreign policy and aid independence or dependence.  However, the thesis does not posit 
that elite perspectives alone determine economic outcomes or they are static.  Elite perspectives 
are established by the influence of multiple factors, then become the basis of policies and are 
responsive to the policy outcomes.  In the path, elite perspectives become reinforced or reshaped 
and are reflected in policy over time.  The thesis is about the influence of elite perspectives of the 
wealth and power of nations on what nations choose as their key to obtain them.  This thesis does 
not proclaim a deterministic approach.  Instead, the thesis aims to explore the temporal progress 
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from the critical initial conditions shaping elite perception of aid to aid independence or aid 
dependence.  Industrial mercantilism and indebted mercantilism derive from the perceptions of 
the members of the elite.  Those perceptions materialise as foreign policy change and sets path 
dependence in motion.   In shaping a path, elite perceptions serve as a blue-print; it is the horizon 
of possibilities beyond which alternatives cannot be imagined (bounded rationality) (Pretorius, 
2006).  According to Goldstein and Keohane (1993, p.12), ―once an idea is selected, this 
pathway limits choice because it logically excludes other interpretations of reality or at least 
suggests that such interpretations are not worthy of sustained exploration.‖  In the same vein, the 
perceptions of members of the elite concerning foreign aid become initial conditions that lead to 
a critical juncture of foreign policy change in this thesis.   
 
 
1.3.2 Path dependence: Origin and perspectives  
Before the term ‗path dependence‘ began to be used, a number of renowned thinkers used the 
concept to explain institutional development or economic development.  One of the seminal 
works is Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective by Gerschenkron (1962).  In the 
book, the author suggests that a reinforcing process of increasing returns grants early 
industrialisers a set of favourable conditions that later industrialisers cannot easily replicate.  
Cardoso and Faletto (1979, p. 464) also rely on the path dependence understanding of economic 
development as seen in ―late-late industrializers […] locked onto paths of distorted 
development.‖  
 
Path dependence as a theoretical concept first began to be used in Economics.  Path dependence, 
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in the beginning, was mostly used to understand expansion and persistence of pareto-inefficient 
suboptimal outcomes in technology such as the QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985).  Increasing 
returns generated by insignificant historical events make people adopt a technology regardless of 
its lack of long-run efficiency, and the non-ergodic character of path dependence locks out more 
efficient technology (Arthur, 1989; 1994).   North (1990), one of the pioneers who spread the 
concept of path dependence from Economics to Political Studies, applies path dependence to 
institutional development to account for divergent economic development.  In Elusive Quest for 
Economic Development, Easterly‘s (2001) understanding of economic development can be also 
understood using the concept of path dependence (Page, 2006).  
 
Even though path dependence was developed and popularised before it reached Political Science, 
the economists‘ approach of path dependence such as the QWERTY keyboard development 
model, is ―too contingent and too deterministic‖ to apply to political development (Thelen, 1999, 
p.385). The initial openness of a critical juncture in which, according to economists, 
technological development can be tipped by small events, rarely exists in politics.  Instead of 
initial openness and random tipping, political development or political decision is always 
circumscribed by antecedent situations.  In contrast to the application of path dependence in 
Economics that losing technology simply dies out and disappears, evolution and change of power 
dynamics is the core in political development and losing institutions change their forms rather 
than simply disappear.  Therefore, what intrigued political scientists was not the simple 
application of path dependence with respect to adoption or extinction.  Rather, it was the concept 
of ―locked in‖ in path dependence: once a path is taken, it has stabilising self-reinforcing power 
which locks out alternative options (Pierson, 2000).  
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In Political Studies, path dependence is appreciated as a tool to gain better understanding of 
temporal and exhaustive development of institutions or political systems.  Path dependence 
provides deeper understanding in a form of moving pictures with sequences of time instead of a 
snapshot of synchronic causality (Pierson, 2000, p.263).  It has been mostly used in analysing 
public policy while looking at either departure (critical juncture) or continuity (self-
reinforcement).  The critical junctures school accounts for the origin of different institutions.  
Even though this approach offers a great deal about cross national difference in terms of political 
institutions, it is not sufficient to explain how the critical junctures are sustained as a legacy.  On 
the other hand, the self-reinforcement school can explain the stabilised and re-produced political 
institutions, but it does not account for how we end up with different political institutions 
(Thelen, 1999, pp.387-390).  The thesis puts balanced weight on both a critical juncture and 
following reinforcement processes in order to look at the origin of different foreign policy and 
the lingering stabilising effect.10 
 
 
 
1.4 Terms in the thesis  
1.4.1 Aid dependence  
This thesis defines aid dependence as a situation in which a country cannot sustain its national 
                                                 
10 In contemporary literature, Ohemeng and Anebo (2012) apply the path dependence framework to explain failure 
of administrative reform in Ghana.  They argue that the repetitive regime changes and the obsession of every new 
regime with administrative reform broke the continuity of the path toward national development in Ghana 
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economy without foreign aid.  However, before elaborating the application of the term in the 
thesis, as background, it would be helpful to set how the term aid dependence is used in the 
thesis within its historical context.  Discussions on why a country remains aid-dependent have 
evolved in accordance with the debates and thoughts about what development is or should be.  
At first, aid dependence and development was understood in terms of economy but currently, 
many writers on development argue that development should not be considered from an 
economic point of view; it should include general human development factors, such as gender, 
health, and human rights.  Observing such trends, Hettne (1995, p. 15) notes that debates and 
studies on development become ―non-disciplinary‖ beyond multi-disciplinary.  For instance, 
Sobhan (1996, p.122) sees aid dependence as ―a state of mind, where aid recipients lose their 
capacity to think for themselves and thereby relinquish control.‖  The World Bank also avers that 
the condition of economic dependence creates a mentality of ‗let-donors-do-it‘ among aid-
receiving countries (World Bank, 1995).   
 
However, for scholars who try to approach aid dependence at a more functional level, such as 
Riddel (1996), aid dependence is more related to lack of financial capacity of politically 
independent government rather than to the minds of people.  Roger Riddell (1996, p. 24) defines 
aid dependence as a ―process by which the continued provision of aid appears to be making no 
significant contribution to the achievement of self-sustaining development.‖   However, 
according to Lensink and White (1999), Riddell‘s definition has some limits.  They (p. 13) point 
out the many purposes of foreign aid and the complexity of economic growth, noting that ―a 
country is aid dependent if it will not achieve objective X in the absence of aid for the 
foreseeable future.‖  These writers use the concept of ―objective X‖ to avoid the fallacy of 
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general assumptions that aid is only for economic performance.11    
 
The focus of the thesis is on sustained economic development through restructuring national 
industry.  Thus, in this thesis, the term aid dependence takes a more functional approach rather 
than human-oriented one, and thereby, the emphasis goes to gross capital invested in domestic 
industry restructuring.   To measure the aid dependence, the thesis makes use of a proxy measure.  
One renowned foreign aid scholar, Bräutigam (2000, p.9) suggests that the reason behind the 
usage of proxy measures in gauging aid dependence is as follows:  ―Since these states and 
processes of aid dependence involve either a counterfactual, or a psychological state, or are 
otherwise difficult to measure, we need a proxy measure.‖  In her research on the impact of 
foreign aid on government, she chooses the ratio of aid to central government expenditure for the 
proxy measure.12  The thesis examines aid intensity using a proxy measure of ratio of aid as a 
percentage of gross capital formation (former gross domestic investment) in the bigger context of 
industrial restructuring for sustained economic growth.  Computing aid dependence using the 
proxies, one can get a result like Figure 1-4. 
 
                                                 
11 In addition, they underline that one should distinguish bad aid and aid dependence.  The term ―bad aid‖ describes 
ineffective aid which fails to accomplish an intended goal of the aid.  However, it does not lead the recipient country 
of bad aid to aid dependence or vice versa. 
 
12 However, due to lack of data she replaces it to aid ratio to GNP 
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Figure 1-4. Aid dependence 
 
The ratio of total ODA and Official Assistance to Gross Capital Formation 
Source: The World Bank, World Indicators database (2013)13 
 
 
1.4.2 Elite 
The thesis uses the term ‗elite‘ to refer to a small group of decision-makers who occupy top 
hierarchical positions in a government.  In that sense, the elite in the thesis means the ruling elite.  
However, even though the ruling elites in some cases include bureaucrats, civil servants, the 
political elite in executive, legislative and judicial structures and the business elite (Brezis & 
Temin, 2008, p. 1), the thesis narrows down the bracket of the elite into a smaller range of 
decision-makers who has direct and official authority to decide national affairs.  Therefore, it 
does not include non-ruling elites either.  In other words, the thesis excludes those who have 
access to prestige economically, culturally or religiously, such as opinion-makers in mass-
communication media, academics, religious leaders and international or local advisors.  They 
                                                 
13 Compiled by the author based on the World Bank Indicators. 
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have influence and sometimes shape opinions about a particular policy decision, but they are not 
in the post of and do not have authority of decision-making in national affairs.  In the same vein, 
voters, electorates or lobbyists are not elites: they might influence decision-making in an indirect 
way but their influence always has to go through the decision-makers, i.e., elites.  Even though 
the thesis does not regard them as decision-making elites, their roles are not disregarded in 
decision-making in policy since they make influence on elite perspectives or attitudes.  
Accordingly, the elite in the thesis include heads of state, high-level civil servants in the 
departments of agriculture, economy, industry planning, finance, trade, foreign affairs, and 
defence.  In both Ghana and Korea, members of parliament are not included since under the two 
regimes, parliament was in the iron grip of a military administration and did not function as an 
influencing or decision-making entity in foreign policy. 
 
 
1.4.3 Perceptions, views and perspectives  
Jervis (1976), in his seminal book Perception and Misperception in International Politics 
explains why we should examine decision makers‘ beliefs about and images of the world and 
others.  Without reference to those perceptions, it is impossible to understand foreign policy and 
its intention.  As he succinctly puts it, ―if that is the way the statesman saw the situation, it is no 
wonder that he acted as he did‖ (p.14).  In political psychology it is generally assumed that 
foreign policy decisions are ―based less on their objective circumstances than their perceptions of 
those circumstances‖ (Renshon & Renshon, 2008, p. 511).  For example, in understanding 
rebuilding South Korea-Japan relations, it is not enough to look at the objective fact that North 
Korea was economically more powerful than South Korea.  Rather, what needs to be more 
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focused is the belief of South Korean elites that South Korea should act not to get invaded again 
by industrialised North Korea.  In addition, as Jervis notes, ―the world is so complex and our 
information processes so limited‖ (Jervis, 2006, p. 650) In other words, the whole complexity of 
the world does not affect the policy decisions.  What affects the policy-making is what elites 
believe based on the limited set of information they have.  Thus, instead of trying to examine the 
complex international and domestic situation surrounding elites, the thesis tries to focus on the 
perceptions of elites. 
 
Reis and Moore (2005, p.3), in Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality, define perceptions as 
―a combination of cognitions (non-evaluative understanding); norms (internalised ideas about 
appropriate roles); and values (ideals about what might be).‖14  According to their analogy, if 
opinions are weather, perceptions are climates.  Perceptions are more stable and last longer than 
short-term opinions driven by current events.  Perceptions include both cognitive and normative 
orientations.  A cognitive perspective is about how to see and interpret the world; realists for 
example see the world as an anarchic international system, while liberalists see multiple forms of 
international governance despite the absence of a world government.  A normative perspective 
involves what ‗ought‘ to be done with respect to particular issues.  When UN officials confirmed 
that chemical weapons had been used in 2013, heads of international affairs such as US Secretary 
                                                 
14 Reis and Moore (2005) approach poverty alleviation by examining contemporary elite perceptions of poverty and 
inequality.  They conducted interviews in order to extract elite perceptions of poverty in selected countries 
representing the Global South: Brazil, Philippines, Bangladesh, Haiti and South Africa.  They compared the 
perceptions and found that, despite the wide diversity of developing countries, power was in the hands of a small 
group of elite who perceived poverty ambiguously as a possible threat to themselves and simultaneously as a 
problem for others. They define elite perceptions of poverty as ―values and beliefs that constitute elites‘ assessments 
of poverty‖ (p.3). 
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of State John Kerry, Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud Al Faisal, China's President Xi Jinping, 
and the President Vladimir Putin of Russia reacted differently, based on what they thought the 
response ought to be, and this is a good example of normative perspectives.   
 
In this study, perceptions, views and perspectives are used interchangeably.  The term ‗elite 
perceptions of foreign aid‘ refers to elites‘ basic values and beliefs that constitute their notion of 
what foreign aid is, what foreign aid should be, and what good foreign aid has done.  Elites 
matter in aid independence because they make decisions in national affairs.  When elites make 
decisions to adopt or block certain changes that affect restructuring of the national economy, the 
decisions came from their idea whether the changes would make impacts in favour of or against 
the elite (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006).  The idea of the potential gain or loss refers to elite 
perceptions in the thesis. 
 
 
1.4.4 Foreign policy 
In the mid-1950s when foreign policy emerged as a single and separate subject of research, it 
was considered as the combination of the following: relatively permanent material elements such 
as geography and natural resources; less permanent material elements such as the level of 
industrial and military development; and, human elements such as population and leaders 
(Macridis, 1989, p. xv).  This example of disassembling of foreign policy was a reaction to the 
simplistic explanations of realism, a theoretical school of thought rooted in power politics, and it 
represented the emergence of foreign policy analysis as a separate subject of research.  Since, 
there has been continuous development accompanied by heated debates and breakthroughs in 
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foreign policy studies.  Among those, a number of seminal works by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 
(1962), Rosenau (1966), Allison (1971), and Janis and Mann (1977) led contemporary foreign 
policy thinkers to accept that actors at different levels play their parts in shaping foreign policy: 
individuals, decision making groups, and institutions.  Various other factors in foreign policy, 
including societal and cultural factors, were also identified. 
 
Even though foreign policy began to receive attention as a subject after World War II, scholars 
and writers were not enthusiastic about conceptualising what foreign policy is.  In the 1970s, 
some writers began to point out the broad conceptualisation of foreign policy which was taken 
for granted (Hermann, 1978, p. 26; Cohen & Harris, 1975).  Referring to the lack of clarity in 
conceptualisation, Cohen and Harris (1975, p. 389) note as follows:  
While a reasonable consensus obtains among analysts regarding the general nature of 
foreign policy—it is a set of goals, directives, or intentions, formulated by persons in 
official or authoritative positions, directed at some actor or condition in the environment 
beyond the sovereign nation state, for the purpose of affecting the target in the manner 
desired by the policy makers—to have said that ins not to have said very much.  
 
Despite various attempts to standardisation, the definition or conceptualisation of foreign policy 
varies depending on the focus of the specific foreign policy; for example, internal and external 
driving factors of foreign policy, foreign policy decision making processes, or outcomes of 
foreign policy.  However, as Anderson (1984, p. 159) succinctly notes and as  expressed clearly 
in Cohen and Harris‘s account, there are differences in definitions of foreign policy but one 
obvious commonality is that ―foreign policy is a goal directed activity‖ applied by a government 
towards external entities outside its sovereignty.  
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In the pursuit of foreign policy, a government uses diplomacy.  The word diplomacy is derived 
from diploma, an ancient Greek term referring to a ―folded document‖ (2002, p. 37).  Nicolson 
(1950, pp. 13-14) notes that the term diplomacy is sometimes used as a synonym for foreign 
policy, a process of negotiation, a branch of embassy, or skill to conduct international 
negotiation.  Kissinger‘s Diplomacy (1995) uses a broad conception of diplomacy which can be 
replaced with foreign policy or international politics.  On the other hand, Berridge (1995), in his 
book Diplomacy, uses the term to refer only to the conduct of international negotiations.  
 
This thesis defines foreign policy as a goal directed government policy toward external entities 
and diplomacy as a whole range of actions executed by the government in pursuit of the foreign 
policy goal.  In aid directed foreign policy, the goal becomes foreign aid, planned and executed 
by an aid-recipient government towards foreign aid donors.  In this context, the thesis uses the 
term ‗foreign aid policy‘ referring to an aid-receiving country, it means foreign policy which is 
designed and executed to obtain aid from abroad.  On the other hand, when foreign aid policy is 
used to aid donors, it means foreign policy regarding giving aid.  
 
 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
The thesis is structured as follows.  Chapter one introduced the research questions and set out the 
claims of the thesis.  It also outlined the methodology and approach of the research, and defined 
terms used in the thesis, as such delimiting the research conceptually.  Chapter two reviews the 
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development of literature on foreign aid policy.  Despite the impact of foreign aid in many aid-
recipient countries, studies of foreign aid policy have evolved around the donor side of that 
policy.  The chapter examines mainstream literature on donors‘ foreign aid policy.  It also 
examines the recipients‘ foreign aid policy, which is an issue that has been marginalised in the 
literature.  Furthermore, the chapter suggests mercantilism as an alternative framework to 
account for recipients‘ aid-driven foreign policy.  Chapter 3 provides the rationale why the thesis 
is focusing on elites.  The role of elites in foreign policy making and in economic growth is 
discussed.  The chapter offers not only elite-oriented perspectives but also various alternative 
views on factors in foreign policy making and economic growth.  The latter part of this chapter 
examines the ideologies that influenced elites in Korea and Ghana.  In this part, elite nationalism 
in Korea and Ghana is reviewed to build a better connection with elite mercantilism. Based on 
the literature reviews in Chapters two and Chapter three, the chapters that follow examine a case 
of industrial mercantilism in Korea in Chapter four and indebted mercantilism in Ghana in 
Chapter five.  Each case examines how elite perspectives of foreign aid in aid-seeking foreign 
policy shaped a path from the initial conditions, to a critical juncture and to reinforcement and 
stabilisation.  Based on the findings in the case study, each chapter analyses the political 
economy of aid-directed foreign policy and then defines elite perceptions that lead to industrial 
mercantilism, and elite perceptions that lead to indebted mercantilism in the light of aid 
dependence.  After the juxtaposition of the two cases in Chapter four and five, the thesis ends 
with Chapter six which concludes with findings and a summary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
The thesis is about how elite perceptions of foreign aid affect aid (in)dependence.  It uses a 
methodological framework of path dependence to examine the link and juxtaposes two cases: 
Korea and Ghana.  The thesis, as research using comparative historical analysis, does not intend 
to extract a grand theory or lessons from one case to the other.  The two cases described in the 
thesis are different in many ways: time, geography, geopolitical conditions, natural endowments, 
culture, history, etc.  Taking those differences into account, by juxtaposing the two different 
paths, the thesis aims to highlight the critical role that elite perceptions play in aid independence 
in Korea and aid dependence in Ghana.  In addition, the part which was not sufficiently 
addressed in the thesis due to the lack of access to data will be researched in future occasions 
through post-doctoral researches of the author. 
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Chapter 2 Aid-directed Foreign Policy  
This thesis is about elite perspectives on foreign aid and its impact on economic growth.   
Therefore, as background, this part of the thesis first reviews literature on foreign aid.  The idea 
of foreign aid emerged in the nineteenth century and is a relatively new international political 
phenomenon bearing in mind the long history of international politics.  However, it is of 
importance in the contemporary international political economy, and a brief reflection on the 
discourses on foreign aid shows how donor-oriented foreign aid has evolved.  Regarding foreign 
aid policy, the literature pays far more attention to the donor and very little to the recipient.  The 
reasons why a donor gives aid have been extensively studied in aid literature.  On the other hand, 
the question why a recipient country asks for aid has rarely been raised.  This chapter aims to 
show how Western-centred or donor-oriented the current literature on foreign aid policy is.  It 
then aims to offer an alternative explanatory framework for foreign aid policy.   
 
The first part of the chapter examines various views on what development and foreign aid should 
be.  The chapter then reviews literature on donors‘ foreign aid policy.  In the study of foreign aid, 
economists were mainly interested in aid effectiveness whereas scholars in Political Economy 
and International Relations have been giving more attention to the donor‘s intention.  This part of 
the chapter looks mainly at literature in Political Economy and highlights donor intentions: 
commercial interest, military interest, altruism and other mixed interests and good will.  Thirdly, 
the chapter examines the scarce body of literature on the foreign policy of recipient countries.  
The existing theoretical frameworks, such as the submission model and consensus model, are 
introduced.  The chapter concludes by suggesting an alternative mercantilist model to understand 
the aid-directed foreign policy of recipient countries.   
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2.1 Brief history of debates on foreign aid and development 
The evolution of debates on foreign aid is based on what donors have been thinking about 
development over time (van de Walle, 2001, p. 193).  Although discussions on development 
emerged in the early 1940s, full-fledged debates on foreign aid began after World War II (Tarp, 
2010).   After that war, even though the aid flow was fundamentally based on the logic of the 
Cold War and post-Colonialism, the debates on foreign aid still were motivated mostly from an 
economic perspective. 15   The first serious examination of foreign aid, Problems of 
Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe appeared in The Economic Journal 
(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943).  In this pioneering article, Rosenstein-Rodan argues that to make the 
world more equal in terms of income, the abundant labour of ―international depressed countries‖ 
should meet the capital of industrialised countries.  For that, either labour or capital should move 
toward the other.  However, any movement of labour to industrialised countries through 
emigration entails many practical problems, and so it is more practical for capital to move into 
the depressed countries and to use their labour for industrialisation.  Nevertheless, since private 
investors in industrialised countries are not willing to take the risk of lending large amounts of 
money for industrialisation elsewhere, the governments in developing countries need to secure 
the lending or lend the capital themselves.  The idea of moving capital to depressed countries 
became the basis of the pro-foreign aid notion of ‗Big Push.‘ 
                                                 
15 Until 1955, the USA, the UK and France accounted for 90% of total world aid.  The UK‘s aid went to the 
Commonwealth members and France‘s aid went to its former colonies.  The aim of US aid was to ―help free people 
of the world from the threat of Communism‖ (US President Truman‘s 1949 speech, quoted in Riddle, 2007). 
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In the 1960s, the discourses on foreign aid expanded to the political sphere.  Rostow (1964; 
1971) bridged economic aspects of foreign aid and politics through his well-known concept of 
―take-off‖ (Riddell, 1987).  Along with Rostow‘s model of linear economic growth, the success 
of the European Recovery Program, better-known as the Marshall Plan,16 inspired economists 
and politicians in North America.  They began to believe that the same economic success in the 
Third World was possible through foreign aid.  In the 1960s, technical assistance became a big 
component of aid, based on the optimism that the traditionally under-developed world could also 
be modernised as the industrialised world had done.  To realize the optimism, multilateral aid-
operating institutions were created such as the United Nations Development Programme in 1960, 
the International Development Association in 1960, and the Development Assistant Committee 
in the OECD in 1961. 
 
The 1970s, however, saw frustration take over from optimism.  It became broadly accepted that 
the success of the Marshall Plan could not simply be repeated in another part of the world and it 
was recognised that aid benefited only a few members of the elite in the Third World.  The belief 
in a trickle-down effect was abandoned and the direction of aid was turned toward poverty 
alleviation, which was also referred to as the basic needs strategy.  However, with the beginning 
of the 1980s, the new direction became overshadowed by debt crises.  Stabilising macro-finance 
emerged as a core agenda among multilateral aid institutions, and as a new norm, structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs), involving conditions attached to the aid, became a prerequisite for 
                                                 
16 During 1948 to 1952, the US transferred US$13 billion to Europe which was 2% of the GDP of the US (Thérien, 
2002).    
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receiving aid or rescheduling service of debt.  Even though there were a few claims from 
unorthodox thinkers asking for ―adjustment with a human face‖ (Cornia, et al., 1987), voices 
favouring poverty alleviation became subdued and economic neo-liberalism known as the 
Washington Consensus became the mainstream principle of aid transfer in the 1980s 
(Williamson, 1997). 
 
The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War became momentous historic events 
in the field of foreign aid as well as in other fields of International Relations.  The need for 
supporting foreign regimes in the face of expanding ideological antagonists had gone, and 
indeed, foreign aid drastically declined after 1992.  In the midst of this fall-off in aid, the failure 
of the SAPs in the 1980s led to pessimism about foreign aid in general.  In the meantime, aid 
fatigue and donor fatigue became popular terms and poor domestic governance emerged as the 
new challenge to tackle for effective foreign aid (Nelson, 1990; Haggard & Kaufman, 1992; 
Killick, 1998). 17   To reverse the pessimism, lengthy discussions took place initiated by 
multilateral aid-giving institutions such as the World Bank and the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  
As an outcome of those efforts, poverty elimination emerged as a new core target of development 
(World Bank, 2000).   After the events of 11 September 2001 in the US, heads of donor countries 
and international policymakers began to pinpoint poverty as a root of global terrorism (Piazza, 
2006, pp. 159-160).  This gave a practical and rhetorical ground to use aid as a means to fight 
global poverty for ‗home land security‘ as expressed in the statement by US President George 
                                                 
17 Critical factors for economic development such as a leader‘s political fear or economic doubts, bureaucratic 
managerial capacity, and political stability in recipient countries, were examined only in the context of adopting a 
stabilising programme: as the Western donors intended (Nelson, 1988). 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Bush: ―We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror‖ (Blustein, 2002).18   
 
Today, there are worries that aid has become a ―pop product‖ championed by rock stars and 
Hollywood celebrities without any serious and systemic examination of the consequences.  
However, a substantial body of contemporary aid literature suggests that aid promotes economic 
and socio-political development (Tarp, 2010).   So-called ‗Big Push‘ proponents claim that aid 
enables poor countries to break out of the poverty trap and, ultimately, to ascend the ladder of 
development and end poverty (Sachs, 2005).  In contrast, some critiques of foreign aid offer 
various absorptive capacity problems19 relating to aid (Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2010).   The issues 
of how to make aid more effective has been in the centre of aid discussions among donors, and 
aid effectiveness is the main issue at the OECD meetings on foreign aid, such as the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005); and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008).  Recently, 
however, the focus changed from ―aid effectiveness‖ to ―development effectiveness‖ as in 
discussions by the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation in 2011 (Wenping, 
2013).  In addition, with a rising recognition that remittance and trade can boost or offset the 
benefits of foreign aid, both the pro- and anti-aid theorists are asking for cross-sector policy 
collaboration in which policymakers in different sectors can work together to make foreign aid 
effective. 
                                                 
18 Quoted in Piazza, 2006. 
 
19 These absorptive capacity problems can be put into four categories: decreasing returns, the pipeline effect, Dutch 
disease, and socio-political consequences.  The pipeline (or bottle neck) effect refers to failures caused by a long lag 
between commitment to aid-giving and actual disbursement.  Dutch disease is a rise in the exchange rate due to the 
sudden inflow of monetary aid and following loss of competitiveness in recipients‘ terms of trade.  Finally, socio-
politically, it is known that aid can distance governments and the elites of recipient countries from their 
responsibility and sense of ownership.  However, in general, absorptive capacity indicates decreasing returns: when 
aid reaches a certain point the marginal return of aid decreases.   
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2.2 Donors’ foreign aid policy  
Looking at foreign aid from the perspective of International Relations, foreign aid is ―one of the 
most original political innovations of the twentieth century‖ (Thérien, 2002, p. 449).  Throughout 
history, no wealthy nations transferred significant financial resources to poor nations, yet, since 
the late 1940s, more than US $ 1 trillion of monetary aid was sent from the North to the South.  
Most of the literature on International Relations has sought the reasons why aid is given.  Riddell 
(2007) specifies eight clusters of motives20  and Morgenthau (1962) identifies six21 , yet the 
reasons behind aid-giving can be broadly divided into two groups: self-interest and altruism.  
Further, reasons of self-interest can be divided into two groups: security and commercial 
benefits.   
 
   
2.2.1 Self-interest: Aid as a means to national security 
Foreign aid was developed as a tool of diplomatic realism.  There were aid-like behaviour before 
1945 such as aid for relief, colonial development and technical assistance but these were limited 
in scope: full-fledged aid began expanding because of Cold War rivalry.  The origin of foreign 
                                                 
20 Riddell (2007) divided the motives in aid-giving into six traditional motives and two growing ones: (1) emergency 
aid; (2) developmental aid; (3) aid for demonstrating solidarity; (4) aid for national political interests; (5) aid for 
national commercial interests; (6) aid given for reasons of historical ties; and two currently emerging motives; (7) 
aid for global goods and against global enemies; and (8) human rights oriented aid. 
 
21 These include: (1) humanitarian aid; (2) subsistence aid which helps recipient governments become subsistent by 
filling budget deficits; (3) bribery; (4) military aid; (5) prestige aid  that is not practically helpful to recipient 
countries and only shows the generosity or financial superiority of donors e.g. building unused highways; and (6) aid 
for economic development 
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aid makes the realists‘ arguments plausible.  Thus, Lancaster (2007) asserts that foreign aid 
would probably not exist today, had there not been the Cold War.  In the same vein, Morgenthau 
(1962, p. 309) emphasizes that foreign aid must be in the hands of ‗political experts‘ and not in 
those of economists or philanthropists, as military policy must be in political hands and not in 
those of the generals; after all, foreign aid policy is a ―weapon(s) in the political armory of the 
nation‖ as is the case of military policy.  Since foreign aid is a policy tool linked to security, 
Morgenthau adds, those in the province of politics, such as policy makers or political thinkers, 
have absolute priority dealing with foreign aid.  The purpose of giving aid is to secure political 
advantages and this applies regardless of what type of humanitarian or developmental causes are 
quoted to gloss or embellish transaction. 
   
Along with the philosophical debates on the true purpose of foreign aid, some scholars have 
found motives through empirical studies (Fleck & Kilby, 2010; Alesina & Dollar, 2000).  In Who 
gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?, Alesina and  Dollar (2000) find that foreign aid is 
directed by political and strategic considerations of donor nations as much as it is guided by the 
needs of recipients.22  Particularly after 9/11 in the US, dominant contemporary aid literature 
sees national security as a driving motivation for aid-giving (Woods, 2005; Riddell, 2007).  
Despite the recent emphasis on aid for development, especially from multilateral aid institutions, 
realists argue that the ultimate purpose of aid for development still lies in national security.  Aid 
is a supplementary tool of diplomatic and military endeavours: it originated from the belief that 
                                                 
22  In contrast to the realist school who regard a political aspect as being inherent to foreign aid, an opposing school 
of scholars, mostly economists, blames the political inclination of aid-giving for the cause of ineffectiveness of aid 
(Killick, 2004). 
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―a root of the national security threat … is the lack of development, which cannot be addressed 
by military and diplomatic means alone‖ (USAID, 2005, p. v).  
   
 
2.2.2 Self-interest: Aid as a tool for economic benefits  
Along with national security, the other pillar of the self-interested origin of foreign aid is 
commercial benefits.   From this perspective, trade promotion is the top priority for many aid-
giving countries, and donors have little humanitarian or developmental concern in mind 
(McGillivray, 2003).  Foreign aid with economic motives is pejoratively labelled as ―rogue aid‖ 
(Naím, 2007); in contrast, aid given with a diplomatic purpose is said to be justified.   
 
In most contemporary western literature, aid from the ―traditional‖ or ―established‖ donors (i.e. 
member countries of the DAC in the OECD) is depicted as given for the developmental purposes 
of recipient countries, or if it is self-interested, for diplomatic purposes.  In contrast, aid transfer 
between developing countries or aid given from ―emerging‖ donors (i.e.: non-DAC donors)23 is 
depicted as neo-imperialistic.  Most western scholars regard US aid to Egypt and Pakistan 
bearing geopolitical concerns as high-minded aid.  On the other hand, Chinese aid to Nigeria for 
                                                 
 
23 In much of the aid literature, the terms ―old‖, ―traditional‖ or ―established‖ donors refer to members of the DAC 
in the OECD.  ―New‖ or ―emerging‖ donors are more controversial terms for aid-giving developing countries which 
are not members of the DAC.  Woods (2008) uses the term to refer to aid-giving non-DAC countries including 
China, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, South Korea (Korea became a member of the DAC in 2010), 
Venezuela, India, Kuwait and Brazil.  He explains that they are ―emerging‖ and should not be called ―new‖ donors 
since their aid-giving is not a new phenomenon, taking an example of China which started giving aid from 1949.  
However, even the term ―emerging‖ donors is regarded as a loaded one, and a more neutral term ―non-DAC donors‖ 
is generally used.  
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commercial concerns is treated as ―rogue aid‖.  Aid from emerging donors, mostly represented 
by China, is described as bribery for commercial benefits with little or no concerns for the 
economic or social development of aid-receiving countries (Mohan & Power, 2008).  Chinese 
and Indian aid to oil producing or resource-rich countries is likewise vilified since it is mainly for 
improvement of trade and investment and it does not come with conditions attached, for example 
better governance or improvement in human rights.  Thus, some commentators urge western 
countries to improve their understanding of the abhorrent aid-giving pattern of emerging donors 
(Kragelund, 2008).  A chairman of the DAC also warns that aid from non-DAC donors, not 
bound by the DAC standards, is likely to prejudice the balance of payments of indebted 
recipients.  It is also likely to retard economic development of poor countries as it enables them 
to delay the adjustments required by the Bretton Woods institutions (Manning, 2006).   
 
However, whether it is for commercial benefits or for security reasons, there is no difference 
since both types of aid are given for the benefit of donors.  Security reasons are not nobler than 
commercial reasons.  In addition, traditional donor countries also allocate their aid based on self-
interested economic concerns as well.  The Chinese government does not hide that its aid to 
Africa began with a political motive but turned to economic pragmatism since the advent of 
Chinese economic reforms in the late 1970s.  In the same vein, instead of calling it ―aid‖, China 
prefers ―mutual assistance among friends that falls into the category of South-South 
Cooperation‖ (Wenping, 2013, p. 4).  Some theorists even favour the growing influence of the 
non-DAC donors (Reisen, 2008; Woods, 2005, 2008; Bräutigam, 2009).   As Bräutigam (2009) 
points out in The Dragon’s Gift, foreign aid is fundamentally a part of foreign policy, and China 
is not an exception.  Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the commercial motivations of emerging 
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donors are demonised as ―rogue‖ motivations by the anxious mainstream western theorists.   
 
 
2.2.3 Altruism: Moral obligation   
The moral justification for aid-giving is another long-standing motive in the study of motivations 
of aid-giving.24  Of the various ethical and philosophical grounds for the moral justification, a 
rights-based perspective and utilitarianism are mostly recognised.  The former claims that 
―everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being… including 
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services‘ (The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25(1)).  The latter, utilitarianism, insists the morality of aid 
because ―a dollar redistributed from a rich man to a poor man detracts less utility than it adds, 
and therefore increases the sum total of utility‖ (Streeten, 1983, p. 380).  Even though it is true 
that foreign aid is transferred strategically and for economic interests, moral advocates claim that 
egoistic explanations alone are not sufficient to account for aid-giving.  There is a more 
important reason than hard-headed national interests, and this reason is the humanitarian and 
egalitarian principle.  
 
Scholars seeking a moral justification for aid-giving find the origin in the Four Point Speech, the 
inaugural speech of US President Truman in 1949.  In the speech, Truman proclaims continuous 
support of the US for international peace and development that does not expect any reciprocal 
privileges based on ―the conviction that man has the moral and intellectual capacity‖ 
                                                 
24 However, the altruistic argument has been largely dismissed in the sphere of International Relations. 
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(Lumsdaine, 1993; Hattori, 2003).  Yet, it is noteworthy that the same speech is also quoted by 
many realists to suggest the realistic origin of aid-giving since the speech is also inundated with 
the necessity of supporting ―like-minded nations‘, ―our partners‖, or ―freedom-loving nations‖ 
against ―the dangers of oppression‖ or ―false philosophy‖ of communism. 
 
Nonetheless, scholars claiming ethical motives for aid-giving have put forward empirical 
evidence.  Lumsdaine (1993) argues that as much as two-thirds of aid has been given in 
accordance with ethical principles rather than national interests.  In terms of aid ratio to GDP, the 
largest aid donors have not been countries with strong interests in the Third World but have been 
North European countries with strong domestic social welfare values, even during the Cold War.  
In addition, aid has been given in a stable manner, which contradicts the realists‘ gloomy 
prediction that aid would have vanished with the end of the Cold War.  A growing role for 
multilateral aid agencies, which reduces the direct influence of donors, is another example.  
Continuous efforts by the DAC in the OECD to shift members towards grants rather than loans 
and towards untied aid rather than tied aid evidently support the moral dimension of aid-giving.  
Also, an increasing international acceptance of global burden-sharing through 0.7 per cent of 
gross national income (GNI) and a shift in aid allocation from middle-income to poor countries, 
both seem to support the idea of a moral ground for aid-giving (UN Millenium Project, 2005; 
The Commission for Africa, 2005; Sachs, 2005). 
 
 
2.2.4 Hybrid model 
Discussions of reasons why aid is given mainly cited three reasons: national security, economic 
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benefits and altruistic motives.  However, in general, contemporary scholars agree on so-called 
―hybrid models‘ indicating that aid is given for a combination of the different motivations 
(Berthélemy, 2006, p. 179).  Even though most donors give aid for self-interested motives, 
whether geopolitical or commercial, a degree of selectivity can be traced, based on altruistic 
concerns such as recipient needs and merits.  However, it does not necessarily mean that those 
motivations are evenly-balanced, and it is generally agreed that donors‘ interests dictate their aid-
giving behaviour (Alesina & Dollar, 2000).   The norm among contemporary thinkers is that 
there is no universal rule or system that explains the aid-giving behaviours of all donors.  Even 
an individual donor has different reasons for giving aid.   
 
 
 
2.3 Recipients’ Foreign Aid Policy  
The foreign policy of aid giving countries such as motives or strategies for aid allocations have 
been the topic of a great number of studies, but aid-seeking foreign policy in recipient countries 
has been largely ignored and insufficiently explored (Moon, 1985).  Recipient countries have not 
been the subject of systemic examination of aid transfer, and the question of why a country seeks 
foreign aid has never been seriously raised.  This section briefly reviews the scarce literature of 
aid recipients‘ foreign policy.  Due to the scarcity, literature introduced in this section includes 
works on foreign policy of the Global South since there hardly is substantial literature on foreign 
policy of ‗aid recipients‘.  Given that all aid recipient countries are within the category of the 
Global South, this would not be a groundless extension of the application.  In what follows, 
literature on aid-receiving countries‘ foreign policy is briefly reviewed and further, the main 
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views on recipients‘ foreign policy are examined: submission and consensus. 
 
 
2.3.1 A brief literature review on recipients’ foreign policy 
Today, the term Global South might be the most commonly used to refer to ―African, Asian, and 
Latin American nations (which) still are relatively under-developed vis-à-vis the global north 
countries‖ (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003, p. 5).  Before the United Nations (UN) came up with this 
term in the 1970s, a number of terms that entailed international power relationship were used to 
refer to aid receiving Global South countries such as small states, weak states, underdeveloped, 
dependent nations, the Third World, etc.  In this section, the literature on the foreign policy of the 
Global South is briefly explained with a focuse on the power relationship contained in those 
names.  
 
―Weak‖, ―small‖ and ―poor‖ countries are common descriptions for aid-receiving countries.  
From a realist‘s point of view, weak, small and poor states do not pose sufficient weight to 
influence international politics and therefore their relative deficiencies vis-à-vis powerful, big 
and wealthy states results in their dismissal from a range of analyses in International Relations 
(Neack, 2008, pp. 164-5).  Rothstein (1977) is one of the pioneers who attempt to explain foreign 
policy behaviour of small countries against the realist mainstream.  In a book titled The Weak in 
the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System, Rothstein (1977, 
pp. 105-106), while using new, weak, developing and underdeveloped countries as synonyms in 
the book, notes that foreign policy is important to any new state since it reaffirms the new state‘s 
independence and identity.  Nevertheless, in new and weak states, most foreign policy decisions 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
are dominated by constraints rather than choices due to lack of organisational and informational 
capacity of the state.  In addition, foreign policy of a small power has a high propensity of being 
personalised because its policy making institution is under-developed and the public has little 
interest in foreign policy.  On the other hand, some scholars put more focus on the definitions of 
those relative concepts of weak, small and poor.  According to Singer (1972), ―weak‖ countries 
are defined by wealth, organisation, and status, while ―small‖ has been used to refer to countries 
which are small in physical factors such as population or GDP.  As one of the attempts to clarify 
the definitions, Vellut (1967) classifies great, medium, small and smaller powers using indicators 
such as population, GDP, veto in the United Nations Security Council and the size of armed 
forces.   However, there is still no agreed dividing line to categorize them and those terms are 
used to show the relative deficiency of aid receiving Global South vis-à-vis the North.  
 
Another set of terms that shows power relations clearly are ‗developing‘ against ‗developed‘ 
countries.  The ―developed-developing‖ dichotomy was recommended in referring to aid-giving 
and receiving countries since it was regarded as less political and less condescending than ―rich-
poor‖ or  ―advance-backward‖ (Commission of International Development, 1969). At first, the 
term ―under-developed‖ countries was used as it is found in a UN document25 in 1951, but this 
―derogatory‖ term soon became replaced by ―developing‖ or ―less-developed‖ (Wolf-Phillips, 
1979, p. 106).  Due to the growing monetary flow from North America and Europe to Africa, 
Asia and Latin America, the term ―aid‖ came into common use, and along with the popular use 
of aid, the name ―developed‖ was given to aid-giving countries and ―developing‖ or ―less-
                                                 
25 UN document Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries (E/1986 ST/ECA/10 of 3 
May 1951) 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
developed‖ to recipient ones (White, 1974).  The broadly-used dichotomy of ―developing‖ and 
―developed‖ originates from emergence of aid in the late 1950s and the early 1960s.26  However, 
in practice, donors are not always developed or recipients developing, and donors are not always 
rich or recipients poor.  There is a list of developing countries which includes one of the world‘s 
biggest donors: China.   
 
The Third World, as a collective term, is another common name to indicate countries in the aid-
receiving continents.  Originally, it was a political term referring to a loosely allied group of 
nations.27  Later, the term Third Word began to be used more commonly, at the time of growth in 
aid in the early 1960s, and soon it included all the non-European and North American countries; 
that is, all the countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America (Haq, 1969; White, 
1974).  Later, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the term ―Second World‖ became obsolete and 
former Second World countries were absorbed into the category of the Third World.  By making 
the definition of the term more loose, the phrase ―Third World‖ came to mean the opposite of the 
                                                 
26 Unlike the definition and category of developed and less-developed countries, Least Development Countries 
(LDCs) has clear criteria: income level, human development level, and economic vulnerability (United Nations, 
2013).  A country which satisfies all three criteria is classified as a LDC.  The category of LDCs was established in 
1971 by the UN and today 48 countries are listed in the LDCs category and 34 countries among them are African 
countries.  47% of the population in the LDCs still under the poverty line of $1.25 per day and 89 out of 1,000 
children die before their 5th birthday.  The LDCs accounted for 1.19% of world total trade in 2011 (UN-OHRLLS, 
2013).  The list of the LDCs is; Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People‘s Democratic Republic, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, 
Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen, and Zambia (UN-OHRLLS, 2011). 
 
27 Third World, tier monde, was coined at the height of the Cold War in 1952 by French demographer Alfred Sauvy  
to refer to a group of countries that claimed to be neither part of the Western world nor the Soviet bloc (even though 
in reality most of them were part of one or the other in the bi-polar system) (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003, p. 4)  
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―First World‖ (Jowit, 1992).  Despite the ever-growing diversity of countries in the Third World, 
Rapley (2007) highlights that they share the common features of low per-capita income and a 
low proportion of manufacturing in the national economy and have experienced life as a colony 
of former imperial powers, except Ethiopia.  Despite the calls to use the term ―Forth World‖, 
instead of the faded Third World, to refer to aid-dependent weak states (Moore, 1998),28 the term 
Third World is still predominantly used, and the false assumption of Third World homogeneity 
makes the study of recipient foreign policy unattractive academically.  
 
The terms of less-developed, poor, and the Third World are frequently used in economic writings 
and development studies, but in the literature on foreign policy, the term ―dependent‖ state is 
more commonly used.29  Even though dependence can include cultural, political and economic 
dependence, it usually means economic dependence.  As the phrase ―dependent‖ states suggests 
the recipient foreign policy has been treated as a dependent variable which changes along with 
the changes of independent variables, which are in most cases, foreign policy of donors.  As Hey 
(1995, p. 201) explains, ―their (dependent countries‘) low status on the global ladder overwhelms 
other explanatory factors of their foreign policy.‖  However, some do not agree with the 
monolithic approach of aid-receiving countries as dependent ones.  For instance, Paradakis and 
Starr (1987, p. 423) argue that foreign policy decisions in small powers with binding 
                                                 
28  Moore (1998) defines three characteristics of the Fourth World as economic underdevelopment, political 
underdevelopment and high aid-dependence. 
 
29 Scholars agree that ―dependence‖ should be differentiated from ―dependency‖ in dependencia theories (Hey, 
1995; Moon, 1985).  Dependence means that one country relies on another country at an external level.  On the 
contrary, ―dependency‖ involves both internal and external subordination through international division of labour or 
internal colonisation.  
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commonalities of ―minimal population, resources, and geographic area‖ are also contingent on 
opportunities in international system and leaders in those countries are as willing to take 
opportunities in that system as leaders in powerful countries.  
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, aid-recipient countries became the focus of a range of policy 
studies.  However this does not mean that the focus of study was shifted from donors to recipient 
countries. The subject of study was not the domestic political economy of aid recipients per se.  
Rather, domestic factors of recipient countries were treated as merely a precondition to make 
money and efforts from donors ―more fruitful‖ (Haggard & Kaufman, 1992, p. 9).  Grovogui 
(2003, p. 31) notes that such trend in literature came about ―either by benign neglect or sheer 
intellectual hubris‖ of the donor countries.   
 
Unlike the a priori assumption in mainstream literature on foreign policy, foreign policy of an 
aid receiving country is neither a pure dependent variable on a donor‘s behaviour nor a constant 
variable in the international system.   However, this does not mean that aid recipient countries 
exert as substantial power or influence as most powerful aid donors.   As Vellut (1967) argues, 
small countries are more sensitive to and serious about foreign policy changes than big and 
powerful countries.  Rosenau (1966) also claims that in foreign policy behaviour, small states are 
more sensitive to international circumstances than big ones.    However, it is also true that some 
foreign policy makers in some small countries, such as Israel and South Korea, took advantage 
of their strategic niche and gained bigger leverage than other small countries (Bobrow & Chan, 
1988).   
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In conclusion, according to an old and crude perspective, an aid recipient country is weak, 
dependent, and under-developed.  Recipient foreign policy has been regarded as being shaped by 
external factors such as the international system or dominating countries.  Terms implying 
inferiority are inclined to relate to material values and can overshadow other values and qualities 
that aid-recipient countries have (Pearson, 1970).  The terms highlighting economic inferiority 
and ignoring domestic factors of aid-receiving countries have been randomly used without 
systemic examination in a manner of ―I know one when I see it‖ (Hey, 1995, p. 203).  However, 
contrary to the views of Eurocentric thinkers, aid-receiving countries have economic, political, 
social and cultural elements that are as complex as those of developed countries.  Moreover, 
developing countries are not homogeneous but have tremendous variety (Baran, 1957). 30  
Therefore, general patterns among aid-recipient countries are difficult to establish, and thus, no 
single model can explain aid-recipient foreign policy behaviour.  Foreign policy patterns of aid-
receiving countries differ as much as those of donor countries.  Despite the wide variety, 
literature on recipient foreign policy lacks theoretical continuity that comprehends the diversity 
(Hey, 1993).   The reason can be found in general perceptions of aid-recipient countries as a 
dependent variable and domestic politics of recipients as a constant.  The root of these 
perceptions can be found in the long dominating realist perspective in International Relations and 
in a political economic perspective that sees foreign policy as exchange.   As Morgenthau (1962, 
p. 305) bluntly states, ―as there are bums and beggars, so there are bum and beggar nations‖, but 
it seems that the simple concept that the poor always beg has been accepted without serious 
questioning of why they beg and what for. 
                                                 
30  The homogeneity of the Third World which has been assumed by the western theorists is partly responsible for 
the lack of Third World foreign policy studies. 
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2.3.2 Submission: The compliance model 
The foreign policy of recipient countries has mainly been approached from two conflicting 
perspectives: compliance and consensus.  The compliance school regards the foreign policy of an 
aid-receiving country to be a consequence of submission to donors.  On the other hand, the 
consensus school argues that it is a subconscious agreement by elites in aid-receiving countries 
who share the same value system with elites in donor countries.  However, the two mainstream 
explanations are not sufficient enough to account for foreign policy behaviour of aid-receiving 
countries.  Before suggesting an alternative framework that explains aid-seeking foreign policy 
of recipient countries, this section introduces the two mainstream schools of compliance and 
consensus.  
 
Dahl (1957, pp. 201-215) famously defined power as ―the capacity to get an actor to do that 
which it would not otherwise do.‖  In the sphere of international relations or political economy, 
this Dahlian formulation of power can be rephrased as an influence by nation A to comply nation 
B to choose a set of foreign policies which nation B would not otherwise do.  The asymmetric 
power relations between donor nations and recipient nations become the basis of a compliance 
model of recipient foreign policy.   For scholars who take foreign policy as ―an instrument of 
exchange‖ (Richardson & Kegley, 1980, p. 198), foreign aid is ―partial payment in exchange for 
the maintenance of benefits they derive from their economic ties to the dominant country‖ 
(Richardson, 1978, p. 64).  For scholars who take this position, aid has never been unconditional 
(Hayter, 1971).  Aid is merely ―a means to support a government and ensure its obedient 
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behaviour at the same time‖ (Payer, 1974, p. 31).  This perspective illustrates why studies of 
foreign policy of aid-recipient countries have been largely ignored in relation to those of aid 
donors.   
 
In the compliance model, also known as a bargaining model, international asymmetry is 
assumed. This assumption is based on the understanding of international politics as a 
continuation of conflicts over allocation of scarce resources (Reiter, 2003).  A compliance model 
depicts international relations as ―powerful nations [securing] the cooperation of weaker states 
chiefly through the use of reward and punishment behaviour‖ (Moon, 1983).  Regarding 
economic resources, economic aid is a major form of reward while economic sanction is a 
powerful tool of punishment.31   A country suffering from a lack of the money bargains to receive 
more, and to avoid receiving less.  As a result, the country is believed to choose foreign policy 
complying with what donor nations require.     
 
The assumption behind the compliance model was accepted by scholars and policy makers 
without systematic examination during the 1960s and 1970s.  Policy makers who believed in the 
possibility of a linkage between aid and a compliant foreign policy of recipient countries tried to 
use the linkage through manoeuvring aid allocation.  The belief is well expressed by Jean 
Kirkpatrick who was the first UN ambassador of the Reagan regime;  
We must communicate that it is not possible to denounce us on Monday, vote against us 
                                                 
31 Economic sanctions also have foreign policy objectives.   These could be as relatively modest as addressing 
human rights, or it could be as serious as enforcing surrender of territory as illustrated in the sanctions against the 
South African Apartheid regime to secure surrender of the control of Namibia. Economic sanctions have been also 
studied from the frame-work of a compliance model.  However, this thesis does not go deeper with the compliance 
model apropos economic sanctions since this is beyond its scope. 
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on important issues of principle on Tuesday and Wednesday, and pick up our assurances 
of support on Thursday and Friday. ... Voting behaviour should be one of the criteria we 
employ in deciding whether we will provide assistance. (The Washington Post, 1983, p. 
A14, quoted in Kegley & Hook, 1991) 
 
Based on this belief, the US Congress authorised the president to limit aid to non-compliers in 
1986.   
 
However, from the 1980s, scholars began to examine the broadly assumed compliance model on 
both the empirical and theoretical levels, and reached a general agreement that the correlation 
between foreign aid and foreign policy compliance is very weak (Rai, 1980;  Richardson, 1981; 
Armstrong, 1981; Moon, 1983; Moon, 1985).  In order to examine the plausibility of the 
compliance model, researchers mainly employed economic aid, military assistance and trade 
dependence as indicators and compared the correlations based on the degree to which donors and 
recipients voted identically in the United Nations General Assembly roll-call voting.  Kegley and 
Hook (1991) tested the efficacy of the aid allocating policy of the Reagan administration and 
pointed out that UN voting coincidence rate was dropped after the adoption of the quid-pro-quo 
strategy.  According to their analysis, the aid strategy ―vociferously announced‖ by the UN 
ambassador from the US in 1986, led to defiance by aid recipients rather than deference.  
 
 It is now generally accepted that there are no, or, at best, very feeble links between aid and 
compliant foreign policy as shown in Kegley and Hook‘s findings.  Moon (1985) also asserts that 
any link is dubious both theoretically and empirically.  Theoretically, the central assumptions of 
the model require sufficient flexibility in ‗conditioning tools‘ in both aid-giving and receiving 
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countries.  In other words, for the compliance model to work in practice, policy makers of both 
countries must have enough room to respond to and to re-draft foreign policy.  However, such 
flexibility requires an absence of constraints in internal policy making, which is hardly likely for 
both countries.32   Empirically, for the model to be cross-sectionally valid, a country which 
receives more aid should show a higher compliance level.  To be longitudinally valid, a recipient 
should show more compliant foreign policy behaviour during the time when a country receives 
more aid.  However, various empirical tests show the absence of both cases (Moon, 1983).  
 
In addition, UN voting patterns are not sufficient to examine a country‘s foreign policy 
behaviours.   There are various other foreign policy decisions that are more important than the 
UN voting pattern.   Also, as the Dahlian formation of power suggests, in order to prove 
―coercion‖, one needs to prove that the recipient country would not have voted in the same way 
as its donor unless aid was granted; in practice, this requirement would be difficult to meet.  In 
addition, it is not correct to classify the same voting pattern as being coerced or compliant just 
because they happen to coincide.  If the recipient country makes the decision for what it feels are 
its own good reasons then this is not an example of coercion by external powers.  A seemingly 
simple voting pattern contains many and complicated deciding factors and so any examination of 
what influences foreign policy requires complex and multi-dimensional approaches. 
                                                 
32 Even though it is generally accepted that decision makers in aid-receiving countries face less severe constraints in 
policy making than those in aid-giving countries with established bureaucratic structures, varied opposition political 
parties and active participation of civil societies, they also are not free from internal constraints in policy making.  
However, asserting that policy influence is not reliant on democratic processes, Moon (1985, p.304) adds that 
―leaders in Third World must spend more, not less, of their time and resources trying to remain in power; the 
constraints they face are in some way more severe than those in stable constitutional democracies‖ given coalition 
maintenance and ever-present potential coups. 
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Nevertheless, withdrawing foreign aid is often used by the international donor community to 
punish recipient countries engaged in wars or committing crimes against humanity.  In 2012, 
when the United Nations became aware of the Rwandan government‘s backing of the military 
rebel group M23 in the Democratic Republic Congo, most international donor countries 
including the US, Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands instantly froze their foreign aid to 
Rwanda.33  Even though recipient countries vehemently see this manoeuvring of aid-giving as a 
―child-to-parent relationship‖ in the words of Rwandan Foreign Minister (Miriri, 2012), it seems 
that aid donors still like to use, or like to think of, aid as a stick for correcting the misbehaving 
aid-recipients.   
   
 
2.3.3 Consensus: Voluntary agreement between elites  
In contrast to the compliance model, the consensus model finds the cause of dependent foreign 
policy in collaboration between foreign policy makers in recipients and donor countries.  The 
consensus model borrows its frame of analysis from dependency theory.  As in the compliance 
model, dependency theory also assumes ―relational asymmetry‖ between nations (Duvall, 1978, 
p. 51).    However, instead of looking at a state as a unit of analysis, dependency theory looks 
into the state and finds classes resulting in international structural dependency.  According to 
Cardoso and Faletto (1979, p. 140),  
There is no such thing as a metaphysical relation of dependency between one nation and 
                                                 
33 The affected amount of aid from the US, German, the UK, and the Netherlands was $0.2  million, €21 million, 
€16 million, and €5 million, respectively. 
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another, one state and another.  Such relations are made concrete possibilities through the 
existence of a network of interests and interactions which link certain social groups to 
other social groups, certain classes to other classes.   
 
In the same vein, Wallerstein‘s (1974) world system theory divides states into core, semi-
periphery and periphery, but more importantly he stresses that each state has its own core class 
which manipulates state policies for its own economic benefit.  Galtung (1971), one of the 
founders of the dependency theory, explains that the world consists of the Centre (dominating 
countries) and the Periphery (dominated countries), and each part of the world has its own centre 
(dominating class) and periphery (dominated class).  Certain international political economic 
phenomena such as conflicts or cooperation are not between states but between classes in 
different states.  Taking imperialism as an example, it was the ―joint benefit‖ of the centres both 
in the Centre and the Periphery (Galtung, 1971, p.81). 34  The special link between the centre 
classes generates deep reaching structural distortions in a dependent country, since the centre in 
the Periphery shares common interests and perceptions with the centre in the Centre more than it 
does with the periphery in the Periphery.   
 
Foreign policy scholars adopted this framework into the consensus model to explain the foreign 
policy of aid-receiving countries.  According to Moon (1983; 1985), who pioneered the 
application of this dependency/dependencia model to foreign policy behaviour of dependent 
countries, the elites or foreign policy decision makers in a dependent country share values, 
                                                 
34  Galtung asserts that this perspective should be differentiated from that of Marxist-Leninism.  Dependency 
theorists look at ―structural relationship‖ produced by two collectivities-the centres in the Centre and the Periphery.  
However, to Marx-Leninists, imperialism is an ―economic relationship‖ which was brought about from the greed of 
capitalists wanting to expand their market, i.e. from the centre to the periphery (p.81). 
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perceptions, and interests with the elites in the donor country, where they were often educated, 
send their children to, have bank accounts in, and receive news from.  They have more in 
common with those donor elites than with the masses in their own aid-receiving nation.  Thus, 
the elites in a dependent country come to favour foreign policy directions in accordance with the 
foreign policy of a donating country for this is beneficial for them and they share a similar value 
system.  This process is free from coercion, but, from the perspective of the consensus model, 
produces insidious dependency. 
 
Even though the compliance model and consensus model are the two main approaches 
concerning dependent foreign policy, these are insufficient to explain various patterns of foreign 
policy in aid-receiving countries.  Hay (1993, p.551) points out that an attempt to generalize 
dependent foreign policy behaviour within these two frameworks is not only incorrect but also 
―condescending‖.  Both models share the same assumption that the most decisive, if not the only, 
driving factor of recipient foreign policy is the simple fact of being dependent.  However, if 
dependency is the decisive factor guiding the directions of dependent foreign policy, then foreign 
policy among the aid-receiving countries would be expected to show a common pattern; 
however, this is not the case.  Also, elites are not homogeneous and have differing interests; thus, 
one cannot simply assume that dependent foreign policy purely represents the interests or value 
system of the elites (Evans, 1979).  Furthermore, a large part of the dependent foreign policy is 
not aligned with the foreign policy of the aid-giving country; this discrepancy cannot be 
explained by either the compliance model or the consensus model.  Foreign policy of aid-
receiving countries simply does not always accord with that of donor countries.  Elites in 
recipient countries sometimes deliberately choose an opposing foreign policy for their own 
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survival in local politics and in order to appease their public who are frustrated by their country‘s 
dependent situation or to offset the consequences of economic dependence.  Hey (1993, pp.549-
551) categorizes these two different types of foreign policy divergence as i) counterdependence 
and ii) compensation.  Counterdependence indicates anti-core foreign policy making in 
dependent countries which intends to demonstrate frustration among core-unfriendly policy 
makers and to offset the consequences of economic dependence.  Compensation is in line with 
counterdependence as it also refers to anti-core foreign policy, but it differs because policy 
makers reluctantly choose to go against a dominating country to please the domestic public even 
though they themselves are core-friendly.  Moreover, some foreign policy decisions fall outside 
any considerations of economic dependence or the relations with dominating nations.  In many 
cases, a political leader‘s personal style or world view, the dynamics of domestic interest groups 
and a nation‘s historical development play more dominant roles in foreign policy making than 
the simple fact of being an aid recipient.  
 
 
 
2.4 Mercantilist aid-directed foreign policy 
The two views of compliance and consensus do not sufficiently explain foreign policy of aid-
receiving countries.  There still is a gap in studies on a recipient‘s foreign policy, such as when to 
seek foreign aid, reasons for inclining toward a specific donor, and how and where to use aid.  
These decisions are affected by domestic factors as well as international constraints or 
opportunities.  The bargaining power of aid receiving countries grows even bigger when they 
deal with aid issues than when they discuss other international affairs in general.  Indeed, 
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according to White (1974), recipient countries play a decisive role in many foreign aid policy 
decisions.  Easterly (2001, p.117) also notes that ―surprisingly enough, the impoverished 
recipients are in the driver‘s seat during negotiations over disbursement of aid loans‖; after all, 
international donors or lenders are not usually eager to declare the failure of their disbursement 
as this might cause embarrassment.  Both parties are aware of the situation and so, a recipient‘s 
demand for more loans or aid has more leverage than often acknowledged.   Today, especially 
with emergences of alternative less traditional donors, such as China and India, in the 
international political economy, the leverage of recipients at the aid negotiation table is even 
greater than before (Frynas, 2007, p. 250).  Therefore, the study of foreign policy of aid-
recipients or Global South requires novel analytical tools that incorporate elements of colonial 
and post-colonial history, International Political Economy and International Relations as well as 
traditional approaches to foreign policy analysis.  Thus, the thesis introduces mercantilism as an 
alternative view to examine aid-seeking foreign policy of recipient countries. 
 
As noted in Chapter one, mercantilism in the thesis is approached from dual dimensions; first, it 
is a practice of foreign policy behaviour that a state seeks wealth as a primary means to secure its 
survival; and second, it is rationality that elites adopt in search of the wealth and power of their 
own.  Much of the literature uses the former approach in understanding mercantilism.  However, 
in literature on mercantilism, the definitions and ranges of application do not always accord.  In 
fact, the meaning of mercantilism ―turned some sharp corners‖ and in the course lost the 
continuity of interpretation, the application of mercantilism became too broad to mean anything 
in particular (Wilson, 1957, p. 181).   For instance, mercantilism in economics means trade 
supremacy in the national economy, while mercantilism in Marxism or in neo-Marxism refers to 
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―the ideology of the monopoly trading companies‖ (Coleman, 1980, p. 780).  In current 
international politics, the US government often uses the term ―mercantilist policy‖ to criticize 
China‘s approach to Africa‘s oil supplies (Luo, 2013, p. 55).  However, these definitions of 
mercantilism are based on a ―political caricature‖ rather than analytical categorisation (Sautman 
& Yan, 2006. p.64).   
 
This section of the thesis reviews the development of mercantilism which becomes a framework 
explaining state behaviour and, at the same time, rationale of elites‘ decision in the thesis.  In 
political economy, mercantilism refers to the supremacy of the state over the economy.  
According to Schmoller, mercantilism is the synonym of ―state-making‖ (Gray, 1931, p. 69).  
Even though there might be slight differences in the definition of mercantilism depending on the 
sub-schools: classical mercantilism, economic nationalism, the German Historical School, 
statism, and neo-protectionism, the common and absolute feature in mercantilism is a strong 
state (Gilpin, 1987; O‘Brien & William, 2010).  According to Viner (1958, p.286), mercantilism, 
regardless of the time and place, has the following propositions: (1) wealth is an absolutely 
essential means to power, whether for security or for aggression; (2) power is essential or 
valuable as a means to the acquisition or retention of wealth; (3) wealth and power are both 
proper ultimate ends of national policy; and (4) there is long-term harmony between these ends, 
although in some circumstances it might be necessary for a time to make economic sacrifices in 
the interests of military security and long-term prosperity.   
 
Mercantilism is fundamentally different from two other main principles in political economy: 
economic liberalism and economic socialism/structuralism.  Economic liberalists base their 
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theory on the Ricardian assumption that free trade maximizes comparative advantages and the 
mutual benefits of participants.  For liberalists, the market is the most efficient mechanism for 
the well-being of rational individuals.  The less government influence, the closer the state 
progress to utopia since economic liberalism is based on the assumption that ―economics is 
progressive and politics is retrogressive‖ (Gilpin & Gilpin, 1987).  In contrast, economic 
socialists/structuralists argue that the relative gains which economic liberalists take as grounds 
for cooperation are the very source of conflict.  In structuralism, class is a unit of analysis, and 
society and the world should be regarded ―in relation to the structure of production which creates 
owners of means of production (the bourgeoisie) and labourers who sell their labour power to the 
bourgeoisie (the workers)‖ (O‘Brien & Williams, 2004, p. 25).  Thus, the working class should 
break their connection with the core, both domestically and internationally, in order to free itself 
from structural exploitation.   
 
In contrast to structuralism, even though the thesis looks at the dual levels of state and elite in 
explaining mercantilism, in most mercantilism literature the unit of analysis is the state.  Also, in 
contrast to the economic liberalist view that the state exists for the market, mercantilists argue 
that the market exists for the state.  Early mercantilists between the 15th to 18th century in Europe 
considered the power of the state as ―the sole or overwhelming preponderant end of foreign 
policy‖ and they valued wealth as ―a necessary means‖ to attaining power (Viner, 1958, p. 
277),35 while later mercantilists take a more eclectic position than the pioneers.  According to 
Heckscher (1935), power is not the only end in mercantilism: wealth can also be an end.  
                                                 
35   This orthodox form of mercantilism in the nineteenth century can be read from German scholars such as 
Schmoller (1898) or English historians such as William Cunningham (1903). 
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Moreover, power can even be the means to obtaining more national wealth.  Today, it seems that 
mercantilism is still most preferred state practices as a British diplomat confesses that the 
interests of diplomats ―typically, and by inherited tradition, take the form of a hierarchy of 
priorities where security—the requirement to secure the state and its population—ranks at the 
top, followed by economic interests‖ (Ross, 2011, p. 141).  With this background, the rest of this 
section overviews the historical development of mercantilism from the original emergence of 
mercantilism: classical mercantilism, industrial mercantilism, and neo-mercantilism.   
 
 
2.4.1 Classical mercantilism 
Classical mercantilism or financial mercantilism refers to a belief that ―it is always better to sell 
goods to others than to buy goods from others, for the former brings a certain advantage and the 
latter inevitable damage‖ (Johann Becher, quoted in Galbraith, 1987, p. 39).  This was the 
dominating idea during the classical mercantilist era.  Even though there have been many debates 
on the historical timetable of mercantilism,36 it is generally agreed that mercantilism emerged 
between the decline of feudalism and the emergence of the Industrial Revolution in Europe in 
1780 (Canterbery, 2001).  During this time, nation-states began to form, and their main concern 
was ensuring their security and power.  Thus, merchants (the term mercantilism has its 
etymology in the Italian word for merchant) were expected to collect as much gold as possible in 
                                                 
 
36 The economic historian, D.C. Coleman (1980, p. 780) finds the emergence of merchant capitalists ―exercising 
sway over government‖ responsible for the emergence of mercantilism.  According to his timetable, mercantilism in 
England emerged in 1713, whereas in Western Europe it emerged at various times after the demise of the feudal 
economy.  
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order for the government to secure military capacity needed for war, to produce or buy weapons 
and soldiers.  During this period, war was a major source of expenditure in the public budget 
(Galbraith, 1987).  Mercantilism also refers to ―a period of history when newly emerging nation-
states faced problems of security‖ (Balaam & Veseth, 2005, p. 29).  Even though there were 
disparities in the economic policies of European countries, the underlying idea was the same: the 
government controlled the economy for the sake of the survival of a nation.   
 
The policies of classical mercantilism included promoting production, exporting domestic goods, 
limiting domestic consumption of exportable goods, and placing tariffs on imported goods to 
create a favourable balance of payments.  It sought maximising exports while minimising 
imports, thus precious metals such as gold and silver could be earned and retained.  Newly 
established nation states needed money to expand military force to ensure their security and 
independence.  However, gold, the currency of the day, was scarce except in Spain which was 
enjoying a surfeit of gold from Latin America.   
 
  
2.4.2 Industrial mercantilism 
The first wave of mercantilism died out at the start of the Industrial Revolution; a new type of 
mercantilism emerged with the Industrial Revolution.  As the economy of Britain grew bigger 
and more powerful, other nations such as the US and Germany felt threatened by the expanding 
economic liberalism of Britain and began to adopt new mercantilist policies.  This time the focus 
of policies was not obtaining more gold.  It was on achieving internal development of the 
national economy through ‗manufacturing‘.  Those countries looked for the key to their survival 
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in industrialisation of the domestic economy.  This new generation of mercantilism in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth century is known as industrial mercantilism or economic nationalism.  
The two most famous proponents of this school were Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List.  
Hamilton‘s Report on Manufactures showed the priority given to manufacturing over commerce: 
It must be less in a nation of mere cultivators, than in a nation of cultivators and 
merchants; less in a nation of cultivators and merchants, than in a nation of cultivators, 
artificers and merchants (Hamilton, 1791). 
 
Hamilton‘s argument was based on Lockean political philosophy of the political virtue of 
acquisition; thus, wealth was the common good and welfare of a nation was plausible through 
manufacturing and some government intervention (Frisch, 1991, pp. 41-52).  Industrial 
mercantilism includes state support for infant industries and sacrifices for the national interest 
and future gain, both of which have their advantages and disadvantages.  Industrial mercantilism 
seemed to focus on economic growth rather than hostility towards other countries; nevertheless, 
it was argued that to some extent, over-production beyond the absorbable level of domestic 
markets and over-competition among the mercantilist countries were responsible for the 
subsequent imperialism and two World Wars. 
 
 
2.4.3 Neo-mercantilism 
The criticism that mercantilist competition brought about much human sufferings and the 
economic damage of the World Wars led to the creation of international institutions for deeper 
international economic integration: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO).  Explicit and overt mercantilist policies such as manipulation 
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of tariffs and quotas were banned by the new institutions.  Due to the international atmosphere 
and the regulations imposed on each country, the views of economic liberals seemed to be 
accepted; free trade stops wars by increasing inter-dependency among states and benefits people 
through win-win economic gains.  However, international norms and local interest groups with 
increasing voice are not always aligned.  Thus, states started to craft new polices that seemed less 
like the hostile classical mercantilist.  The new set of policies is known as neo-mercantilism and 
takes many forms such as ―the desire for a balance-of-payments surplus; the export of 
unemployment, inflation, or both; the imposition of import and/or export controls; the expansion 
of world market shares; and the stimulation of advanced technology‖ (Gilpin, 1975, p. 46).   
 
Economic liberalists argue that these neo-mercantilist policies are as harmful as those of the 
classical mercantilist.  Neo-mercantilist policies aim at passing onto other countries the costs of a 
state‘s domestic social interventions, and thus undermine the interests of other counties.  For 
instance, the cost of boosting local agricultural industry in the US and the European Union (EU) 
passes on costs to the farmers in developing countries.  For economic liberalists, neo-
mercantilism is still a ―profoundly disruptive force in international relations‖ (Malmgren, 1971, 
p. 119). 
 
In contrast to the economic liberalists‘ perspective, the proponents of neo-mercantilism claim 
that there is not proof that mercantilism causes wars between nations.  Buzan (1984, p. p.610) 
explains that even though some degree of economic inefficiency and territorialism is unavoidable 
in mercantilism, there is no evidence that neo-mercantilist protectionism for self-reliance leads to 
politically aggressive policies.  Scholars favouring neo-mercantilism argue that any 
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misunderstandings of neo-mercantilism stem from an inability to distinguish benign and 
malevolent mercantilism.  According to (Gilpin, 1987, pp. 31-34) who first drew the distinction 
between the two mercantilisms, both entail a form of protectionism but benign mercantilism 
entail the consideration of economic welfare and political stability at a local level.  It contrasts to 
malevolent mercantilism which aims at enlarging state power by decreasing the power of others, 
as in the Nazi economic expansion toward eastern Europe in the 1930s.  However, it should be 
noted that both can have the same form and the main difference is the matter of the motive 
behind the policies.         
 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter‘s focus was aid-seeking foreign policy of recipient countries.  As background, the 
chapter began with a brief overview of literature on foreign aid.  Mainstream foreign aid 
literature in International Relations has been dealing with foreign aid from a donor-oriented 
perspective.  For instance, the intention of aid giving has seen the relatively systematic 
development of theories, such as military gain, commercial benefits and altruism.  On the other 
hand, foreign policy of recipient countries or reasons for aid-seeking has rarely been addressed.  
Even though there are two main views, submission and consensus, that have been applied to 
explain aid-recipient foreign policy, these approaches do not fully elucidate aid-seeking foreign 
policy of recipient states.  Thus, the thesis suggested mercantilism as an alternative tool to 
explain recipients‘ foreign aid policy.  Mercantilism takes wealth and power as two ultimate 
goals of a state for the survival of a state.  When mercantilism is applied to an aid-seeking state, 
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therefore, it can be translated as a state seeking foreign aid because otherwise the state would be 
less likely to politically survive.  However, this thesis sees another layer of mercantilism: elite‘s 
perspectives to mercantilism.  A state seeks foreign aid because otherwise the elite think they 
would be less likely to politically survive, and thus they use the practice and rationale of 
mercantilism for their own survival. To understand, the elite aspect of mercantilism, the next 
chapter investigates ‗the elite‘ and its relationship to aid and especially aid independence.  
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Chapter 3 Elites in aid-recipient states  
Elites matter in aid independence and aid dependence.  More precisely, what elites think of 
foreign aid matters in aid (in)dependence.  The thesis researches the elite perspective on foreign 
aid through the event of foreign policy change towards foreign aid and examines the 
consequences.  In the previous chapter, the literature on foreign aid policy was reviewed.  Based 
on that background, this chapter examines the role of elites in foreign aid policy and especially in 
aid (in)dependence.  This chapter begins with a brief overview of elite literature.  Then, it 
examines the role of elites in foreign policy making and aid independence, and in that sense this 
part of the chapter becomes the rationale of the argument in the thesis.  The subsequent part of 
the chapter investigates ideas that influence elites in Korea in the 1960s and in Ghana in the 
1980s; thus providing background for the following chapters that deal with the case studies on 
Korea and Ghana. 
 
 
 
3.1 A brief review of the classics in elite studies 
The term elite came from the Latin eligere, which means ‗to elect‘ (Brezis & Temin, 2008, p. 1).  
Élite, as a word, was first used in the seventeenth century to refer to commodities of excellence, 
and the usage was later extended to social groups with superiority (Bottomore, 1964, p. 7).  
During the time of the normative elitism of Plato, elite rule was taken for granted, and thus, for a 
long time it was not a subject of analytical examination.  It was in the late nineteenth and the 
early twentieth century when the elite became a subject of political analysis thanks to the seminal 
works of scholars in the Italian school.  According to Vilfredo Pareto (1935) and Gaetano Mosca 
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(1939) who are ―the classical founders of the notion of the elite‖ (Jones, 1970, p. 103)37. it is 
inevitable for any population to fall into two strata and the influence and power of the minority 
group at the top is bigger, stronger and more important.  Mosca (1939, p. 50) asserts that 
throughout the political history of mankind, every political organisation has shown the obvious 
phenomenon of the co-existence of two classes: ―a class that rules and a class that is ruled.‖  The 
emergence of a ruling class is as natural as that of a political society and a small ruling class has 
the merit of simply being small: they are more efficient in communicating.  Every political 
organism has one individual at the top and that person needs an organised minority to control the 
unorganised masses.    
 
Instead of Mosca‘s ruling class, Pareto uses the term ―elite‖.  Pareto‘s elite includes a range of 
people wider than Mosca‘s.  Pareto‘s elite is subdivided into two: non-governing elite and 
governing elite.  The latter overlaps with Mosca‘s political ruling class and the former is 
insignificant in politics.  Both Mosca and Pareto view human history as a continuous repetition 
of the two classes.  The minority shares real and/or symbolic merits or influence and these 
common attributes separate them from the majority.  What has changed is only the appearance of 
the ruling minority elite group.  In primitive society, warriors were the minority elite.  In a 
hereditary society, birth is the criterion to define a member of ruling class, and in a society where 
a religion has great influence, religious leaders share the attributes and economic and political 
merits of a ruling class.  As civilisation progressed, the main attribute of the ruling classes 
                                                 
37 Parry (1969, pp. 30-63) includes Michels in a list of classic writers in elitist thought along with Pareto and Mosca.  
According to Parry, Michels was a disciple of Mosca and shared with him a similar organisational approach in 
studying the elite which differed from Pareto‘s psychological approach.  Therefore, this part of the thesis does not 
include Michels‘ work in depth. 
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transformed from being brave to being rich. 
 
The classical elitism of the Italian school is succeeded by Mills (1956) who pioneers modern 
elitism.  However, unlike classic elitists who describe the elite as great men or as men who 
achieved success, Mills finds the cause of the division between the ruling class and the ruled in 
the political and economic structure.  According to Mills (1956, p. 3), elites, whose decisions 
―mightily affect the everyday worlds of ordinary men and women‖, occupy high hierarchies of 
three major institutions: governments, corporations, and the army.  The leading men in high 
positions of each domain are not separate but tend to be interlocking resulting in forming the 
‗power elite‘, a cohesive minority group in whose hands is concentrated the power to make 
national decisions through institutions.   
 
Since Mills‘ work of looking at the three domains to identify elites, the attempts to clarify the 
definition of elite more precisely and, at the same time, subdivide the ruling class have been 
continued by thinkers such as Putnam (1976) and Dahrendorf (1979).  Putnam (1976, pp. 3-4), 
who develops Mills‘ modern elitism in the 1970s, refers to the common arguments shared in the 
three classic text on elite scholarship: The Ruling Class of Mosca (1939), The Mind and Society 
of Pareto (1935), and Political Parties of Michels (1962) who was a student of Mosca.  The 
arguments are as follows: ―(1) political power, like other social goods, is distributed unequally; 
(2) essentially, people fall into only two groups - those who have significant political power and 
those who have none; (3) the elite is internally homogeneous, unified, and self-conscious; (4) the 
elite is largely self-perpetuating and is drawn from a very exclusive segment of society, and; (5) 
the elite is essentially autonomous.‖   According to Putnam‘s analysis, classic elitist thinkers 
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share the basic assumption that a society inevitably has the elite that rule, in contrast to the 
masses who are ruled.  Moreover, the elite share important similarities that bind them together 
and differentiate them from the masses.  Putnam (1976, pp.115-121) divided the elites in three 
brackets based on their attitudes: consensual, competitive, and coalescent. In a similar attempt, 
Dahrendorf (1979, pp. 229-231), in a study of the German elite, lists four different types: 
authoritarian, totalitarian, liberal, and cartel elite based on their social position and political 
attitudes.38  However, he also suggests the power elite in Germany as one unit of ―a set of 
perhaps two or three thousand men (for there are few women among them), which, while it is 
stratified considerably within itself—nowhere is the drop of power as steep as its peaks—
represents as a whole what may be called the German power elite‖ (p. 219). 
 
Later, Field and Higley (1980) and Field and Higley (2001) revive and extend the modern elitism 
studies and establish a new elite paradigm which distinguishes between unified elite and dis-
unified elite.  That new elite paradigm suggests that unified elite are essential for institutional 
stability.  The unified elite contribute to a successful and representative democratic government 
by creating political stability.  On the other hand, disunity within elite results in political 
instability (Field & Higley, 1980).  According to Burton and Higley (2001, p.8 & p.82), who 
defined elite as ―persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful 
organisations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly 
and substantially‖, the transformation of political elites becomes ―the fulcrum for fundamental 
                                                 
38 High coherent social position with uniform political attitudes produces authoritarian elite, while low coherent 
social position with uniform political attitudes produces totalitarian elite.  Liberal elite are the result of high coherent 
social position with multiform political attitudes (Dahrendorf, 1979, pp. 229-231). 
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policy change‖.   
 
Throughout the history of its study, the term ―elite‖ was value-loaded.  When the study of elite 
began, Pareto noted that the masses had zero political power in contrast to the governing political 
elites.  Studies placed great emphasis on social, political and economic inequality (Mills, 1956; 
Zeitlin, 1989; Useem, 1984).  Today‘s political system allows the masses more power to 
influence and participate in decision-making.  However, elections can only determine which 
particular elite rules but the fact that power is in the hand of the elite, instead of the people in 
general, does not alter.  No matter what the political system is power and resources are always 
unequally allocated in favour of the elite.  The elite are well informed and have direct power to 
make decisions.  In most cases, the general public is excluded from national secrets in the name 
of the national interest, or is even punished for accessing or spreading the information.39  The 
most critical information is only for the elite.  The elite have an almost exclusive access to such 
information and can make decisions based on that information.  With the exclusive information, 
the elite exert absolute power and influence in foreign policy making and economic growth.  In 
what follows, the thesis looks at elite-focused approaches in explaining foreign policy and 
economic growth as well as opposing views. 
 
 
                                                 
39 The cases of Edward Snowden and Bradly Manning are good examples of the exclusivity of national information 
and the consequences of its violation.  Snowden, a former computer specialist in the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) in the US, fled from his home country and sought asylum in Russia for disclosing government secrets on mass 
surveillance in 2013.  The same year Manning, a former US soldier, was sentenced for 35 years for leaking restricted 
documents including a video clip of the 2007 Baghdad Airstrike. 
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3.2 Why Elites? 
3.2.1 Elites in foreign policy  
The answer to the question of who makes foreign policy varies depending on schools in 
International Relations.  This section first briefly introduces the two main views in International 
Relations regarding the issues: realism and pluralism.  A realist school argues that an external 
threat to the existence of a state is the most important agent of foreign policy change.  Even 
though Waltz (1996, p. 54) asserted famously that ―international politics is not foreign policy‖, 
the two realist approaches of balance of power and balance of threat, help to explain a state‘s 
change in foreign policy.  However, there are different sub-schools of realism with different 
diagnoses.  For offensive realists, foreign policy activities are ―the record of nervous states 
jockeying for position within the framework of a given systemic power configuration.‖  In 
contrast, defensive realists see foreign policy as ―the record of rational states reacting to clear 
system incentives‖ (Rose, 1998, p. 150).  Nonetheless, the common ground within the school of 
realism is that pressure from the international system is the real agent of foreign policy change; 
states are the sole actors and foreign policy changes take place when a state responds to external 
threats or incentives (Wohlforth, 2008).   
 
One should acknowledge that realists focus on conflicts between states and their system-level 
analyses have helped to understand broad historical trends of wars.  However, no war is 
explainable ―without direct reference to the decision making of individual leaders‖ (Renshon & 
Renshon, 2008, p. 511).  In addition, if external pressure is the most critical factor that shapes 
foreign policy, most less-influential countries should show a similar pattern in foreign policy, 
which is far from what is observed in practice.  A country reacts differently under similar 
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external pressure.  In other words, the international system is not decisive or sufficient enough to 
affect the foreign policies of individual countries.  Rather, along with different domestic 
environments, different dynamics in elite groups render diverse foreign policy under similar 
international pressure.  What realists see is foreign policy made and carried out in the name of 
and on behalf of the state.  It is elite who make and execute the foreign policy. 
 
Pluralism does not agree with the realists‘ account either.  According to the pluralist idea, there is 
no system or no single powerful stratum that decisively affects decision-making.  Instead, several 
agents in society drive foreign policy.  They see foreign policy as ―the culmination of inputs from 
various units in society‖ involving nongovernmental and societal actors (Akokpari, 2005, p. 
183).  Collective action of interest groups or lobbyists is regarded as having an influence on 
policies in general, including foreign policy (Olson & Olson, 1965, pp.135-164).  Allison (1971) 
who pioneered a systematic pluralist approach explains that participating agents range from the 
rational calculations of government leaders and organisations to bureaucratic politics.  Rose 
(1998) places more emphasis on the domestic dimension of the plural agents and gives them the 
name of innenpolitik which encompasses agents from internal politics and economic ideology to 
partisan politics.  
 
Among those multiple actors, the mass media is often regarded as one of the most influential 
actors.  Those who are holding high positions in this industry are also regarded as non-ruling 
elites (Brezis & Temin, 2008, p. 1).  Their influence has been called ―the CNN effect‖, coined by 
Eachs and Livingston (1995, p.413), meaning ―elite decision makers‘ loss of policy control to 
news media.‖  Referring to media coverage of the US intervention in Somalia in 1992, Eachs and 
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Livingston (1995) argue that the eventual foreign policy decisions were a result of not just 
diplomatic and bureaucratic operations but also news coverage in the mass media.  It is generally 
acknowledged that news coverage on global real-time television in the early 1990s, showing the 
suffering in Iraq and Somalia, prompted US interventions (Robinson, 2002, pp.7-9).  The rapid 
speed of technological advance is also credited for the so-called Arab Spring which began in 
2010.  The advanced information technology of videophones and wireless telephony has the 
ordinary person participating in a new form of journalism, which is known as ―the CNN effect 
plus‖ (Livingston, 2003).  According to the pro-media schools, the evolution of information 
technology and increase in public participation has placed the media and public in the position of 
agenda setters and therefore foreign policy officials need to be in a reactive position.  
 
However, the extent to which the media influence foreign policy making is ambiguous.40  The 
―CNN effects‖ work only in limited areas of foreign policy.  Missiles and dying babies can make 
good pictures but multi-lateral trade negotiations do not.  The foreign policy area is very broad 
and includes politics, economics, environment, multi-lateral cooperation, cross-border 
management, and the like, but CNN has a powerful effect in only a few emotive areas.  In 
addition, Bennett (1990, pp.116-121) argues that the reverse is true.  It is not the media which set 
the foreign policy agenda; the government and state elite use the media to spread their agenda.  
He argues that government officials draw the lines initially and the media follow them.  In 
Manufacturing Consent, Hermann and Chomsky (1988) assert that the media follow the lead of 
                                                 
40 The media is a target of strong lobby groups as are policy makers.  Thus, foreign policy makers and the media are 
under the influence of the same lobby groups, and it cannot always be said that media coverage influences a foreign 
policy agenda.   
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government and are being used as a means of propaganda.   
 
In sum, the pluralistic approach is not sufficient to explain foreign policy behaviour despite the 
fact that it adds some insights to the simplistic realist explanation of foreign policy.  Even though 
various factors in domestic, international and cultural levels can influence foreign policy 
decisions, as Hermann (2001, p. 47) points out, those influences are ―necessarily channelled 
through the political apparatus of government that identifies, decides and implements foreign 
policy.‖   Even though a number of pluralists make attempts to measure the impact of public 
opinion and non-ruling elites such as the new media and academics (Powlick, 1995; Kreps, 
2010), their role and influence is at best limited.41   According to Kreps (2010) study on NATO-
led operations in Afghanistan, leaders do not respond to public unpopularity.  Rather, what 
determines foreign policy decisions, according to her, is elite consensus.   
 
In that sense, a seemingly pluralist system of foreign policy making is an illusion.42  Even though 
foreign policy making in most democratic system takes a form of inclusive policy-making 
through public hearings and complex administrative procedures, this does not mean that those 
are all taken into consideration in foreign policy decision making.   In reality, the ―black box‖ is 
                                                 
41 Powlick (1995) examines the communication between foreign policy officials and the public and finds out that 
different public groups have different levels of communication with government.  The communication level of 
foreign policy by government with both the news media and elected officials was high whilst that with non-
governing elites such as academics and interest groups was low. 
 
42 Putnam (1976, pp. 6-7) distinguishes direct influence, indirect influence and spurious influence in deciding policy.  
Direct influence refers to actor A being one of the participants in the final policy decision process.  Indirect influence 
means that actor A influences actor B who directly decides policy.   Spurious influence takes place when actor B 
directly influences policy and at the same time the standpoint of actor A.   Even though it seems as if actor A 
influences policy due to the simultaneous change, it is only a coincidence and not the result of actor A‘s influence.  
Putnam argues that elites study should include direct and indirect influence but exclude spurious influence.   
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only accessible to a few, ―small minorities who appear to play an exceptionally influential part in 
political and social affairs‖, i.e. elites (Parry, 1969, p. 13).  The range of elite who are engaged 
with foreign policy making is even smaller than that of political elite in general.   As noted 
above, Mills (1956, p. 5) called them the ―power elite‖, referring to a higher circle of decision 
makers who rank above professional politicians.  Even though there are other theorists such as 
Lowi (1967, quoted in Zimmerman, 1973) who believe that elites involved in the foreign policy 
process are even smaller than the power elite, the fundamental belief of elitism is common: 
foreign policy is a process regulated and distributed by ―a polyarchy of elites‖ (Zimmerman, 
1973, p. 1211).  Later, Hermann and Hermann (1989) refer to the foreign policy elites as the 
―ultimate decision units‖, which Hermann (2001) later renames ―authoritative decision units.‖  
Usually, the presence of elites in foreign policy, a leader and his/her close advisors, are exposed 
in the time of national crisis.  When the US decided the drop nuclear bombs on Japan in World 
War II, the decision was made by a small number in the elite group despite objection from the 
US Congress.  The Cuban missile crisis was another example that disclosed the power elite of 
American foreign policy making in the Kennedy administration. The entourage of Kennedy led 
the foreign policy crisis with discretion over legitimate institutions (Allison, 1971).    
 
Foreign policy elites are comprised of two different groups: foreign policy officials and the 
political leader.  Literature on the role of the elite in foreign policy making is also mainly divided 
into two.  The first group of literature focuses more on the decision making process of foreign 
policy officials.  After Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962) proposed foreign policy decision-making 
as a new perspective in studying foreign policy, decision-makers and their subjective 
interpretations of the world became more important than objective reality of the world in 
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understanding state behaviour (Kuperman, 2006, p. 537).  The study of elites‘ interpretation soon 
became complemented with studies on decision-making processes such as bureaucratic politics 
and formal and collegial policy groups (George, 1980).   
 
On the other hand, presidential studies pay more attention to a leader at the top instead of 
decision-makers or their decision-making processes.   As Mosca (1939, p. 51) famously wrote, 
all political organisations consist of two classes: the class that rules and the class that is ruled, 
and there is a ―chief‖ at the top of the ruling classes who he identifies as,  
At times, alongside of the hereditary king or emperor there is a prime minister or major-
domo who wields an actual power that is greater than the sovereign‘s.  At other times, in 
place of the elected president the influential politician who has procured the president‘s 
election will govern.  Under special circumstances there may be, instead of a single 
person, two or three who discharge the functions of supreme control (p.51). 
 
Even though most presidential literature treats each president as unique from other presidents 
and therefore does not allow for theoretical generalisation (Mitchell, 2005, p. 182), in most cases 
it is common that the role of a leader at the top is decisive in foreign policy making.   
 
As an attempt to converge those two areas, Herman and others (2001, p. 83) investigate the cases 
when the decision unit of foreign policy making is a single individual leader, which they name ―a 
predominant leader.‖  They identify eight different leadership styles based on responsiveness to 
constraints and openness to information which lead to different foreign policy outcomes.43  As 
they illustrate, monarchs and authoritarian leaders are illustrations of predominant leaders 
                                                 
43 The eight types of leadership are as follows: expansionistic, evangelistic, incremental, charismatic, directive, 
consultative, reactive and accommodative (Hermann, et al., 2001, pp. 94-100). 
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(Hermann, et al., 2001, pp. 83-84). Prominent leaders are more likely to appear in a newly 
independent country, where institutions are yet to develop and the state is going through 
transition (Mintz & DeRouen Jr., 2010).  Considering the outcome of these researches, the role 
of two authoritarian leaders in newly independent countries, namely Park Chung-hee in Korea in 
1960s and Rawlings in the 1980s, was critically decisive in the foreign policy making of those 
countries. 
 
 
3.2.2 Elite, aid dependence and development  
 Foreign policy decision making is not the only area that elites play a decisive role in.  Aid 
independence cannot be achieved without a proper role of elites either.  Of course, it is hard to 
isolate the main causes for perpetual aid dependence since aid dependence is the outcome of 
endogenous and exogenous, as well as natural and man-made factors.   However, among the 
various factors, elites hold a special position because of the criticality of its role both in aid 
independence or perpetual aid dependence.  Bottomore (1964, p. 99) notes that despite 
distinctive features and problems that each underdeveloped country is facing, there are many 
important and common characteristics that they share.  One of the common features is that the 
political elite in those countries are ―pre-eminent in deciding the course of their development.‖44  
The elite play a decisive role in both aid independence and aid dependence.  Nevertheless, 
literature on the elite has not examined their role as a key element of the economic development 
process (DiCaprio, 2012, p. 1).  In what follows, the role of elite in aid dependence is introduced.  
                                                 
44 Bottomore classifies the elite in developing countries as either nationalist leaders, revolutionary intellectuals or 
military officers.   
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However, instead of focusing narrowly on literature on aid dependence or aid independence, this 
section includes literature on economic growth and poverty since there is only a thin range of 
literature regarding aid dependence.  In addition, in much contemporary literature, the term aid 
independence can be replaced with economic growth in the given context, and the term aid 
dependence is used synonymously with poverty or economic backwardness.  
 
Elites, in more literature on economic growth, are part of the problem rather than the part of 
solution.  In the 1970s, aid theorists and practitioners began to discuss the failure of the 
illusionary trickle-down effect, and they began to think that the elite kept the benefit of foreign 
aid unfairly instead of distributing it (Thérien, 2002).  Or more fundamentally, elites can stun 
economic growth by blocking the introduction of new technologies or economic change.   
According to a political-loser hypothesis by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, pp. 126-127), when 
adoption of new technologies is perceived as a threat to political power of the ruling elite, the 
elite block the adoption.  Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) later developed their hypothesis and 
introduced a ―political replacement effect‖ theory which explains why some countries adopt 
policies that cause economic backwardness and find the answer in the idea that elites hold.  All 
else being equal, elites adopt technologies that benefit society because they will increase future 
output and consequently revenue for elites.  However, when elites think certain technological 
changes would get the incumbent elite to be replaced, they will block the changes even when 
such changes benefit the national economy in general.  By doing so, elites establish ―extractive 
economic institutions‖ which are designed to extract wealth from the masses to the benefit of 
elites (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 76). 
 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
The negative perceptions of the role of the elite have a long history and the denunciations in 
many cases target the elite in Africa.   Critics of African elites argue that the new African elites 
merely replaced colonial rulers.  Since independence, or the handover, power in African politics 
has been concentrated in a few hands (Gillies & Joseph, 2009, p. 3).45  The elites in Africa, to 
bolster and maintain their own standard of living at the level of their European predecessors, 
―undertake half-hearted, loss making industrialisation‖ while soliciting large amounts of foreign 
loans and aid (Mbeki, 2009, p. 9).   Taylor (2012) argues that only ―gullible donors‖ believe that 
elites in Africa would channel aid toward national development.  According to Taylor, the 
African elite simply do not have any commitment to general national development as is evident 
from the fact that African political leaders die of natural causes abroad; the implication is that 
African elites prefer to obtain expensive Western medical service rather than investing in 
national development such as health care and improving the quality for the person in the street.46 
 
In other words, when elites fail, economic growth fails.  Therefore, Brezis & Temin (2008, p. 5) 
assert that ―a crucial element of economic growth is that the recruited elite be of the highest 
quality.‖  Elites make decisions on policies which become the basis of institutions.  That is why 
all major schools on economic development and aid dependence regard the elite as holding a 
special position.  In modernisation theory, the elite is at the centre of economic take-off since 
they plan industrialisation and secure international capital in lieu of an underdeveloped private 
                                                 
45 In most African countries, the existing elite were replaced after independence but the new elite inherited and 
exploited colonial institutions.  Thus, the elite is a crucial factor to explain institutional persistence (Robinson, 2012, 
p. 32). 
 
46 Since 2010, 12 African heads of state died of disease while they were in office.  Ten died abroad and the other two 
died on their way home from abroad. 
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sector.  In dependency theory, the elite are blamed as being part of the oppressing mechanism 
created by the West; elites are the exploiter of the national economy of the Third World.  In 
contrast, economic liberalism takes a less aggressive attitude toward the elite; nevertheless the 
elite are not desirable since they inhibit the entrepreneurship of the private sector.   How the 
abovementioned major schools regard elites in economic development has been discussed 
substantially in existing literature.   Instead, in what follows, two relatively new but widely 
accepted approaches on economic growth are briefly introduced in relation with an elite-oriented 
approach.  The first school attributes poverty to largely unavoidable factors, such as climate or 
geography, and the second school looks at culture as a detrimental factor in economic growth. 
 
First, a group of thinkers, represented by Jeffrey Sachs, think ―destiny factors‖, which human 
kind can hardly alter, play a decisive role in economic growth (World Bank, 2000b, p. 23).   
Those destiny factors which people usually just have to accept include location (whether a nation 
is landlocked or located in the middle of the desert or tropical forest), size of a nation, and 
extreme or irregular precipitation.  These factors have economic consequences such as higher 
transportation costs due to lack of access to the coast, a heavier government burden due to 
tropical disease outbreaks, and failure of crops (Sachs, 2005).  The destiny factor is also 
responsible for a low population density, which is often referred to as one of the factors that 
hinders Africa‘s economic take-off.   In the initial stage of economic growth, climatic conditions 
control population levels, through outbreaks of diseases or crop failures.  Africa and Latin 
America did not have large-enough populations to stress resources or to spur technological 
innovations.  Africa, even before slave trade, did not have enough population to cause population 
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pressure, and this shortage was aggravated by the slave trade. 47  When population density 
increases, people face limited productivity of the land and devise new technology to boost 
productivity and feed the people.  The idea of ‗population pressure‘ which is a term first coined 
by Ester Boserup, becomes the trigger of innovation and economic growth (Easterly, 2001).  Due 
to the lack of population, Africa failed to encounter the economic pressure for growth which took 
place in Europe and Asia.  Also, in the area of technological innovation, a low population has an 
adverse effect on economic growth since a low population density raises the costs of 
infrastructure (World Bank, 2000b).  Africa did not have a large enough population to create 
markets and domestic demand on a scale that encouraged industrialisation. 
 
The school of thought that emphasises destiny factors thus holds that unfavourable geography 
hinders development while favourable geography helped economic development in other parts of 
the globe.  The early development of the Western European countries with a significant 
population size is partly due to their location close to the sea and rivers.  That advantageous 
location helped them to expand maritime and riparian trade and stimulates them to develop the 
skills and technologies necessary for navigation, leading to technology advanced enough to 
colonize other continents (Baran, 1957).  Rodrigues-Clare (1996), even though he does not 
explicitly point out geographical factors and aid dependence per se, also takes geographical 
factors into consideration in his powerful argument of  the ―underdevelopment trap‖.  When a 
country with a small open economy is located geographically far from the large international 
                                                 
47 The estimated number of Africans sold as slaves varies from ten million to two hundred million due to the absence 
of precise data (Rodney, 1972).  Despite the uncertain number, the impact of the slave trade on Africa had an 
irreversible and regressive impact on its economy.   
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markets or suppliers, it is not attractive enough for foreign investors since the transportation 
costs are high.  Hence, the country fails to accumulate capital and consequently, the wage level 
remains low in a self-reinforcing underdevelopment trap.  This maintains constant poverty.    
 
However, even though it is true that tropical diseases cause a lot of human, agricultural, and 
livestock suffering, according to Acemoglu & Robinson (2012, pp. 48-56), the destiny factors are 
not the cause of poverty in the tropical region.  The gap between the poor countries and wealthy 
countries which took place in the 19th century in Europe was neither by divergent agricultural 
performance thanks to more favourable climate or geography nor by healthier people with longer 
life expectance.  Instead, the decisive cause that created the cleavage in the European continent 
was different attitudes of elites in dealing with new technology.  In contrast to England in the 17th 
century, elites in Russia and Austria-Hungary actively blocked the adoption of new technologies 
for industrialisation, such as railways, in fear of political destabilisation that was likely to be 
caused by industrialisation and urbanisation and chose to keep society agrarian (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012, pp. 222-226). Of course, members of any group of society can resist the 
introduction of new technologies when they perceive the technology as a threat to their own 
survival.  However, as the failure of the Luddites movement in Britain presents, any opposing 
group without political power to effectively block the dissemination of technology comes to fail 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 85).  It hinders economic progress only when elites with 
formidable political power form opposition against the introduction of new technology that is 
perceived as threat to their status quo political and economic power even if the technology can 
benefit society as a whole.  
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Culturalists also do not agree with the idea of the destiny school.  Harrison (1985, p. 1), who 
defines development as ―improvement in human well-being‖ sees increase in the creative 
capacity of all people as the way towards achieving development.  According to him, other 
factors such as natural endowments, geographical conditions, geopolitical location, and 
institutional soundness can only influence the pace and direction of economic development, but 
they cannot be its locomotive.  Values and attitudes of people, e.g. in relation to punctuality, 
rationality, and equality are important.  These attitudes affect development, especially ethics and 
attitudes about work.  When values and attitudes are unfavourable to economic development, this 
situation could be the biggest obstacle to efforts to promote economic development.  Including 
Harrison, scholars from the culturalist school finds culture as a source of poverty or prosperity.  
This popular culturalist hypothesis dates back to Max Weber (1930) who argued that the 
Protestant ethic was the key to economic growth in Western Europe (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012, pp. 56-57).  From the 1980s, after the economic success of the East Asian nations in the 
1970s, the culturalist view became more popular in explaining the economic establishment of the 
region (Choe, 2006, p. 86).   
 
Others find culture as a cause of economic backwardness.  Through a voluminous study of South 
Asia‘s economic underdevelopment, Myrdal (1968), points out that the attitudes of people are 
not immutable to improvement and they can be redirected in favour of development through 
investment in health and education.  In the same sense, Bauer (1971), quoting the example of the 
Navajo Indian population, argues that no matter how much foreign aid streams into a recipient 
country, material advance will not happen if people in that country are not interested.  According 
to Bauer, people and their attitudes towards poverty in aid-receiving areas are different from 
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those in aid-giving ones, and this retards progress in aid-receiving countries and thus, the key 
determinant is people‘s attitudes followed by social institutions and political arrangements.   
 
Since culture is believed to play an important role, some scholars have made attempts to find the 
origin of ‗problematic‘ culture.  The impact of the colonial experience on the post-colonial 
economy of the colonised countries is discussed in a large body of literature including Fanon 
(1968) who argues the experience of social violence of slavery had an impact on the overall 
society and mind-set of African people.  Scholars of this school, instead of emphasising the 
physical structure‘s impact on the economic growth of the colonised countries, argue that the 
colonial experience carries more weight.  According to Lewis (1955), people in a society that 
experienced slavery have inherited an idea that work is fit only for slaves.  In a society of this 
kind, a lavish life style is wanted without a work ethic and hard work.  Entrepreneurship and a 
socio-political environment friendly to economic growth are unlikely to take place in those 
places.  
 
However, the cultural hypothesis does not explain a number of critical cases in the history of 
economic growth.  The hypothesis does not explain the different level of economic growth under 
an almost homogeneous culture, for instance in North Korea and South Korea (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012, pp. 57-58).  Before the two Koreas were divided after World War II, North and 
South Korea had been one country for more than a millennium with relatively tight border 
control.  Consequently, the two Korea have shared homogeneity in terms of history, ethnicity, 
language, clothing, food, etc., or more broadly culture.  However, today, North Koreans are 
living in abject poverty because of the authoritarian elites and their policies, not because of their 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
culture.  If culture is the key to their poverty, one cannot explain the economic prosperity of 
South Korea sharing the same cultural background with the poor North.   In addition, culture is 
not immutable.  Culturalism treats culture as a static variable, but in the world of contingency, 
culture changes over time and thus it would be short-sighted to explain economic performance 
through culture (Samuels, 1994, p. x). 
 
Even though culture is not the significant factor that divides economic prosperity and poverty, 
values and culture matter because these factors affect the attitudes of people in general and 
especially the elite, for instance the post-colonial mind-set of elites as a consequence of colonial 
experience.  Krueger (1995, pp. 37-51) questions why poor countries would keep policies 
inimical to growth and concludes that the answer should be sought in the origins of those 
policies: the colonial legacy, ideas on development at the time of policy adoption, and the 
perceptions of the role of government.  Pointing out the key role of elite culture in Africa, 
Mkandawire (2001, p.295) also asserts that ―lack of ideology of development is evidence of the 
cultural rejection of development by African leaders and their followers.‖   In other words, elite 
mind-set, or ideas matter in economic growth.  In order to understand the elite mind-set, one 
needs to examine various factors including history.  Therefore, the rest of this chapter examines 
the cultural, ideological and historical factors that influenced elite perceptions in Korea and 
Ghana.  The focus is on elite perceptions of economic growth and a state, i.e. elite‘s perspectives 
on mercantilism. 
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3.3 Ideas that influenced the elite in Korea in the 1960s  
This section introduces three main ideas that influenced the elite in Korea in the 1960s regarding 
their interpretation of mercantilism.  It starts with explaining nationalism in Korea from the 
elite‘s perspective.  Then, the Japanese influence of technological supremacy on Korean elites is 
introduced, and lastly, the section looks at modernisation theory and its impact on the elite in 
Korea as an influential development ideology of the time (zeitgeist) across the world and as a US 
ideology on developing the Third World. 
 
 
3.3.1 Korean nationalism 
Korea is ―an exceptionally homogeneous one ethnic group nation state‖ (Choe, 2006, p. 84). It is 
generally known that Korean people hold relatively strong nationalism as Armstrong‘s (2007, p. 
272) succinctly puts it as ―few people with even a passing knowledge of Korea can fail to be 
impressed with the depth and persistence of Korean nationalism.‖  Even though there are a few 
contending views on where the strong sense of nationalism originates, it is agreed that a number 
of factors contribute to Korea‘s strong sense of ethnic nationalism (Lee, 1963; Shin, 2006b; 
Armstrong, 2007): the sense of unity which dates back 4 000 years ago by legend of which at 
least last 2 000 years can be traced in documents; well-defined and stable territory 48 ; a 
centralised bureaucratic state for more than a millennium; and a single ethnicity shared not only 
by biological heritage but also by culture and language with little variation across the state.  
                                                 
48 Borders of the three dynasties, Silla (57-939), Goryeo (939-1392) and Joseon (1392-910), were well defined from 
much earlier than those in Europe and did not drastically change over time.  Crossing borders was restricted to 
government delegations and those who cross borders illegally were beheaded until the 19th century (Choe, 2006, p. 
93).   
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Based on such a variety of factors, modern nationalism in Korea was able to take root at the end 
of Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910).  Japanese colonialism played a critical role not only in forming 
nationalism in Korea but also in developing it by provoking a sense of resistance and unity 
among Korean people against assimilation policy under Japanese rule in the 1930s.  Japan, which 
also had its own version of strong ethnic nationalism, justified its annexation of Korea saying the 
Korean race is inferior to the Japanese race, and such racist propaganda motivated Korean 
nationalists to advocate and preach the distinctiveness of the Korean race to the Korean 
populace, suffering defeatism, through newspapers and private schools (Choe, 2006, p. 95).  
Until today, according to Shin‘s description (Shin, 2006b, p. 226), the presence of strong 
nationalism is pronounced in both North and South Korea, and many Koreans, even today, 
believe Korean ethnicity or Korea is immortal and eternal. 
 
Against this background of the development of modern nationalism in Korea, the way the elite in 
Park‘s regime used nationalism for economic growth is interesting in a few respects.  First, most 
of the military elites in Parks regimes, used to serve as Japanese military officers including Park.  
As will be explained in a latter part of the thesis, Park was also nationalistic to Japan insofar as 
he not only fought in a Japanese war for Japanese victory, but also voluntarily abandoned his 
Korean name and changed it to a Japanese name in an effort to Japanise himself.  In addition, 
before he became a Japanese soldier, he was a teacher at a public school and at the time, the role 
of teachers in public school was to Japanise Korean people.  After independence, Park joined 
Namrodang, which was a communist party in South Korea, in which the international socialist 
class held higher priority than South Korea as a nation.  Therefore, the nationalism which was 
generally shared by the Korean populace did not seem to affect most of Korean military elites 
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under Japanese rule and afterwards.  Still, when the military elite took power, nationalism 
became the legitimising ideology of their coup.  Moreover, nationalism became the key ideology 
that the military elite relied heavily on in the period of post-war economic development 
(Armstrong, 2007, p. 273).  The military elite used nationalism in two ways: first to recruit 
technocrats abroad and second, to mobilise people for economic growth. 
 
First, the military elites used nationalism in order to repatriate highly skilled expatriates from 
abroad.  The reverse-brain drain was a systematic effort led by Park and his military elites. Park‘s 
cash-strapped government which did not have much to offer to compensate the skilled 
expatriates ―appealed to their nationalism and patriotism‖ through individual persuasion (Yoon, 
1992, p. 7).  This state-led repatriation was successful and the military government succeeded in 
bringing in 553 PhDs in Economics and Science from abroad.  Given that there were only 79 
PhDs residing in Korea in 1965, it was a huge form of empowerment to the government. Those 
repatriated brains became the first elite group of technocrats and they played a leading role in 
designing economic and industry policies and restructuring the national economy in Korea. 
 
Secondly, the elite used nationalism as ideology for economic growth.  They called for sacrifice 
by people for a better future of the father land. Indeed, the link between strong nationalism and 
industrialisation was noted by a number of economic development thinkers such as Rostow and 
Hansen.  According to Rostow (1959, p. 6), ―a reactive nationalist sentiment‖ against foreign 
threat is highly linked with industrialisation.  In addition, Hansen (1976, p. 29) also argues that  
―an unusual degree of acceptance of the (national) identity‖ can explain ―patriotic sanction to the 
motives of private gains as an underlying force in the economy.‖   
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In short, in Korea, the military elites who took power at first did not share the same strong sense 
of nationalism with the Koran populace.  However, they used nationalism to repatriate brains 
abroad and built highly capable technocrats equipped with a high sense of nationalism and 
patriotism.  In addition, the military elites effectively used nationalism among Korean people.  
Shin (2006b, p.229) insightfully summarised it as follows:  
Authoritarian regimes relied on nationalist rhetoric to justify their autocratic system and 
to mobilize the populace for ‗national‘ goals they identified as security and 
development…in South Korea nationalism was instrumental to the rise of ‗developmental 
ethic,‘ which performed a function equivalent to what Max Weber called the ‗Protestant 
ethic‘ in the rise of Western capitalism [emphasis original].  
 
 
3.3.2 Japanese technonationalism 
As mentioned above, the military elite in Korea served Japan, and most technocrats were also 
survivors of and educated in the period of Japanese occupation.  However, they usually denied or 
remained silent about their Japanese linage (Atkins, 2010, p. 12), and Korean scholars are not 
eager to excavate the colonial linkage regarding its economic growth.  According to Kohli (1994, 
p. 1270), the strong nationalism among Korean scholars created blind spots to deny the colonial 
influence on Korea‘s fast economic growth.  He argues that ―Japanese colonial influence on 
Korea, in 1905-194549, was decisive in shaping political economy that later evolved into the 
high-growth South Korean path to development‖ [emphasis added] (Kohli, 1994, p. 1270).   
                                                 
49 It is assumed that Kohli used 1905 as an initiating year of Japanese rule because the Japanese Protectorate Treaty 
was signed in that year.  However, the Annexation of Korea by Japan took place in late August of 1910.  Thus, it is 
correct to change it to ‗1910‘-1945.  The author of this thesis did not find any other publication using 1905 as the 
beginning year of Japanese colonisation of Korea. 
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However, his colonial linage determinism fails to explain the dismal economic growth of North 
Korea.  If North Korea, where the identical colonial influence took place during the same period, 
does not show the same high-growth economic development, colonial experience cannot be the 
‗decisive‘ explanatory factor of economic growth.  Hasan (1976, p. 26) also argues that even 
though the 35 years of Japanese occupation significantly influenced the culture and society of 
Korea, it was ―only limited segments of Korean life‖ and the impact on economic structure was 
also limited because of ―the restrictions placed on Korean participation in economic and political 
planning and management.‖   
 
In addition, whereas Kohli (1994, p. 1286) suggests export-oriented policy in Park‘s regime as a 
specific colonial linage from Japan to Korea, he fails to recognise that Park had pushed import-
substitution strategy as a national development model prior to the export-oriented one.  Export-
oriented strategy was adopted only after import-substitution strategy was implemented and 
proved to fail in Korea (Kim, Gwanghee, 2008).  Therefore, it is logical to conclude that export-
oriented policy was adopted by trail-and-error, instead of by the Japanese colonial linage in 
Korea.  Furthermore, even though a number of observers such as Suh Sang-Chul (1966) and 
Schumpeter (1940) explain that Korea‘s economic growth under Japanese rule, which was 3 per 
cent per annum, was export-led growth, the pattern of trade was an epitome of extractive colonial 
trade.  It was dominated by the forced export of high-quality rice to Japan and import of cheap 
rice to replace the domestic demand (Kuznets, 1977, p. 11).  Therefore, the mere fact that Park‘s 
government also chose the export-led growth strategy does not mean that the regime returned to 
colonial origins in economic policy making. 
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Even though Kohli‘s argument that Korea‘s economic path would not have been adopted without 
its colonial experience from Japan has a significant degree of fallacy50, one cannot deny that 
Korea‘s military elites were influenced by Japanese military culture.  Regarding the wealth and 
security of the state, one outstanding and lasting ideology of Japan is technology supremacy as a 
tool to build a state stronger and richer. Samuelson (1994), in his book Rich Nation, Strong Army, 
explains that Japanese industrialisation started with military industries with an aim of 
strengthening the nation through technological advancement under the slogan of ‗Rich Nation, 
Strong Army‘.  Behind the military industry-led industrialisation, over centuries there was a 
strong Japanese belief that the nation cannot be militarily strong without advanced technology.  
Samuel (1994, p. x) named the Japanese belief ―technonationalism‖, which refers to ―the belief 
that technology is a fundamental element in national security, that it must be indigenised, 
diffused, and nurtured in order to make a nation rich and strong.‖   This technology supremacy 
influenced elites in Korea during the era of Japanese occupation.  For most technocrats in Korea 
the Japanese model was the model Korea should copy identically (Kim, Chung-Yum, 2006, 
p.145).  The technonationalism became more obvious when the elite in Korea decided to turn its 
economic course towards heavy-chemical industry in the later stage of its industrialisation in the 
1970s in the midst of deteriorating regional security.  The US announced the Nixon doctrine of 
‗Asian defence by Asians‘ by which the role of the US army in South Korea was planned to be 
scaled down in the late 1960s and, at the same time, North Korea‘s provocation was increasing 
(Moon, 1999, p. 3).   
 
                                                 
50 The fallacy, in part, is believed to be caused by the limited access of literature on Korea, especially publications 
written in Korean.  As Kohli  (1994, p. 1289) admits, he only examined English language literature, and the lack of 
language capability would lead to a biased conclusion, especially in qualitative researches as his. 
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In sum, whereas, traditionally (and up to today), political elites in Korea despised the colonial 
lineage and Japanese impact on Koreans and especially on them, it was impossible for elites in 
Korea in the 1960s to be free from Japanese influence.  Even though the thesis refutes the idea 
that Japanese colonial experience was the decisive factor in Korea‘s economic growth, the 
Japanese perspective on economic growth, notably regarding technological supremacy, 
influenced elites in Korea in Park‘s regime, and it is observed in Korea‘s turn to heavy-chemical 
industry in the middle of increasing security concerns. 
 
 
3.3.3 Modernisation theory and Rostow  
Modernisation theory, as an ideology of developing the Third World, had a big influence on 
elites not only in Korea but across the world.  Among various versions of the modernisation 
argument, Rostow‘s economic version of modernisation notably made a significant impact on the 
elite in Korea.  Rostow was not only a development economist but also a government official and 
presidential advisor specialised in the Asian region.  As a result, his idea of stages of economic 
growth influenced elites in Korea not only as an idea but also as an American policy dealing with 
Korea and US aid to Korea.  This section examines, first, the logic of modernisation theory, and 
then introduces Rostow‘s argument on economic modernisation and its impact on the elite in 
Korea. 
 
Modernisation theory became popular in the late 1940s and continued through the 1960s.  
According to the theory, development entails an evolution from a lower form to a higher one.  
The West, which is in a higher position, can guide the lower Third World through aid-giving and 
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technology transfer.  Modernisation theorists perceive that modernisation first occurred in the 
West through commercialisation and industrialisation.  The West is ―a special kind of hope‖ to 
the underdeveloped Third World (Apter, 1965, p. 1), and colonialism is ―an interesting historical 
phase‖ which became an opportunity for the Third World to learn from colonial systems brought 
by Europeans (Apter, 1965, p. 56).  Modernisation can replace traditionalism and colonialism in 
backward regions through occupational specialisation, commercialisation, urbanisation, and 
religion (Apter & Lystad, 1968, p. 88).  Modernisation theorists saw the development of 
backward regions as an all-inclusive process not only involving economic issues but also 
political, cultural and psychological ones.  The term ―modernisation‖ was used in every field 
with various connotations.  Political ―modernisation‖ in the colonial system was sought by 
placing Westernised secular elites onto Westernised governments.51  Politically, development 
follows the path from a primitive and traditional monarchy to modern secular democracy 
(Almond & Powell, Jr., 1966).  From the social development dimension, the foundations of 
society develop from traditional ―clan sanguinity‖ to various occupational groups which are not 
subject to considerations of birth or consanguinity (Durkheim, 1972, p. 142).   Even though there 
are subtle differences, the core idea of modernisation is a uni-linear and irreversible process.  
 
In every sphere of modernisation, industrialisation takes a special space.  Industrialisation is 
synonymous with development in modernisation theory.  Industrialisation requires vast amounts 
of capital that are too much for private sectors to provide; in view of this, a state at the centre of 
development is a logical consequence.  In Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and South-
                                                 
51 Thus, modernisation theorists understand independence as an unfortunate historical event that replaced modernity 
with systems that manipulate it. 
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Eastern Europe, Rosenstien-Rodan (1943, p. 204) argues that a laissez-faire approach is not 
appropriate to train skilled labour for an industrialised economy.  Individuals can be 
entrepreneurial but they lack sufficient information for the whole national economy.  In order for 
the individuals to get benefits from positive external economies of scale, a state should be an 
active participant that creates and plans the whole national economy as ―one huge firm or trust.‖   
When various industries are developed simultaneously, labourers hired in one industry can 
become consumers of the goods produced by other industries; also infrastructure for one industry 
can benefit other industries as well.  Once a country reaches this level of sharing of consumers 
and infrastructure among industries, the development of the country expedites with the positive 
spiral of complementary development.  What is critical here is the role of coordinated planning 
which only a state can play.  Rosenstien-Rodan‘s idea of a ―Big Push‖ later becomes a 
foundation of the pro-foreign aid school.52   
 
The economic version of modernisation sees economic growth as stages that a country should go 
through as illustrated in Rostow‘s (1959; 1960) Stages of Economic Growth.  Rostow (1959; 
1960) presents five stages of economic growth that generalise modern economic history based on 
the dynamics between supply, demand and the pattern of production: the traditional society, the 
precondition to take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity and the age of high mass 
consumption.  The traditional society has limitation in production due to the ceiling in 
technological advancement.  When a society meets the preconditions of technological 
advancements, it takes off led by ―the achievement of rapid growth in a limited group of sectors 
                                                 
52 Modernisation theory puts a state or a government at the centre of development as ―a modernising instrument‖ 
(Apter, 1965, p. 54). 
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where modern industrial techniques are applied‖ (Rostow, 1959, p. 7).   The technologies, 
initially limited to a few leading sectors, spread into the rest of the economy in the stage of the 
drive to maturity.  When a society reaches the final stage, adoption of new technology is not an 
over-riding objective of the society anymore and high technology goods as well as welfare and 
leisure are consumed on mass basis (Rostow, 1959, pp. 4-12).   
 
Among those stages, what captured elites in developing countries most was the stage of 
precondition to take-off.  Indeed, when Rostow visited Korea in 1965 as the Chairman of the US 
State Department Policy Council, he delivered a speech to the Korean public at a University in 
Korea, and in the speech, he said that ―Korea is already in the early stages of take-off‖, which 
gave a boost to the confidence of elites in Korea, even though, given the economic situation of 
Korea at the time, his remark must have been just diplomatic (Kim, ChanJin, 2009, p. 71).  In 
addition, Rostow argued that such preconditions can be led and established by nationalistic elites 
(Rostow, 1959, p. 6).  According to his argument (1959, p. 5), the precondition period is critical 
because it is when the three non-industrial conditions are established for industrialisation, i.e. 
take-off: first, transport not only for movement of goods and people but also for efficient 
governance; second, a technological advancement in agriculture which enables increase in 
population and urbanisation; and third, expansion in imports and financial imports.  For late 
industrialisers, financial imports is critical since ―such increased access to foreign exchange was 
required to permit the less advanced region or nation to increase the supply of the equipment and 
industrial raw materials it could not then itself supply‖ (Rostow, 1959, p. 5).   
 
Right after Kennedy was elected Rostow was invited to the Task Force on Foreign Economic 
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Policy and developed his theories into policies especially regarding newly development countries 
in Asia (Park, 2007, p. 138).  Even though some intellectuals in Korea criticised modernisation 
theory and Rostow‘s idea as imperialistic (Park, Heebum, 1968) 53, his idea influenced elites in 
Korea significantly not only as development ideology but also as US policies toward Korea.  
Even though his role in the American government did not last long,54 he and his idea was at the 
centre of US foreign policy toward Asian countries including Korea, and his idea of stages of 
economic growth was adopted by the elite in Korea.    
 
This section of the thesis examined a major ideological influence that built the foundation of elite 
perspectives on security and economic growth in Korea in the 1960s.  First nationalism in Korea 
was examined from an elite perspective, and the Japanese techno-supremacy and Rostow‘s 
economic modernisation theory was introduced as ideology that affected elites‘ idea of economic 
growth.  In the following section, the thesis examines ideas that influenced the elite in Ghana.   
 
 
 
3.4 Ideas that influenced the elite in Ghana in the 1980s  
Elites in Ghana in the 1980s were influenced by their own historical legacy and international 
ideologies of the time as well.  In the 1980s, a different set of international ideology of economic 
                                                 
53 Requoted from Park, Tae-Gyun (2007, p. 148) 
 
54 After Kennedy‘s assassination, Rostow, again, worked closely with Johnson regarding foreign policy toward 
Asian nations.  He supported all-out bombing of North Vietnam during the Vietnam War and due to that, could not 
come back to the US government after Johnson withdrew his presidential candidacy (Park, Tae-Gyun,  2007, pp. 
139-141).   
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growth influenced the elite in Ghana.  In what follows, the thesis examines the Ghanaian version 
of elite nationalism and non-alignment movement as historical factors that shaped the foundation 
of elite perspective on the wealth and security of the nation.  In the latter part, dependency theory 
is introduced as an international ideology that contributed to shaping elite perspectives in Ghana 
in the 1980s. 
 
 
3.4.1 Ghanaian Nationalism 
From the beginning, the elite in Ghana were the prime advocators of nationalism.  Nationalism in 
Ghana shares commonalities with African nationalism in its origin but at the same time has the 
unique Ghanaian features which originated in its post-colonial experience.  Therefore, in order to 
understand the nationalism that influenced Ghanaian elites, one needs to understand African 
nationalism in comparison with Eurasian nationalism as well as the distinct Ghanaian historical 
factors. 
 
To provide a context to the emergence of nationalism in Ghana, this section starts with providing 
a brief historical review on the emergence of the nationalist elite of the Gold Coast in the 
colonial era.  In the late 19th century the Gold Coast had three main different groups of elites: 
families of traditional Chiefs, European ruling class and the newly educated Africans.  At first, 
the newly educated elites made an alliance with traditional Chiefs against racial discrimination of 
the European elite.  However, at the turn of the century, the new elites started to challenge the 
traditional elites as the British indirect rule supported the traditional elites rather than the newly 
educated elites.   According to Coleman (1954, p. 408), one of the pioneers in the scholarship of 
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nationalism in Africa, ―tiny educated minorities‖ in Accra popularised nationalistic sentiments by 
preaching it as emancipation from ―a servile colonial mentality‖ and tapping the grievance 
among ―the tradition-bound mass‖.  Nationalism, for those new elites, was ―perceived as the 
quintessential creation...in simultaneous revolt against the dead hand of tradition and the live 
weight of alien rule‖ (Young, 1994, p. 66).   The newly educated elites claimed their leadership 
on a national scale which they learned from training in modern world, and by the end of the 
1920s, these new elites, most of whom were wealthy and professional, began to take the lead in 
the National Congress movement (Busia, 1956).   
 
According to Kilson (1958), who explains the development of Western African nationalism 
through the emergence of the middle class, the claims and aspirations of Western-educated 
professionals in the middle class were not fulfilled in colonial institutions and this frustration led 
to political movements which later became political organisations demanding self-government.   
However, even though Kilson (1958, pp. 372-373) rightfully points out the role of wage-earning 
urban labourers and income-earning farmers in the spread and support of nationalism, his 
categorisation of middle class which includes from farmers to Kwame Nkrumah is too broad.  If 
the top echelon of Kilson‘s middle class is re-categorised as the elite, his argument that 
nationalism was used by the middle class, namely elite, as means for protecting and advancing 
socio-economic and political status in the colonial era gives more insight to the origin of 
nationalism in Ghana and Western Africa generally.  To name a few who are in Kilson‘s category 
of middle class but indeed were elites, there are J. John Mensah Sarbah who was a leader of the 
first Western Africa nationalist organisation, Aborigines‘ Rights Protection Society, (he was a son 
from a wealthy family and Western educated, and he also was the first African to be invited to 
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the British Bar in 1887); J. B. Danquah who was educated at the University of London and the 
founder of the United Gold Coast Convention, the parent organisation of Convention People‘s 
Party of Kwame Nkrumah; and Kwame Nkrumah, the founding president of independent Ghana, 
who was educated at Lincoln University in the US (Kilson, 1958, pp. 384-385) .   
 
In other words, the fervour of nationalism in Africa started by ―the bourgeois national elites‖, 
who were in high positions in the colonial administrative system, such as top civil servants, 
lawyers, judges, and senior army and police officers, into whose hand the colonial administration 
handed over political power (Kofi, 1973, p. 98).  Of course, elite-centric development of 
nationalism is not a unique feature found only in Ghana.   In fact, as Young (1994, p. 70) points 
out, ―a class dimension to the idea of nationalism is one of its universal properties‖ since the elite 
class is the main beneficiary of nationalism.   However, nationalism in Africa is distinctive due to 
its multiple identities.  The colonial institution imposed three different identities onto Africans: a 
racial African, a native in a colonial partition, and a member of a certain ethnic group.  Those 
identities later develop as pan-Africanism, territorial nationalism and a sense of ethnicity, 
respectively (Young, 2007, p. 247).  With these dynamics, nationalism in Ghana has been 
developed in part as a distinctive Ghanaian nationalism and in part sharing commonalities with 
an African version of nationalism as explained below. 
 
On top of the shared colonial experience, Ghana‘s nationalism became uniquely Ghanaian since 
Nkrumah claimed pan-Africanism.  The pan-Africanism can be interpreted as overpowering of 
continental identity over state-nationalism in Ghana.  Nkrumah, the first president of the first 
independent African nation, perceived the balkanisation of Africa as the most threatening danger 
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on the continent.  Pan-Africanism was his old ambition which he had since his days at Lincoln 
University (Rooney, 1988, p. 140).  In practice, Nkrumah‘s pan-Africanism began with the 
Ghana-Guinea Union in 1958 which later included Liberia.  Nkrumah urged African nations to 
join a union of African states and to tackle the obstacles in building his visionary union together.  
Nkrumah said that Ghana‘s independence and its relative economic prosperity were meaningless 
without the complete liberation of the whole African continent, and indeed he was committed to 
sacrifice the resources of Ghana for a liberated and united Africa (Lengum, 1962).  This would 
be a great and necessary commitment as a leader of Pan-Africa, but this grandiose goal was not 
beneficial to the people and economy of Ghana.  At last, Nkrumah was ousted by the right-wing 
supported military coup in 1966 and the elite in Ghana reverted to the conventional notion of 
statehood (Kofi, 1973, pp. 98-107; Clapham, 1996, p. 47).   
 
Even though Ghanaian elites stopped explicitly advocating Pan-Africanism, it was transformed 
into non-alignment in Ghana‘s foreign policy (which will be discussed in the following section of 
the thesis, 3.3.2).  In addition to the legacy of pan-Africanism as the distinctive Ghanaian feature, 
Ghana‘s nationalism shows commonalities with most other African countries.   Young (2007) 
raises a question how the sense of national unity in African states can be persistent despite of the 
dereliction of state institutions and consequent socioeconomic and political hardship in the daily 
life of average Africans.  If one consider the exogenous and artificial nature of nationalism in 
Africa, the persistence of African nationalism is even more perplexing (Young, 2007; Englebert, 
2009).  Whereas nationalism among citizens in Africa is persistent, to the elite in Africa, 
nationalism was a means to enrich the ruling elites and to strengthen the patron-client relations 
between them.  In short, the elite in Africa used nationalism as a tool of ―legitimation of the 
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holders of sovereign power‖ (Englebert, 2009, p. 200).   
 
 
As explained earlier in Chapter one, sovereignty has mainly three dimensions: international legal 
sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty, and a sense of nationality should 
be based on all those three dimensions.  However, elites in dysfunctional countries where 
domestic sovereignty is not upheld overemphasize the international legal dimension of 
sovereignty to promote nationalism among the masses of the country.  According to Engelbert 
(2009, p. 61), ―this is in part why visits of African heads of state abroad and their meetings with 
other heads of state tend to receive such disproportionate coverage in African media, with 
speeches before the UN General Assembly all-time favourite.‖   
 
Nationalism in Ghana is far from an exception in this regard.   The elites in Ghana in the 1980s 
were also losing domestic sovereignty to control domestic economic activities while most 
Ghanaians resorting to black markets for necessities and exchange currencies.  They yielded the 
Westphalian sovereignty or autonomy of Ghana to international donors in exchange for foreign 
currency and the foreign aid enriched the elites.  In the meantime, the elites appealed to 
nationalism to sustain their survival. In Ghana, like most African nations, nationalism in the 
populace is persistent.  Nkrumah proposed the name Ghana in an attempt to create the sense of 
national unity as he explained: ―it is clear the name of GHANA [the name of an ancient West 
African empire] serves the purpose of providing the people of the Gold Coast with a symbol of 
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their national unity and a link with past history‖ (Great Britain Colonial Office, 1953)55.  And, 
throughout the unrelenting economic hardships of the 1970s and 1980s, there had not been any 
critical revolts by the grassroots resisting the dysfunctional and exploitative state institutions and 
the state elites.  Instead, there were several coups and counter coups which only changed 
members of the top ruling class in the name of nationalism.   
 
 
3.4.2 Non-alignment  
The Non-aligned Movement (NAM) is one of the critical elements that have shaped a frame of 
thoughts of Ghanaian elites in foreign policy making.  The debates on what non-alignment 
means, which continue up to today, began in the 1950s (Williams, 1987, p. 50).  Independent 
Ghana‘s founding president Kwame Nkruma was one of the key figures who collectively 
conceived of the idea of NAM along with Nasser from Egypt, Nehru from India and Tito from 
Yugoslavia (Rooney, 1988, p. 214),56 and since then, the NAM became the moral foundation of 
Ghana‘s foreign policy.  Especially, the elite in the Rawlings regime who identified themselves 
as ideological inheritors of Nkrumah found the philosophical ground of their foreign policy in 
the non-alignment.  
 
                                                 
55 Quoted in Kilson, 1958, p. 381. 
 
56 Some scholars note that the conception of NAM was the triumvirate of the other three figures except Nkrumah 
(Hveem & Willetts, 1973, p. 4; Abraham, 2008, p. 196).  However, Nkrumah attended the Bandung Conference, 
which was essentially a meeting among Asian countries, as one of three African attendants (Gold Coast, Liberia and 
the Sudan) (Williams, 1987, p. 53) and put forward the idea of NAM in his UN address in 1960 before the idea was 
officially launched in 1961 (Rooney, 1988, p. 214).   
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In 1961 the NAM had its first conference in Belgrade where the principle of the movement and 
the criteria of membership were announced after a few years of preparations and discussions 
since the Bandung conference in 1955.  According to the criteria, in order to become a member 
of NAM, a country should not belong to either the Communist or the Western military bloc; 
should not have any bilateral military agreement with either of the blocs; should not have any 
foreign military base on its soil; should support liberation and independence from colonialism; 
and should have a policy of peaceful co-existence (Burton, 1966, p. 19).  Ghana, as one of the 25 
countries represented in the first summit, has been a prominent upholder of the idea from the 
beginning.57  According to Hveem and Willetts‘s (1973) research on the practice of NAM, none 
of the member countries in NAM was fulfilling every one of these criteria to become a member 
except four countries: Ghana, India, Nepal and Kuwait.  They used for proxy indices of 
diplomatic relations, military cooperation, UN voting, and trade volumes to measure the 
neutrality and found out that Ghana and India were ―the most prominent‖ in the movement 
(Hveem & Willetts, 1973, p. 22). 
 
While most scholars consider non-alignment as a collective foreign policy behaviour of the 
Global South, Rothstein (1976, pp. 112-130) argues that NAM is not foreign policy but a tactical 
response to the international distribution of power which serves the primary goals of elites in the 
Global South: maintaining personal security and creating a sense of national unity.  According to 
his argument, NAM spares leaders from a burden of choosing a side in international politics and, 
as a result, it allows leaders to avoid domestic political conflicts caused by ideological 
                                                 
57 Currently NAM has 120 member countries (16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, 2012) and the next 
summit of NAM is scheduled in 2015 in Venezuela. 
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differences.  Moreover, NAM gives a sense of independence and sovereign equality since it plays 
a role as a symbol of ―freedom and independence and the right to decide important issues 
without Great Power meddling‖ (Rothstein, 1976, p. 117).  Therefore, for elites who are not 
willing to take a risk of restructuring domestic politics and economy, NAM is an attractive 
political choice.  However, NAM did not mean practical gains, such as foreign aid.  Instead, 
aligned countries such as Korea and Taiwan, were the biggest aid recipients. Consequently the 
ideology of non-alignment became less persuasive, and eventually, ―the powerful NAM lost 
some of its raison d‘être‖ with the demise of the Cold War (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003, p. 4).   
 
Nevertheless, it is still a ―frame of mind‖ to elites in member countries and certainly to those in 
Ghana (Sayegh, 1964, p. 94).  One interesting aspect of non-alignment in Ghana is that even 
when elites upheld the on-alignment as a principle of its foreign policy, its practices were closer 
to building a stronger bond with Communist countries.  It originates from Nkrumah‘s ideological 
direction which was well expressed in his proposal in the first conference in Belgrade.  At the 
conference Nkrumah proposed not only the end of colonialism but also the recognition of East 
Germany, the admission of mainland China to the UN, and appointment of three deputies to the 
UN Secretary General: one from the Western bloc, one from the Communist bloc and one from 
the NAM.  This idea of three deputies was originally proposed by Russia (Rooney, 1988, p. 214).  
By any standard, such a proposal seems closer to pro-Communism than to neutrality or non-
alignment.  As a result, Nkrumah‘s ‗non-aligned‘ proposal caused anger in the Kennedy 
administration.  The Ghanaian version of non-alignment made a lasting impact on subsequent 
regimes in Ghana; whichever regime proclaiming to inherit Nkrumahism, including Rawlings‘s, 
which chose the ‗Ghanaian version‘ of non-alignment in theory and pro-communist in practice.   
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3.4.3 Dependency theory 
The foundation of elite perspectives in Ghana in the 1980s was shaped not only by historical 
contributors such as Ghanaian nationalism and NAM but also by international ideologies 
surrounding Ghana of the time.  Notably, the elite in Ghana were influenced by dependency 
theory before they made the drastic foreign policy change toward neo-liberalism.  
 
Dependency theory regards the West as an enemy to be blamed for aid dependence in the Third 
World.  The theory finds its roots in the Indian nationalist movement in the early twentieth 
century.  In Economic History of India, Dutt (1901), a high-ranking official in the British 
administration of India, elucidates that India in the eighteenth century was a great manufacturer 
that exported its manufactured products to Asia and to Europe.  However, the trend reversed 
when British laws banned or placed a high import tax on cotton products produced in India and, 
at the same time, exempted tax on the goods admitted to India from Britain; the aim was to 
encourage manufacturing in Britain and to keep India as a source of raw cotton for British 
manufacturing.  The policy devastated Indian manufacturing, and Indian people had to return to 
agriculture to make a living.58  
 
Later with Frank‘s well-known book, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, Essays 
                                                 
58 Baran (1957, p. 150) develops Dutt‘s claim and criticizes modernisation theory as ―it should not be overlooked 
that India, if left to herself, might have found in the course of time a shorter and surely less tortuous road toward a 
better and richer society….to realize her destiny in her own way, to employ her resources for her own benefit, and to 
harness her energies and abilities for the advancement of her own people.‖ 
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on the Development and Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy (1969), dependency 
theory became a new tool to analyse the economic problems of Latin America and by extension 
the Third World.   Dependency theorists vehemently deny the idea of linear development.  
Modernisation theory cannot be applied to the Third World since ―the historical experience of the 
colonial and underdeveloped countries has demonstrable been quite different‖ (Frank, 1969, p. 
3).  In addition, economic development does not arise from the infusion of capital or technology 
as suggested by modernisation theory.  Instead, technology and financial capital from advanced 
countries extract resources and credits from less-developed countries that are labour-intensive 
and skill-scarce through an international trade structure.  The unequal exchange between 
exorbitant technology and goods versus cheap resources and labours perpetuates the 
unfavourable terms of trade in less developed countries (Emmanuel, 1972).  Thus, a solution for 
less developed countries to beat poverty and dependency is to sever the ties with the so-called 
modernised world because the cause of underdevelopment comes from ―participation in the 
process of world capitalist development‖ (Frank, 1969, p.7).   In the same vein, foreign aid, 
according to dependency theory, is a tool of the First World to shackle the Third World.  Payer 
(1974, pp. 212-3) argues that the root of perpetual aid dependence can be traced to the elite in 
recipient countries noting ―powerful classes in poor countries benefit from aid [and would] suffer 
from its termination.‖  Dependency theorists understand that the foreign aid disposed by 
international financial institutes such as the IMF and the World Bank work on behalf of the rich 
Western countries.    
 
Dependency theory appears to side with the Third World against the Western nations, but the 
theory can distract attention from the internal problems of the Third World to externalities.  
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Despite the heavy impact of the world‘s political and economic system, a country‘s economic 
development depends on various internal factors.  In addition, dependency theory‘s assumption 
about the elite has a potential fallacy.  It assumes that elites in dependent states comply with the 
elites in first world countries rather than promoting the interests of the general population of their 
own countries.  Therefore, the elites in dependent states are partly responsible for 
underdevelopment of the Third World.  However, it is not always true that the elite in recipient 
countries gain from cooperating with the ―oppressing‖ First World at the expense of populations 
of the Third World.   
 
A dependency perspective began to influence intellectuals in Ghana in the late 1950s and the 
early 1960s.  In Africa, including Ghana, an African version of dependency theory thrived as 
―neocolonialism‖ which was coined by Kwame Nkrumah (Dzorgbo, 1998, p.16).  As part of 
actions taking place against neo-colonialism, in the 1960s, Ghana recognised the People's 
Republic of China, which made Ghana the second African country that recognised China after 
Guinea; Nkrumah welcomed the first Chinese ambassador Huang by presenting his credentials as 
―in the fight for freedom and independence of all Africa, Ghana could count on the support of the 
Communist Chinese government and people‖ (Chau, 2007, p.143).  In the same vein, neo-
colonialism, multinational enterprises and unfair international trade structures were denounced as 
the culprit for the plight of Ghanaians.   
 
When Rawlings took power through the second coup, he was supported and surrounded by 
radical intellectuals with the dependency idea.  His main support groups, such as the June Fourth 
Movement, the Kwame Nkrumah Revolution, and the New Democratic Movement, shared the 
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dependency ideology, believing that Ghana was basically wealthy and evil doers were Western 
capitalists and pro-West Ghanaian elites.  For them, courting Western capitalist countries or the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for aid was reverting to colonialism, and therefore it was 
―anti-nationalist‖ (Gyimah-Boadi, 1993, p. 4).  Around the time of Rawlings‘s second coup in 
1981, dependency theory was ―the single most influential body of ideas‖ that took hold of 
intellectuals, especially at the University of Ghana (Nugent, 1995, p. 32).  Such radical 
intellectuals were also the members of the June Fourth Movement whose chairman was 
Rawlings. 
 
Therefore, the foreign policy change toward the IMF was a dangerous and significant change 
since Rawlings and the elite in Ghana relied heavily on the dependency perspective in 
legitimising themselves and in understanding economic and development problems.  The foreign 
policy shift towards neo-liberalism59 in 1983 was ―perhaps the most significant shift‖ of the 
regime (Gyimah-Boadi, 1993, p. 8).   
 
                                                 
59 Along with the election victory of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald Reagan a year after, neoclassical theory 
as contained in the Wealth of Nations strongly re-emerged.  In his path-breaking book, Adam Smith (1863) argues 
that in order for an economy to grow, the role of government should be limited to three basic functions: defending 
sovereignty, protecting the rights of citizens, and providing public goods.  Any more government intervention 
beyond these three functions hinders free markets and results in inefficiency, retarding economic growth.  According 
to economic liberalists, the smaller the government, the better for the economy and thus, for aid independence.  Neo-
liberalists believe that the elite stifle entrepreneurship and create rent and patron-client relationships.  In contrast to 
dependency theorists, economic liberalists or neo-liberalists claim that joining global trade in a more aggressive 
manner and receiving benefits of the bigger market is the most effective way to break free from aid dependence 
(World Bank, 2000b, pp. 235-258).  They argue that following the first liberation from colonialism and second from 
tyranny, Africa can and should have a third liberation and establish economic development by having fewer 
government policies and more private sector autonomy (Mills & Herbst, 2012).  Despite the utter failure of the 
economic liberalist philosophy in Africa and Latin America in the 1980s, represented by the SAPs, economic 
liberalism is still powerful in guiding aid disbursement in the Bretton Wood Institutions.   
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3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined why elites matter in foreign policy, aid policy and economic growth.  
Elites have information and authority to make decisions within the black-box.  The international 
system or mass media and public opinion tend to have influence on decision-making elites but 
theoretically and empirically their impact has been proven, at best, limited.  In terms of aid 
independence or aid dependence, the role that the elite play is also decisive.  Elites can stun 
economic growth by blocking adoption of new technology that can benefit the populace as a 
whole in order to keep their privileged political and economic status.  On the other hand, they 
can lead economic growth by building institutions open to new technology.  Such different 
attitudes come from ideas which are inherited to or surround the elites.  In the sense, the thesis 
examined ideas that influenced the elite in Korea in the 1960s and in Ghana in the 1980s.  At 
first, the thesis examined the distinctiveness of nationalism in Korea and Ghana.  In Korea, 
nationalism was already strong among the populace, and opportunistic military elites who did not 
show any evident nationalistic propensity before they took power utilised the existing 
nationalism to recruit techno-elites and to mobilize people.  In contrast, in Ghana, historically 
nationalism was created and propagated by elites who needed to obtain power against ethnic 
traditional elites and colonial European elites.  Since then, nationalism has been used as a tool of 
the ruling class to maximize their security and wealth in Ghana and by extension in Africa.  
Other than nationalism, the Japanese ideology of technological supremacy and US ideology of 
stages of economic development were examined as ideas that influenced the foundation of elite 
perspectives in Korea in the 1960s.  In Ghana, on the other hand, non-alignment, as a basis of 
Ghanaian foreign policy, and dependency theory were introduced.  Based on this background, the 
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rest of the thesis examines the two cases of Korea and Ghana.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
126 
 
Chapter 4 Korea, industrial mercantilism 
In 2013, the website of Foreign Policy magazine posted a number of pictures showing poverty in 
Korea in the 1950s under the tile of Once upon a Time in Seoul: Remarkable images of South 
Korea before Samsung and Psy (Wittmeyer, 2013).  Korea‘s outstanding economic growth has 
become a popular subject not only in scholarly writing but also in popular writing and speeches 
on economic development.  Sohal and Ferme (1996) and Murphy and others (1989) focused on 
domestic economic policies such as nationalisation of the banking system or industrial policies 
such as a big push strategy; they selected certain industries and companies to explain South 
Korea‘s remarkable economic growth such as the economy of scale and price control, and to 
assess the effect of punishment on capital flight.60  Even though it is not as heavily investigated 
as Korea‘s domestic economic policy, Korea‘s foreign economic policy has also been studied vis-
à-vis economic growth.  Instead of focusing on Korea‘s foreign economic policy as such, this 
chapter focuses on the perceptions of the Korean elite which formed those policies.  Special 
attention is given to the diplomatic normalisation with Japan which was the critical moment of 
development path in Korea and how it shaped the path of aid independence.  
 
First, a history of Korea‘s foreign policy before the Korea-Japan diplomatic normalisation is 
briefly introduced.  Second, initial conditions before the critical juncture of normalisation are 
examined, and here, other alternatives that Korea had before it turned its foreign aid policy 
toward Japan are examined.  Factors shaping the elite‘s perceptions of industrial mercantilism are 
studied from multiple dimensions of international, local, and elite politics as well.  In the third 
                                                 
60 According to the law passed in 1960, illegal overseas money transfer of more than $1 million was eligible 
for a minimum sentence of ten years in prison and a maximum of the death penalty (Chang, et al., 2012).  
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part of the Chapter, the writer examines how the path of industrial mercantilism was stabilised 
through reinforcement, repetition, and institutionalisation and led Korea to aid independence.   
Based on the empirical work, in the fourth part of the Chapter, the thesis studies the political 
economy of industrial mercantilism and concludes the chapter with a summary. 
 
 
 
4.1 Korea before Park: A brief history 
Since Silla state (57-939) formed the first unified kingdom in the seventh century in the Korean 
peninsula, two more Korean dynasties ruled the peninsula before the Japanese occupation: 
Goryeo (939-1392) and Joseon (1392-910).  Even though there were intermittent and numerous 
wars against neighbouring China and Japan, borders of the three dynasties were well-
distinguished and stable, and central bureaucratic governments were in place from much earlier 
than those of European states (Cumings, 1997).  However, as Kuznets (1977, p. 3) succinctly 
describes, ―Korea‘s modern history has been a history of tragedy.‖  Before Park took power in 
1961, Korea had been a weak state for more than a century (Alice, 1989, pp.27-29).  Before it 
was colonised by Japan, the fractured and corrupted upper class of the Joseon Dynasty (1392-
1910) was losing its legitimacy due to repetitive revolts led by angry peasants rising up against 
autocrats.  The weak state was finally coerced into opening its doors to Japan in 1876 and the era 
of Japanese colonisation began in 1910, with a forced bi-lateral treaty imposed by Japanese 
military force.   
 
Colonisation replaced the traditional elites and social status system with a ―quasi-class system of 
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colonial capitalism‖ which included new classes of bureaucratic professionals (Kim, Kyong-
Dong, 1988, p. 198).  Korea became independent in 1945, but both the first and the second 
administration of the Republic of Korea were still weak.  The first government of Rhee was 
―clearly inimical to developing planning‖ and was replaced after a student demonstration in April 
1960 (Haggard, 1991, p. 855).  The second government produced some reformist ideas but was 
soon overthrown by the military coup of Park in 1961 before it could implement those ideas.  
Park‘s military regime was the first strong state that Korea had known in more than a hundred 
years.   There was a national call for a strong government at the time, which could be one of the 
reasons for the calm reaction of people to the military coup.   
 
In terms of the economy, immediately after independence in 1946, Korea‘s manufacturing 
capacity fell to 25 per cent of the peak level recorded in 1939; this fall was because of the 
collapse of the colonial economic structure in Korea which relied on Japan for its capital, 
technology, and market.  In addition, the three-year long Korean War broke out in 1950 
devastating the already meagre economy, and the resulting damages amounted to 85 per cent of 
GDP in 1953.  The international community reacted upon such damage first with relief aid and 
later with construction aid.  After the Korean War, nearly 15 per cent of Korea‘s GNP and 80 per 
cent of its foreign reserves came from foreign aid, excluding military aid (Cole, 1971).   
 
Between 1950 and 1960, total aid of $2.41 billion was given to Korea by international donors, 
but the US was the primary source of the international aid; between 1948 and 1963, the US 
poured $1.8 billion into Korea (Kim, ChanJin, 2009, p. 34).     Korea‘s economy was absolutely 
dependent on foreign aid.  Between 1953 (the year that the Korean war was over) and 1960 (the 
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year before Park‘s coup), the US aid accounted for one-third of the Korean government budget, 
which was equivalent to 85 per cent of total imports and 75 per cent of gross fixed capital 
formation61 across the period (Kim, ChanJin, 2009, p. 34).   
 
In the meantime, Korea‘s foreign reserves gradually declined since 1961 due to the reduction in 
aid from the US and the expansionary policies of the new regime, which made the government 
increasingly concern about earning financial capital (FrankJr, et al., 1975, p. 15).  The US 
unilaterally announced drastic aid cut to Korea due to the general recession in the US.  US aid to 
Korea dropped from $371 million in 1957 to $220 million in 1959 (Kim, ChanJin, 2009, p. 36).  
Before the foreign policy change instituted by Park in 1963, Korea‘s exports were $55 million, 
foreign reserves were $168 million and the economic growth rate was 2.2 per cent in 1962.  In 
1963, foreign reserves fell to $114 million and the national economy was still sustained by 
foreign aid mainly from the US (Choi, Sang-oh, 2005).  In addition, the burden of debt was 
gradually growing, even though it did not reach the significant level, since the US began to 
substitute grants-in-aid with credit aid from the end of the 1950s (Kim, ChanJin, 2009, p. 34; 
Kim, Jiyoung, 2013, p.9 ).  
 
 
 
                                                 
61 Gross fixed capital formation means ―the total value of a producer‘s acquisitions, less disposals, of fixed assets 
during the accounting period plus certain additions to the value of non- produced assets (such as subsoil assets or 
major improvements in the quantity, quality or productivity of land) realised by the productive activity of 
institutional units‖  (OECD, 2001). 
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4.2 Initial conditions 
This section studies the period before the critical juncture of diplomatic normalisation between 
Korea and Japan.  The initial condition period is characterised by other possible options.  This 
section examines the other options Korea had and focuses on the process of narrowing-down of 
the options to the juncture.  Many writers in different schools have been analysing factors 
contributing to the 1965 normalisation treaty between Korea and Japan.  Initially, studies focused 
on the role and influence of historical animosity and individual political leaders (Lee, Chong-Sik, 
1985).  In the 1990s, the role of the US in the process of protracted negotiations received greater 
attention (Cha, 1996).  More recently, the focus moved to the domestic political economy of 
Korea and Japan (Yoon, Tae Ryong, 2008).  Even though the development of the 1965 
diplomatic normalisation is still an intriguing subject to many historians and social scientists 
focusing on the Pacific region, the thesis does not examine this issue closely.  Rather it aims to 
gain a better understanding of the elite perceptions of foreign aid which led to the normalisation.  
 
 
4.2.1 Alternatives: international consortium and domestic financial capital 
Park‘s government, as was the case with previous administrations, feared any aid from Japan.  
The elites in Korea worried that aid could be the beginning of a Japanese economic invasion 
which would lead to constraints in political autonomy.  It should be noted that Korea became 
independent from Japan only about fifteen years before Park took office.  In the beginning, 
alternative aid sources were sought, and the Korean elite favoured an international consortium 
for Korea‘s economic development.  However, the original plan did not go well.  In 1961 the 
Korean government made its first attempt to obtain funds but this had limited success; indeed, 
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little interest was shown by DAC in the OECD or by other potential donor countries such as 
Australia, Canada, the US, France and Germany.  In a further attempt, in November 1963, the 
Korean government asked the Canadian government to participate in the consortium for Korea‘s 
economic development and provided $1.9 billion to cover the first Five Year Development Plan; 
this further attempt did not succeed either (Chun, Taeck-Soo, 1999, pp. 130-135; Yoon, 
ByeongCheol, 2011).62   
 
In addition to seeking funds from the international consortium, the Park government chose to 
rely on local financial capital.  In order to attract dormant local capital, Park changed the 
currency from Hwan to Won in 1962.  He anticipated that there were hidden private capital in the 
domestic market, and when old banknotes became obsolete, the hidden capital owners would 
take the money out to exchange it for new currency.  However, this surprise change of currency 
led to the realisation that there was very little local capital available.  In addition, this sudden 
currency change was executed without the authorisation of the US government, who disapproved 
of it and brought unease to US-Korea relations (Kim, Chung-Yum, 2006, pp. 96-126). 
 
 
4.2.2 The Cold War, the US and Japan 
In a study of the long process of negotiation for diplomatic normalisation, Cha (1996) points out 
that the role of the US received attention relatively late in the 1990s.  Initial studies focused on 
                                                 
62  The international consortium, including Japan, was established in 1968.  The fact that the consortium was 
established only in 1968 means that at the time of the Korea-Japan diplomatic normalisation there was no other 
source of foreign financial capital for Korea‘s economic development.  
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the historical and emotional baggage of the two countries, which was a hindrance to diplomatic 
normalisation; this baggage included an inferiority complex of Koreans and a superiority 
complex of Japanese.63  Park was very aware of Japanese economic progress, and this personal 
factor was considered decisive to the normalisation.  Many writers have pointed out his personal 
inclination toward Japan as the critical contributing factor to Korea-Japan diplomatic 
normalisation.  In the 1990s, however, government documents on the 1965 Korea-Japan treaty in 
the US were declassified and these shed light on the role of the US and its interests; these 
documents were then studied as an important and previously missing piece of the puzzle in 
explaining the normalisation (Cha, 1996).  Now it is generally agreed that the US needed the 
Korea-Japan normalisation more than Japan did, and so the US pushed Japan to negotiate with 
Korea in a serious manner (Ahn, Soyoung 2008, p.114; Yoo, ByongYong, 2009).  The US-Japan-
Korea relations formed a critical part of the US world strategy, and, therefore, the diplomatic 
normalisation cannot be fully understood without knowledge of the role of the US. 
 
For the US, the purpose of the Marshall Plan was to contain Communism at an international 
level after World War II by rebuilding the economy and confidence in war-torn Europe.  Asia, 
unlike Europe, originally hardly existed in the minds of Americans.  This only changed around 
1948 when the Chinese Communist party achieved a political victory on the mainland.   US 
President Truman suggested a new Marshall Plan in Asia in his inaugural speech in 1949; this is 
also known as the Point Four Speech.  However, the Korean War in 1950 and its accompanying 
increase in military cost stopped the Asian version of the Marshall Plan.  During the following 
                                                 
63 For example, studies focused on the fact such as Rhee personally detested Japan and that the Japanese Prime 
Minister at the time, Yoshida Shigeru ignored Koreans. Yoshida Shigeru once described Koreans in Japan as "insects 
in the stomach of a lion with the potential to kill the lion itself if not checked" (Lee, quoted in Cha, 1996, p.128). 
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decade of the 1950s, under the Eisenhower administration, US aid was allocated in accordance 
with military strategy through the New Look policy.  The military-oriented aid-giving policy 
toward Korea altered in the late 1950s.  At that time, the Korean economy was overwhelmingly 
dependent on American aid.  Between 10 per cent and 23 per cent of GDP or 35 per cent to 50 
per cent of the government budget came from American aid throughout the 1950s.  The US 
prescribed neo-liberalist economic policies to Korea to overcome its aid dependence, and the US 
aid during the period was mainly in the form of consumer goods rather than aid for construction 
(Yoo, ByongYong, 1999 & 2009).  
 
In the late 1950s economic development emerged, for the first time as a goal of the US in 
providing aid to Korea.  The US government began to consider economic aid as a tool to raise 
the Korean people‘s confidence in US commitment (NSC 5702, 1957).  The economic 
coordinator, William Warne, was appointed to Korea in 1956 and strongly asserted the need for 
Korea to draw up its own economic plan.  His assertion influenced many Korean elites (Park, 
Tae-gyun, 2007, p. 41).  In 1958, the National Security Council of the US added a ―self-
supporting economy‖, again for the first time, as a long-term objective in Korea (NSC 5817, 
1958).  This shift, however, should be understood from the Cold War framework rather than from 
any perspective of international development.  As Wade (2007, p. 1) comments, 
―Americans...were extremely serious about accelerating economic development, because they 
saw this region (Korea) as the front-line in the battle against global communism and they needed 
to have economically prospering and politically stable allies on the front-line.‖    
 
The redirection toward economic development as a goal of US aid in Korea became even clearer 
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in the Kennedy administration.  McConaughy in April 1961, in his last report to his government 
before relinquishing his post as Ambassador in the American Embassy in Korea, suggested that 
―[a] carefully conceived and rigorously pursued long-range economic development plan is an 
absolute necessity, providing not only the blueprint for action but also the grounds for hope and a 
sense of achievement that would go with the formulation and execution of such a program‖ 
(Document 210, 1961).  Farley‘s report (Document 202, 1961)64  to Rostow, the economist and 
the President‘s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security emphasizes the need to shift 
emphasis towards developing the Korean economy instead of merely preventing it from going 
down (Document 204, 1961).  Another influential report by Robert W. Komer (Document 203, 
1961) also pointed out that ―underlying ills and needs (in Korea) are economic.‖  In the report, 
Komer suggested the solution of a decade-long commitment to (1) divert military aid to 
economic aid; (2) build up the economy of Korea by focusing on ―public sector, creation of light 
labour-intensive industry, and full utilisation of main ROK resource—people‖; (3) balance long-
term and short-term planning, and (4) a crackdown on corruption.  Komer (Document 226, 
1961), a few months later in a memorandum to the President‘s Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs, argued that previous US foreign aid was wrongly focused on military support 
and ―did little more than keep the economy afloat‖ rather than making it grow.  His arguments 
were in line with the Korea Task Force in the US which was formed about the same time.  What 
Farley, Rostow and Komer suggested became the basis for a newly redirected foreign policy 
toward Korea in the Kennedy administration.  Among these people, notably Rostow as an 
influential high ranking policy maker, redirected American foreign policy towards aid recipient 
                                                 
64 When Hugh D. Farley wrote this 18 page report he had just finished his post which was to be in charge of the 
Technical Assistance Program in Korea. 
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countries and had a huge impact on America‘s diplomatic path to Asian countries including 
Korea and also the Korea-Japan relationship.   Based on what Rostow designed, US aid policy 
turned to planned, public and more aid. 
 
Still, the pursuit of economic development in Korea was a product of the Cold War.  In Korea, 
the US chose economic growth under dictatorship, not democracy, as a more efficient tool to 
fight against international Communism.  Democratisation of South Korea was the cited reason 
for the US dividing the Korean peninsula into two.  Nevertheless, the US showed its ultimate 
interest was not democracy in South Korea but stability under a military junta as long as it is 
anti-Communist.  This Cold War calculation was behind Kennedy‘s swift acceptance of the 
military junta headed by Park, who took power in an unconstitutional way, as the ‗legitimate‘ 
head of Korea.  Kennedy tried to assure the Korean people by inviting Park to the White House 
soon after the coup to show America‘s confidence in him as a leader of Korea (Lee, WanBom, 
2009).  The Cold War policy of Kennedy was non-interference in domestic affairs as long as the 
nations are anti-Communist, and Park understood this very well.  His pursuit of the path to 
economic growth while sacrificing democratic advances was possible because of the attitude of 
the US.   Park had overambitious economic plans which the US sometimes did not support, but 
was very well aware that the US could not turn a cold shoulder to him as long as he kept Korea 
as a strong anti-Communist ally sharing a border with the Communist North Korea backed by 
the USSR (Shin, JongDae, 2009).  
 
The US government wanted to decrease its financial contribution to Korea and this placed 
pressure on Korea and Japan to normalise relations.  Also, aid to Korea was cut in 1964.  
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Eisenhower tried to build Japan as a base camp to contain Communism in Asia but this was not 
easy because the Japanese economy was not big enough to play a leading role in Asia and most 
Asian countries resisted the growing presence of the former Asian colonial power.  Later, during 
the Kennedy administration, Rostow and Komer both supported rapprochement between Korea 
and Japan.  In the 1960s, the Japanese economy became strong enough to carry some burdens 
and Komer (Document 255, 1962) advised Kennedy that normalisation of foreign relations 
between the two countries was important to the US and the US expected Japan to take ―a greater 
share of the burden of subsidising South Korea.‖  Thus, the Kennedy administration pushed both 
parties to normalisation (Document, 260, 1962).65  
 
At the same time, the US worried that Japan would see less incentive to sign the normalisation 
treaty since it would strengthen Korea‘s economy (Document 256, 1962).  In the beginning, 
Japan was not eager for normalisation with Korea.  Japan‘s lukewarm engagement with 
negotiations in the initial stage shows that the normalisation was not at the top of Japan‘s foreign 
affairs agenda although afterwards, despite that Japan later claimed that this was only a 
negotiation tactic (Ahn, Soyoung, 2008, p. 115).  Japan did not want to be trapped in Cold War 
politics by being engaged in South Korea, but at the same time, Japan feared being abandoned by 
the US (Yoon, Tae Ryong, 2008, p. 64).  Moreover, despite America‘s efforts to encourage Japan 
to be a new contributor of aid to Asian countries, the Japanese government was not willing to 
assume this role because of domestic factors, such as strong socialist forces, low GNP per capita, 
high interest rates, a large trade deficit of $400 million, lack of public interest in aid and 
                                                 
65 Yoo (2009, pp. 48-55) notes that most of America‘s foreign policy under Kennedy did not materialize and it was 
the Johnson administration that exerted strong influence on Korea and Japan relations. 
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increasing local demand on social welfare (Ahn, Soyoung, 2008).   
 
However, the Japanese political elite needed America‘s support for its survival.  Thus, under 
increasing pressure from the US, Japan began to show more willingness to negotiate with Korea.  
Finally, a newly-appointed Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister placed normalisation of Korea-
Japan relations at the top of the Japanese foreign affairs agenda, at his first press conference in 
1962 (The Dong-A Ilbo, 1962 July 19).66  The causes of the redirection of Japanese foreign aid 
policy in the 1960s can be found in factors outside Japan, especially the Johnson administration‘s 
Asian policy (Park, Tae-gyun, 2007, p. 180).  Although it is generally agreed that the US pressure 
was a decisive factor that led Japan to the negotiation table, some other internal and regional 
factors pushed forward normalisation too. 
  
First, Japan thought it was the best time to negotiate normalisation at a relatively low cost to 
Japan.  The Japanese government was well aware of the need for normalisation with Korea.  
Tokyo regarded Korea‘s new leader Park as providing an unprecedented opportunity to rebuild 
the relations at the possible lowest cost.  Japan understood that Korean people would also ask for 
more for compensation and Park, who needed money desperately and who could suppress such 
popular demand in an authoritarian military manner, would be the perfect leader to negotiate 
with.  In addition, Japanese businesspeople lobbied for normalisation partly because Korea was 
an untapped market for Japanese manufactured goods.  Moreover, many big projects in the 
second Economic Plan in Korea would be financed by Japan and this meant opportunities for 
                                                 
66 The next items on the ‗agenda‘ were building new commercial relations with the newly-organised EC, trade with 
Communist countries, and negotiations towards Britain-Japan economic cooperation. 
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Japanese firms since the financial package that the Japanese government would offer was 
expected to involve Japanese private firms (Cha, 1996, p.129).  In addition, geopolitically, Japan 
was feeling threatened by increasing hostility from Communist China.  Japan did not want a 
scenario of involving the collapse of economically crippled South Korea and the ultimate 
invasion by communists of Korea, which is within an hour‘s distance by ship from Japan. 
 
In this thesis, proper consideration is given to the motivations of the US and Japan because the 
elite in Korea were aware of these motivations and this affected the elite in Korea.  For instance, 
Park who was desperately seeking for ‗authorisation‘ from the US after the coup, stopped in 
Japan on his first trip to the US.  He, as a coup leader, needed something to assure the US that he 
was the appropriate leader for Korea.  He believed his commitment to Japan-Korea normalisation 
would win America‘s trust.  However, Yoon (2008) points out that those analyses focusing 
heavily on the pressure of the US is not plausible since it was a constant factor throughout the 
first, second and the third administration of Korea.  Thus, it is not sufficient to explain how the 
agreement was reached at that particular time, in 1963.   The changes in the US in 1963 were too 
subtle to force the elite in Korea and Japan to sign the treaty at the particular point.   Thus, the 
following section examines the internal conditions that affected the elite in Korea. 
 
 
4.2.3 Local demand for strong leadership  
The first republic of Korea was overthrown on April 19, 1961 by demonstrators that asked for 
stronger leadership.  Chang Myon, the president of the second administration was not a leader 
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who could fulfil this demand.  McConaughy, then US ambassador in Korea, sent a telegram to 
the White House in which he describes absence of leadership of Chang as ―an ingredient 
definitely lacking at present in Korean political scene‖ (Document 210, 1961).  A magazine titled 
Sasanggye (World of Thoughts) which was at the centre of debate by intellectuals in the 1960s 
introduced an article by Schlesinger titled ‗On Heroic Leadership: and the Dilemma of Strong 
Men and Weak Peoples‘.  The article asserted that ―by denying positive leadership a role within 
the democratic frame, it has tied the hands of democratic societies; by discouraging leadership, it 
has encouraged crisis‖ (Schlesinger, 1960, p. 11). This article represented the call for strong 
leadership in Korea in the beginning of the 1960s. 
 
In addition to the lack of strong leadership, there was relatively strong anti-Americanism in the 
1960s in Korea.  In the 1950s and 1960s, the US was more than just a friend to Korea.  For many 
Koreans, the US was a ―saviour‖ who set Koreans free from Japanese imperial occupation in 
1945, sent troops to set Koreans free from North Korean Communist oppression, and later sent 
millions of dollars of aid for restoration after the War (Shin, Gi-Wook, 2006a, p. 793; Kim, 
Seung-Hwan, 2002, p. 114).   However, after the April coup in 1960 which collapsed the Rhee 
administration, the anti-American climate became noticeable especially regarding to the active 
role of the US in division of Korea for the sake of America‘s quick international diplomatic 
victory in 1953 (Kim, Hyung-A, 2003b, pp. 126-129).  The high anti-American sentiment among 
Koreans before the military coup helped the emergence of the strong state formed by the military 
regime (Kim, Hyung A 2004, pp.48-54).  In addition, a call for Korea‘s independence from the 
US in government decision-making was rising after the event that the Korean government failed 
to imprison Korea-based American soldiers; they killed innocent Korean civilians but flew to the 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
US without standing in courts in Korea because Korea did not have judicial power over the 
crimes that American soldiers committed in Korea.67  Out of humiliation and anger, a university 
student criticised Korea‘s foreign policy for being ―Yes, Sir policy‖ (Lee, Seok-hwan, 1961, pp. 
31-32).  To compound matters, US aid management began to upset many intellectuals in Korea.  
American aid was criticised as being a tool to control Korea and to maximize the national benefit 
of the US at the expense of long-term development of Korea.  Sasanggye published articles 
calling for a new strategy for better management of foreign aid; without a better aid management 
Korea was expected to fall into the same aid dependence as South East Asia and Latin America 
(Cho & Bu, 1961, pp. 200-210; Kim, Hyung-A, 2003b, pp. 126-129).   
 
This national sentiment was reported to the US as well.  According to a telegram sent by the 
American Embassy to the US government in April 1961, a bilateral aid agreement between 
Korea and the US was regarded by Koreans as ―derogatory of their sovereignty.‖   However, the 
problem was not just the terms of aid.  The US decreased significantly its aid to Korea from 1960 
onwards, and US aid to Korea hit the lowest point in sixteen years in 1965.68  The Korean 
government, business people, and population were all dependent on aid from the US.  The 
reduction causes a national crisis and economists began to argue that it was time to change 
Korea‘s economic structure (Go, Seungje, 1960; Choi, Hojin, 1958).   These aid-related issues 
encouraged ―nationalism in Korea, delayed by war and reconstruction, now becoming an 
                                                 
67 According to the ROK-US Status-of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Korean government did not have judicial power 
on criminal activities committed by American Army based in Korea.  
 
68 The amount of US aid fell from $216.4 million in 1963 to $149.3 million in 1964 (Han, 1978, p. 59). 
 
 
 
 
 
141 
 
important factor in Korean life‖ (Document 210, 1961).69 The anti-American sentiment at the 
beginning of the 1960s is noteworthy because Korea was still dependent on the US for its 
survival at that time.  Anti-American sentiment, or nationalism, was a fertile ground for 
industrial mercantilism among Korean decision-makers. 
 
It is ironic that the intellectuals in Korea in the beginning of the 1960s called for a ―young and 
revolutionary leader‖ in order to build a ―liberal democratic nation‖ (Kim, Sanghyeon, et al., 
1960). The military coup in May 1961 gave Koreans the young and revolutionary leader they 
wanted but what he built was far from being a liberal democratic nation.  However, his 
revolutionary and strong leadership worked for restructuring the nation‘s economy.  In this sense, 
according to Kim Hyung A (2004, p.64), the military coup should be understood not only in 
terms of discontent within the military but also in terms of the ―Korean popular demand for total 
reform‖ as expressed by ―liberal intellectual, politically sensitive urban citizens and students,‖ 
and the call for strong leadership was ―perhaps‖ stronger than the call for democracy itself.  That 
demand for strong leadership facilitated not only the military coup but also the subsequent strong 
government drive to industrialisation.  Industrialisation, in developing countries with a 
comparative advantage with labour, is a process that requires a powerful state drive as a 
precondition.  Park‘s regime could exercise the strong state leadership as a response to Koreans‘ 
popular demand, and this became a ground for industrial mercantilism to flourish.   
 
The demand for strong leadership can also be understood against the background of a threat 
                                                 
69 Kim Hyung-A (p.94) rightfully notes that the emergence of anti-American sentiment after the April Student 
Revolution should not overshadow deep-rooted anti-Americanism regarding the division of its country into North 
and South. 
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perception about national survival.  A number of scholars agreed that an external threat may 
boost industrialisation and economic development of a state.  Cumings (1984) researched 
economic development in East Asia and asserted that the existence of external enemies was the 
root of economic development, citing the examples of North Korea to South Korea and mainland 
China to Taiwan.  Rostow (1971, p. 61) also concluded that the threat or resentment of external 
enemies promoted industrial restructuring for take-off.  In addition to the emergence of 
Communist China and Vietnam, North Korea posed a threat to Korea.  Indeed, North Korea was 
not just an ideological threat.  The presence of North Korea and the initial economic advances of 
North Korea that outpaced that of South Korea came as a threat to the South Korean elites and 
population.  However, the economic and industrial progress that North Korea made in the 1950s, 
at the same time, acted as stimuli to the South Korean government.  North Korea launched the 
‗Three Year Economic Plan‘ in 1954 and the first ‗Five Year Plan‘ in 1957 and made excellent 
progress in developing heavy industry.  According to reports from the North Korean government, 
during the first Five year Plan between 1957 and 1960, total manufacturing output increased by 
3.5 times.  Even though the number was probably exaggerated by the North Korean government, 
it is still true that North Korea was establishing fast economic growth in comparison to South 
Korea and other Asian countries.  Park‘s regime felt threatened by North Korea‘s fast economic 
growth and set its economic growth rate as high as 7.1 per cent despite disagreement from the 
US, and his intention was to outpace North Korea (Park, Tae-gyun, 2007, p. 37).  Kim Kyong-
Dong (1988, p. 206) also argues that Park‘s government had no other option but to announce 
South Korea‘s first Five Year Economic Development Plan as a counterplan to North Korea‘s 
Economic Plan ―to overcome the sense of insecurity and to ensure the survival as a nation‖ from 
the threat of North Korea. 
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4.2.4 The elite in Korea  
In this thesis, the Cold War dynamics and local conditions are approached as factors that affect 
the elite perceptions of national security and wealth around the foreign policy change.  However, 
to understand the foreign policy redirection fully, in addition to the question asking what affected 
the elite, another question should be raised: who were the elites?  After that, the thesis can 
properly examine why the lingering negotiations over diplomatic normalisation ended.  In what 
follows, the thesis looks at the elite who made the foreign policy decisions: Park Chung-hee, his 
military elites, and new technocrats.  However, prior to surveying those elites, as background, the 
role of land reform is introduced due to its significance in the emergence of the new elites.   
 
Land reform is ―an essential requirement to promote the pace and direction of development‖ and 
is critical to wider economic growth (Leftwich, 2000, p. 6).  The role of land reform in opening 
the door of national development in Korea is so critical that it is generally agreed that had Korea 
not conducted land reform in the 1950s, there would not have been later economic growth (Lie, 
1998; Leftwich, 2000).  Land reform in Korea contributed to economic growth and political 
stability through turning poor and unmotivated tenants into active landowning farmers and 
abolishing traditional landowning class in a Korean society as a whole.   
 
In addition, especially in this thesis, land reform played even more critical role in emergence of 
new elites in the 1960s in Korea.  Land reform was not only a solution to rural poverty but also it 
undermined the power and influence of agrarian elites who hindered industrialisation (Lie, 1998, 
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pp. 12-13).   The land reform carried out in Korea in 1950 contained three main features: first, a 
landowner should be the cultivator of the land he/she owns; second, no one can own more than 3 
jungbo, which is equivalent to less than 3 hectares or 7.5 acres; and third, it is illegal to rent 
agricultural land (Jeon & Kim, 2000, p. 254).  The government bought agrarian land from 
landlords at the price of 1.5 times its annual crop yields, slightly lower than market price, and 
former tenants paid the same amount in five years, which ultimately discounted the price to 1.25 
times the annual yield (Ban, et al., 1980, pp. 288-9; Jeon & Kim, 2000, pp. 258-9). 
 
The land reform fundamentally reshaped socioeconomic structure of Korea.  Before the reform, 
for more than half a millennium, the ruling class in Korea had been the landed gentry called 
yangban. The yangban dominated Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910), and the domination continued 
under Japanese occupation.  Japan never challenged yangban domination in countryside, and, in 
fact, Japan consolidated the agrarian elite as a part of Japanese rule since the oppressive tenure 
system served the Japanese Empire reasonably well by doubling Korea‘s crop export to Japan 
(Lie, 1998, p. 7; Ban, et al., 1980, p. 283).   Thus, land reform brought in a radical change in 
social stratum which had long been dominated by the yangban whose source of power and 
privilege was land ownership.  When post-independence government discussed land reform in 
the National Assembly and finally the reform became effective in 1950, the yangban or 
landholding class did not have political power to represent themselves in the Assembly because 
of their pro-Japan activities during the colonial period (Jeon & Kim, 2000, p. 257).   As a result, 
in 1944, the richest 3 per cent of rural households owned 64 per cent of all the cultivated lands, 
while 58 per cent did not own any piece of land to cultivate, but in 1956, the top 6 per cent 
owned 18 per cent only (Lie, 1998, pp. 11-12; You, 2005, p. 22).  The yangban virtually 
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disappeared and countryside became ―a sea of small landholders‖ (Lie, 1998, p. 15).  Elites in 
Park‘s regime, especially military elites, were sons of those small landholders and it was only 
logical that they chose industrialisation as a national development strategy.  They did not have a 
strong agricultural class resisting industrialisation drive and, more importantly, they did not have 
any personal interest in promoting agricultural industry.  At last, the completion of land reform 
competed what Jeseph Schumpter (1954, pp. 81-86) called creative destruction which began with 
mass movement under Japanese rule in the 1930s and Korea War.   From this background, 
following section examines the elite in Park‘s regime. 
 
(a) Park Chung-hee 
Park started his career as a teacher after graduating from Deagu Teacher‘s College (Daegu 
Sabeom Haggyo) in 1937.  This was one of three teacher‘s colleges sponsored by the colonial 
state of Japan.  His primary job, as a Japanised teacher, was teaching Korean pupils according to 
the assimilation policy of Japan (Kim, Hyung A, 2004, p. 16).  Three years later, he resigned and 
entered Manchuko Military School in Xingjing and later the Japanese Military Academy in 1942 
as one of the top-honoured students in Manchuko Military School.70  After graduation, he was 
assigned to the 8th Corps of Japanese Infantry as Second Lieutenant and his job was spying on 
local population.  This corps was infamous for suppression of Korean and Chinese guerrillas 
who fought against Japan.  He voluntarily Japanised his name to Takaki Masao while he was at 
the Manchuko School and later changed his name again to Okamoto Minoru to make it closer to 
a true Japanese name.  He used his Japanese name until the independence of Korea in August 
1945.   
                                                 
70 He graduated from the Manchuko Miltary School as dux of his class. 
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When back in Korea, he became a Korean soldier as opposed to a Japanese one, and joined 
Namlodang, a Communist party.  Later, under the hardcore anti-Communist Rhee administration, 
he was at risk of execution for his Communist history, but he avoided the death penalty in 
exchange for providing information on his Communist comrades in the army.  Because of his 
connection with Manchurian Military School he managed to serve in the army again and that 
helped to promote him to a high–ranking officer who could successfully organize and execute 
the military coup on 16 May 1962 (Hong, SeongTae, 2007, p. 33).  
 
Park‘s role is critical and decisive in Korea-Japan normalisation.  He was the absolute decision 
maker and, despite some debate about it, was pro-Japanese.  Park was educated in Japan, served 
as a soldier in the Japanese Army before 1945, respected Japanese figures, spoke Japanese, and 
sang Japanese songs when he was drunk (Lee, Joonsik, 2002; Ryu, Dongmin, 2004).  Most 
historians point out that Park‘s the pro-Japanese attitude was one of the factors helping the 
normalisation process.  However, one can also find numerous remarks by Park that show anti-
Japanese sentiment, especially after he became the president.  Thus, when Park visited Germany 
in 1964, the German Prime Minister recommended that Park should speed up the normalisation 
process and gave the example of German-French reconciliation.  Park responded: 
―Korea-Japan relations should be normalised as soon as possible....But Korea-Japan 
relations are different from German-French relations. You fought each other fairly with 
might and main. Thus it is also easy to apologize and correct the past wrongdoings. 
However, we were stabbed in the back (by the Japanese) without having a chance to fight 
a war with Japan... That‘s why our people have bad feelings toward them‖ (Yoon, Tae 
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Ryong, 2008, p.80 [emphasis added by Yoon])71. 
 
In sum, given the series of metamorphoses of Park, from Park Chung-hee to Okamoto Minoru, 
then back to Park Chung-hee, to Communist, and finally to nationalist coup leader, he seemed to 
be a successful opportunist instead of a genuine nationalist.  Extrapolating from his past, it seems 
that industrialisation became the new ideology he adopted for his survival and ambition as a 
coup leader of an impoverished country.     
 
(b) Military elite  
Even though the Korean elite groups have a long history of Confucian culture, the elite in Park‘s 
regime had something else in common apart from Confucianism.  Park took power by military 
coup and his colleagues were appointed to almost every influential post, and notably, at the 
centre of the coup, there was the Military Academy‘s Eighth Class of 1949.  The members of the 
Eighth Class shared a stronger sense of unity than other classes, arguably because they suffered 
the most casualties during the Korean War; the class produced the biggest number of graduates, 1 
345, but after the War only 450 were alive.  The sense of sacrifice gave them a distinctive sense 
of pride, nationalism and an egalitarian mentality.  They regarded themselves as a reformist 
pressure group which represented the grievance of junior officers who had made a big sacrifice 
during the Korean War but did not get rewarded in promotion properly due to the stagnated and 
lopsided military hierarchy which, they thought, was based on factionalism and favouritism by 
President Rhee and the US military advisors (Kim, Hyung-A, 2003b, pp. 135-137).   They were 
ambitious and highly respected by members of other classes of the Academy.  Interestingly and 
                                                 
71 Yoon quoted this originally from Lee Dongwon (1992, pp. 98-100). 
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importantly, most of the Eighth Class soldiers had rural backgrounds including Park (Kim, 
Hyung A, 2004, p.60).   
 
The militaristic culture of these elite influenced Korean society as a whole.  Park‘s policies that 
empowered heads of enterprises and suppressed labour also stem from the regime‘s militaristic 
understanding of organisational structures.  The political leadership that initiated the 
development plan was also militaristic (Kang, Junman, 2004b, p. 84; Kim, Kyon-Dong, 1988, p. 
213).  As Huntington (1968) points out, in most newly-independent states, the armed forces are 
one of the few bureaucratic organisations exposed to a modernised system of national 
management.  Armies are one of the groups that most embody ―the spirit of rapid technological 
change,‖ (Pye, 1961, p. 83) in less modernised transitional societies.   The elite in the military 
forces in Korea could take advantage of their exposure to the process of liberalisation and could 
gain from their experiences during the Korean War while fighting the Communist army of North 
Korea and China in conjunction with the US armed forces.  However, although the army as the 
political elite was exposed to the ―modernised‖ world, this is not a sufficient reason to explain 
their commitment to economic development.  As one can easily see in cases of African military 
coups and their aftermath, a military regime ends up looking after its own interests rather than 
pursuing economic development.  Therefore, the mere existence of the military elite is not 
enough to explain the characteristics of the regime that redirected foreign policy with the aim of 
industrial mercantilism in Korea. 
 
(c) New elite 
In Park‘s regime, the top management positions were filled with military men.  Another 
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distinctive figure of that ‗regime elite‘ was that the military elite were supplemented or supported 
by newly replaced technocrats.  Two months after the coup, the new regime dismissed 6 900 civil 
servants.72  Soon after, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) discharged another 1 863 
civil servants, and in 1962 banned 4 374 former politicians from political activities.  These 
dismissals were presented as a total reform of society to save Korea, but they were mainly aimed 
at building Park‘s political base with the young elite replacing the old politicians (Kim, Hyung A, 
2004. p.73).    
 
The vacancy arising from these dismissals were filled with fresh young competent bureaucrats 
selected on merit through a government exam.  The bureaucracy of preceding regimes was 
neither effective nor organised.  Korea had competitive civil service exams to select competent 
bureaucrats since about 500 B.C., and passing this exam meant enormous prestige (Cheng, et al., 
1999, pp. 100-105).  However, the tests became careless and ineffective when Korea was 
subjected to the Japanese occupation, the Korean War, and the chaos of nation building after the 
War.  Thus, restoring the examination system was one of the first items on Park‘s agenda.  The 
National Civil Service Exam Law was adopted in 1963 to build the basis for professional 
bureaucrats across the nation. That Law marks the beginning of a meritocratic bureaucracy in 
Korea (Lee, Hahn-Been, 1968). The restoration was based on three principles: (1) open and 
competitive tests as a basis for appointments in general; (2) evaluation of performance on a 
particular post as a basis for promotion; and (3) job security for all public servants (Kim & 
Leipsiger, 1993, p. 30).  The new system enabled Park‘s regime to secure more competent 
bureaucratic manpower as to support his regime. 
                                                 
72 6,700 were dismissed for evasion of military service and the rest for keeping mistresses. 
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Park‘s regime succeeded in securing new and competent government servants through the 
reformed national exams.  They could execute government plans for national economic 
development.  However, the regime did not have talented officials who could plan and make 
decisions about long-term economic development, to transform industry.  In the 1950s, in 
common with other developing countries, Korea suffered brain drain.  According to Yoon (1992, 
p.6), the situation was as follows: 
As of 1967, the percentage of drain for Korean engineers, natural scientists, and social 
scientists were 80.0%, 97.7% and 90.5% respectively (the corresponding world 
comparisons are 30.2%, 35.0% and 34.6%). Significantly, aggregate overseas Korean 
―brains‖ outnumbered those in Korea: As of 1965, those who had a doctoral degree at 
home totaled 79 whereas Korean scientists and engineers in the United States along 
(although not all of them had PhD‘s) numbered approximately 869. 
 
Accordingly Park initiated policies to reverse the brain drain and recruit high level Korean 
technicians from outside Korea.  Recruiting highly educated Koreans from abroad was done in a 
systematic way.  According to the Ministry of Science and Technology, which was in charge of 
the reverse brain drain programme, recruiting was conducted by following strict government 
instructions and rules.  There were governmental requirements for repatriation.   Thus, the 
requirements were for scientists or technicians who had had at least a two-year working career 
after gaining a PhD degree, with Korean ancestors and at least five published research papers in 
the past five years.  Various incentives were offered to people who qualified and these included 
material compensation, research autonomy and technocratic authority, but mostly nationalism 
and patriotism was used to appeal to them (Yoon, Bang-Soon, 1992, p. 7).  The state-led reverse 
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brain drain brought back 553 highly educated PhD holders between 1968 and 1980, and they 
mainly worked at public R & D institutes such as the Korea Institute of Science and Technology 
(KIST). KIST was founded in 1966 as a part of administrative reform for repatriated scientists in 
order for the industries targeted by government to develop strategically.  These industries 
included electronics, chemistry, genetic engineering, and computers.   The status of researchers 
and their work in KIST, as a government think tank, were insulated from political interference 
(Yoon, Bang-Song, 1992).   
 
The elite technicians repatriated from abroad were appointed to positions where they could 
influence decision-making.  Before the Park regime carried out the bureaucratic restructuring, 
technical experts worked under administrative staff in the bureaucratic hierarchy.  Taking the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) as an example, under a minister and deputy minister 
were four directors-general who were in charge of the Bureaus of Industry, Mining, Electricity, 
and Commerce and Trade.  The top positions in those four Bureaus were occupied by 
administrative staff, and technicians were ―systematically sidelined or weeded out‖ (Kim, Hyung 
A, 2004, p.77).   In 1962, however, two assistant deputy ministers, elite technicians themselves, 
were appointed for restructuring the MCI.73   They appointed new young technical elites as 
directors-general in three bureaus of Industry, namely that of Mining and Electricity and 
appointed an expert from a private bank in the Bureau of Commerce and Trade.  Through this 
type of bureaucratic restructuring, the decision-making positions, or elite, in Park‘s 
administration came to be held by technocrats with practical knowledge, and these new elites 
                                                 
73 Of the two assistant deputy ministers, Ham, Inyoung received his PhD in the US in mechanical engineering and 
Seong, Changyoung was a qualified electrical engineer. 
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became the foundation of Korea‘s economic and industrial policy onwards.   
 
In sum, when Park and his military elites took power, the survival of the nation was threatened, 
economically by the drastically cut US aid and militarily by the growing presence of North 
Korea which was outpacing the economic growth of South Korea.  In the midst of the sense of 
crisis, Korean people, who were fed up with century of a weak and incapable state, were calling 
for strong state.  Internationally, the US also was looking for a strong state in Korea which was 
capable of proceeding America‘s new Korea policy of boosting Korea‘s domestic economy as 
part of its international fight against Communists.  Park and his military elites made best use of 
this domestic and international atmosphere.  Even though it does not seem that Park and the 
military elite were genuinely nationalistic, they believed that building the national economy was 
the way for them to survive in relation to the Korean populous and with the US.   In addition, 
most of the military elites were sons of small farmers who were created by the land reform.  
Therefore, they did not have any vested interest in sticking to agricultural business.  Thus, the 
logical option for Park and his elites for their survival and prosperity was economic growth 
through industrialisation.  
 
 
 
4.3 Path-dependent aid independence  
The thesis argues that the main explanation for Korea‘s aid independence is the elite‘s perception 
of foreign aid: industrial mercantilism. Industrial mercantilism is based on the view that 
industrialisation and manufacturing are the keys to survival of a nation, and for the elite in 
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Korea, it meant the keys to survival of their own political position as well.  As was noted earlier 
in the thesis, historically, industrial mercantilism is a branch of mercantilism, a belief that 
explains policies in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries.  Industrial mercantilism emerged with 
the Industrial Revolution in Britain when the capacity for manufacturing goods came to be 
considered more important than gold for the survival of states.  The power of nations was 
believed to lie in their manufacturing capability.  The key to security in industrial mercantilism is 
capacity for manufacturing.  Even though industrial mercantilism is a concept that can address 
the foreign policy behaviour of aid-recipient countries which seek industrialisation through 
foreign aid, it has never been studied from that particular angle.  Industrial mercantilism was 
always regarded as an exclusive policy and behaviour for developed countries.  Theorists and 
policy makers at the time of the Industrial Revolution, similar to many of today‘s political 
economists, believed that industrial mercantilism is the foundation for economic growth and 
survival of the state. 
 
Many renowned scholars have asserted that industrialisation is necessary for economic 
development and self-sufficiency.  In recent times, most countries which established rapid 
economic growth went through the experience of industrialisation. Therefore, in order to find 
solutions to aid dependence, poverty and economic underdevelopment, one must examine why 
some countries fail to escape the ―no-industrialisation trap‖ (Murphy, et al., 1989, p. 1004).   
After the critical juncture of diplomatic normalisation, Korea entered the path of industrialisation 
and escaped this trap. 
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4.3.1 The breakthrough: From reparation to economic cooperation 
The negotiations between Korea and Japan began in 1951.   In the initial rounds, financial 
restitution was the main contentious issue (Lee, Hyunjin, 2008,  p. 73).  The first three rounds of 
negotiation took place under the Rhee administration (1951 – 1958) and were deadlocked 
because the gap was too wide between the amount of money Korea asked for and what Japan 
was willing to offer.  Moreover, Japan asked for claims for reparation which provoked Rhee and 
the Korean population to fury.  In a 1952 meeting, Korea demanded $2.7 billion in claims, but 
Japan was ready to offer only $70 million, which, according to Japan, took into account $2.3 
billion of Japanese foregone properties and assets left in Korea.  In 1953, pro-imperialist 
statements by Kubota Kanichiro angered the Korean negotiators,74 and the talks between the two 
countries were postponed sine die.  They only continued when Park resumed negotiations after 
the coup. 
 
In contrast to the two administrations before Park, industrialisation was the hallmark of Park‘s 
regime.  In an autobiography, Park explicitly notes that ―I want to emphasize and re-emphasize 
that the key factor of the May 16 Military Revolution was to effect an industrial revolution in 
Korea‖ (Park, Chung-Hee, 1963, p. 259).  In addition, his memoirs, published in 1979, begin 
with his declaration: ―Economic development and modernisation have been the single most 
                                                 
74 In the third round of negotiation (6 October 1953 – 21 October 1953), Japan was still asking for the right to claim 
Japanese assets in Korea. When Kubota Kanichiro was asked by his Korean counterpart whether he thought that 
Japanese and Koreans had equal opportunity to accumulate the wealth under Japanese occupation, Kubota answered 
―when it goes to details, we cannot finish the story.  Capitalist system treated them equally for the last 36 years‖ and 
he added ―Korea would naturally have been occupied by some other country (if it were not Japan), and would have 
experienced a more miserable situation than under Japanese rule" (Ahn, Soyoung, 2008,  p.163; Cha, 1996, p.131) .  
This speech inflamed the anger of Koreans and the third round came to an end.  Korea and Japan did not have 
further negotiations until 1958 due to his remarks.   
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important object of the Korean government over the last decade or so‖ (Park, Chung-Hee, 1979, 
p. 7).  His rule began with his successful coup in 1962 and ended with his assassination in 1979; 
during this time, industrialisation was the keynote of his regime. 
  
When examining the rhetoric in the presidential election campaign in 1963, which took place a 
year before the diplomatic normalisation, Kim Hyung-A (2003a, p.89) points out anti-
flunkeyism75 against the US has two priorities: ―Korea-first‖ and ―economy-first‖.  In Nation, 
Revolution and I, which was published a few days after Park announced his presidential 
candidacy two years after the coup, Park points out that 52 per cent of the national budget in 
1961 was US aid and so Koreans must understand that the US therefore has 52 per cent of a 
voice in Korean domestic affairs.  Park perceived the high degree of aid dependence on the US 
as being a threat to Korea, as Korea‘s government would instantly close down if US aid were 
withdrawn (Park, Chung-Hee, 1963, p. 22). 
 
In order to carry out the first Five Year Plan, $426 million was asked for, but only 30 per cent of 
the target was met by the end of 1964 (Kim, 2008, p. 137).  In addition, the US aid was in 
decrease.  Against this backdrop, selecting alternative source for aid, Park preferred bilateral aid 
because he believed that bilateral aid would be easier to restrict donor intervention than 
multilateral aid given by international financial institutions (Kim, Jiyoung, 2013, p. 20).  Among 
potential bilateral donors, Park‘s regime selected Japan as potential source of foreign aid for the 
sake of economic development, because Korea‘s economy was closely connected to Japan‘s and 
                                                 
75 Anti-flunkeyism refers to the sentiment of people in small countries which resists becoming a servant nation of a 
bigger nation.  Kim, Hyung-A (2003b, p. 131) notes that Kim Ilsung‘s Juche ideology in North Korea also has the 
notion of anti-flunkeyism in it but there is no evidence that the elite in Korea was influenced by the Juche ideology. 
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monetary compensation was expected from Japan following diplomatic normalisation (Yoo, 
Byong-Yong, 2009, p. 35).  Park thought very highly of Japan.  Moreover, many core members 
of the elite who determined economic policy, such as Park Choong-Hoon and Kim Chung-Yum, 
who had been educated in Japan, felt likewise; they regarded Japan as a model that Korea should 
learn from and replicate.  In addition, Park felt that Korea should enter the Japan-centred Asian 
regional model designed by the US for the security and economic growth of Korea (Chung, Jina, 
2011, p.97).  Indeed, Park‘s regime announced its willingness to rebuild the severed diplomatic 
relationships with Japan only a week after the coup.  Park said; 
―more than anything else, we need money.  Even though the US helps us, I can‘t expect 
that the US would double its aid and I can‘t trust the US.  But we can demand money 
from Japan justifiably.  It is a huge loss for the nation if anyone destroys that financial 
source in the name of anti-Japanese sentiment or humiliation‖ (Lee, Do-Sung, 1995, p. 
31).76   
 
Park‘s search for money, especially for industrialisation, was recognised by the US as well.  
According to a US government document on the Korea-Japan negotiations, the US was 
acknowledging the challenges and possible breakthrough as:  
―ROK animosity stemming from thirty-five years of Japanese rule in Korea was long the 
chief obstacle; ROK claims were ridiculously high. The new ROK military regime, howe
ver, is interested in an early settlement because General Pak needs money for his ambitio
us development program (emphasis added)‖ (Document 255, 1962).  
 
In the fourth round of negotiations, Japan‘s new Kishi administration proposed an important step 
forward by withdrawing their own repatriation claims and by apologising for Kubota‘s 
                                                 
76 Quoted in Kim Hyung-A, 2004, p. 94.   
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statements.  Kishi also needed to get the treaty signed.  Before the upcoming election, he had to 
resolve the Peace line77 issue, and he was aware that successful negotiation with Korea would 
give him a bigger leverage in upcoming negotiation with the US.   The fourth round is important 
because from then onwards, the negotiation was taken over by top-level officials in the state 
elite, rather than hands-on staff.   
 
Korea and Japan disagreed vehemently over the terms and interpretation of reparation, which 
were the biggest impediments to any progress on negotiations.  As Ahn Soyoung (2008) 
elaborates, through her close examination of Japanese assembly records, the reparation issue was 
a matter of national sentiment to Korea and to Japan.  The breakthrough, as she correctly points 
out, came from the change of the meaning and purpose of compensation: from ‗reparation‘ to 
‗economic cooperation‘.  This was a ground-breaking conceptual shift initiated by Park‘s 
government in the sixth round of negotiations in 1961.  The Kim Jong Pil78-Ohira meeting, 
which practically concluded the negotiations successfully, mainly addressed economic 
cooperation and how to expedite that process.  Following the change of emphasis to economic 
cooperation rather than reparation, the two governments agreed on a $300 million grant for 
economic cooperation and $2 billion in low long-term and low-interest loans.79 
                                                 
77 The Peace line, which was also called the Rhee line, was unilaterally declared by Korea‘s Rhee administration 
in1952 when the Korean government was angered by Japanese passive participation in Korea-Japan negotiation.  
Instead of the international norm of three miles, Rhee announced that its territorial waters extended for 60 miles 
offshore around the Korean peninsula.   In 1952, Korea arrested around 1,000 Japanese fishermen crossing the 60-
mile line which provoked Japanese public opinion and politicians to fury. 
 
78 Kim Jong Pil was the second-in-command in the coup and became Prime Minister under Park after the coup. 
 
79 The Korean government used anti-normalisation protest as a means to increase its bargaining leverage in the 
negotiation (Yoon, Tae Ryong 2008).    
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On the subject of why the conceptual shift from compensation to economic cooperation did not 
take place before Park, Lee Hyunjin (2008, p.83) suggests two reasons.  First, before Park, the 
Japanese economy was too immature to offer any type of economic cooperation, and second, 
Korea was receiving a large amount of US aid in the 1950s.  The Rhee administration did not 
need to approach Japan at the risk of losing legitimacy because it was able to survive with US 
aid.   The top priority of the first administration was to maximize US aid and not to get economic 
cooperation from Japan or any other country.  To fulfil the need for US aid, Rhee could simply 
use the anti-Communist sentiment against North Korea.  Moreover, economic development is 
less of a concern to Rhee than domestic politics or international diplomacy (Kim, ChanJin , 
2009, p. 36).  In addition, for most Koreans who recently suffered under Japanese occupation, 
any economic cooperation with Japan was interpreted as economic submission to Japan. 
 
However, the key members of the elite, notably newly recruited technocrats participating in the 
negotiation process with Japan, saw industrialisation rather than more aid as a way to the 
survival of nation.   For instance, Kim Chung-Yum participated in the negotiations from March 
1964 as a representative member for compensation claims and was in charge of negotiating with 
Japan on cooperation in economic development.  He was one of the elite who was recruited in 
the reverse brain drain and had studied economics in Japan and the US. Kim was one of many 
ardent industrialists who saw the future of Korea‘s economy in a Japanese model of export-
oriented industrialisation, Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI), and ultimately in high-tech 
industry; he did not see any benefit in import substitution industry (Kim, Chung-Yum, 2006, 
p.145).  After the negotiations onwards, he played a significant role in designing Korean 
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economic policies under Park‘s presidency, and held the positions of Minister of Finance, 
Minister of Commerce and Industry, and Chief Presidential Secretary.  He was the longest-
serving Secretary with nine years and three months working under Park.  Chang Ki-Young, 
another critical and influential technocrat, led the behind-the-scene negotiations at the final stage 
of the normalisation deal, and he shared the belief in industrialisation for economic development 
(DongA Ilbo, 1964, p. 1).  After signing the treaty with Japan he was appointed as Vice Prime 
Minister and Minister of Economic Planning Board and he drove the export-oriented 
industrialisation, backed by the President in the beginning of Korea‘s industrialisation era (Kim, 
MyeongSoo, 1999, p. 51).  
 
 
4.3.2 Reinforcement: Money for building a steel mill   
Diplomatic normalisation with Japan provided Korea with the financial capital and technology 
needed to complete the first Five Year Economic Development Plan (FYEP).  As a result, Korea 
succeeded in transforming its national industry basis from agriculture to light industry.  The path 
of industrial mercantilist foreign policy reinforced the pursued path based on the frame of 
industrial mercantilism.  The next important event concerning foreign economic policy and 
economic development took place when Korea aimed to restructure its industry again. On this 
occasion the reinforcement shaped the path from light industry to heavy and chemical industry 
(HCI) based on the second FYEP.   
 
The construction of Pohang Steel Company (now POSCO) and a petrochemical complex were 
two core projects of the second FYEP (1967-1971).  In 1967, eighteen companies from the US, 
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Britain, West Germany, and Italy formed the Korea International Steel Association (KISA). 80  
They secured funding for the projects, and helped negotiations between the Korean government 
and donor entities including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
Export-Import Bank of the United States, and the Government of the respective countries.  
Unfortunately, however, the international environment did not favour building steel mills in 
developing countries, following failed projects in India, Turkey, Mexico and Brazil.  Despite 
KISA‘s efforts, the likelihood of Korea building a steel mill seemed very slim at the end of 1968.  
Because of this, Park asked Kim Hak-ryeol,81 an influential technocrat who led a drive towards 
heavy-chemical industry at the front line as Vice Prime Minister and Minister of the Economic 
Planning Board, and Kim Chung-Yum to discuss the possibility of cooperation with Japan in 
building a steel mill (Kim, DongHo, 2012, p. 139).  This request was made at the second Cabinet 
Meeting between Korea and Japan in August 1968.  The three-day meeting mainly focused on 
asking for cooperation from Japan.  The Korea representatives emphasised that Japan had been 
excluded from KISA due to anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea, but Japanese cooperation with the 
much-needed steel mill project would turn national sentiment towards Japan, which would 
benefit Japan as well (Kim, Chung-Yum, 2006, p.175).  Ohira, the Japanese counterpart did not 
agree to cooperate, but accepted Korea‘s offer to send an investigation team to Korea.  In the 
meantime, the International Economic Consultative Organisation for Korea (IECOK) and the 
Export and Import Bank of the US sent official confirmation that they would not support the 
                                                 
80 France joined the Associates later. 
 
81 Kim Hak-ryeol, a member of the first generation of technocrats, was educated in Japan and started his career in 
government after passing the government exam.  But soon after he went to the US to study economics in a graduate 
school in the US.  He was invited to Park‘s regime after the latter‘s stay in the US and he worked as one of the most 
influential technocrats who restructured Korea‘s national economy (Choi, UJik, 1972, pp. 96-99) 
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steel mill project in April 1969 and May 1969, respectively.   
 
Finally, in December 1969, Korea and Japan signed the Basic Treaty on Integrated Iron and Steel 
Mill between Korea and Japan.  The biggest concern was over the economic viability of the 
project.  In order to decrease the input cost, the Korean government proposed to bear the cost of 
building infrastructure such as a port, roads, and railways around the steel mill.   Another funding 
obstacle arose from the original agreement which indicated the purpose of funding by Japan.  
The funds were originally intended for the agricultural sector, only.  However, after several 
rounds of negotiations with Japan, the Korean policy makers succeeded in nullifying the original 
stipulation on the purpose of the funding and as a result, the funding could be used to build the 
foundry (Hong, Hasang, 2005).  In addition, Park decided to use most of the $300 million 
granted by Japan plus another $200 million in loans; this was agreed at the 1965 treaty on 
building the mill in order to minimize pressure on the Korean government‘s budget.  This was 
not an easy political decision in a situation with many conflicting priorities for compensation 
money.  Many interest groups deservedly asked for government compensation to be paid from 
the money from Japan; they included those who lost private assets under Japanese rule and those 
whose assets were damaged by the rearrangement of the Peace Line which was part of what the 
Korean government gave to Japan in the normalisation negotiation.  It is well-known in Korea 
that before Park announced the decision to spend the money from Japan not on compensation but 
on building the steel mill, he said: ―let‘s consume later and invest first‖ (Kim, Chung-Yum, 2006, 
p.173-179).   
 
Early in 1973, Park announced HCI policy as a foundation of the fourth republic.  The future of 
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exporting light industrial goods began to look unattractive as labour costs in Korea were on the 
increase and developed countries were strengthening restrictions on importing labour-intensive 
goods from developing countries.  The Park administration selected the six main strategic 
industries: steel, chemical engineering, nonferrous metal, machinery, shipbuilding, and 
electronics.  The sole criterion for selection was the spill-over effect, horizontally and vertically.  
In his New Year‘s press conference in 1973, Park announced that ―to achieve our target of $10 
billion annual export by 1980, the share of HCIs should account for more than 50% in total 
exports‖ (Park, Chung-Hee, 1980).   In addition to the need to replace declining light industry 
exports, there was another industrial mercantilist ambition against the backdrop of the heavy 
chemical industry policy.  Military provocations from North Korea in the late 1960s were on the 
increase but the US announced that it would gradually withdraw its troops in 1971-1974.  Also, 
the truce in the Vietnam War provoked a sense of urgency among the elite in Korea concerning 
the need to build a national defence industry; this was impossible without HCIs.   
 
The new economic policy direction was driven by technocrats both from the engineering and 
economics disciplines.  Industrialisation was at the top of the national agenda for the state elites.   
Most Korean elites regarded the Japanese model of economic development from light industry to 
HCIs, as being a model for Korea to follow (Kim, Yong-Jik, 2005, pp. 458-9).  Nam Dukwoo 
was Minister of Finance when Park officially launched the HCI strategy in 1973, and he recalled 
Park‘s response to his worries about difficulties in securing finances for building HCIs: 
―Japanese leaders were defeated and collapsed at the war against the World, but they got up and 
emerged as economic power of the World.  There were HCIs behind Japanese revival.  Mr 
Minister, lets pull it off, come what may‖ (Nam, Dukwoo, 2009, pp. 107-8).  Nam Dukwoo was 
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another influential technocrat who served as Vice Prime Minister and Minister of the Economic 
Planning Board and was in charge of raising foreign financial capital.  Between 1974 and 1979, 
he raised $11.2 billion, representing 74 per cent of the total external financial capital raised 
during Park‘s regime.  According to Nam Dukwoo (2009, p. 126), government‘s intention in 
obtaining foreign capital was to build HCIs and social overhead capital (SOC).  Between 1970 
and 1979, the average GNP growth rate of Korea was 9.3 per cent, and for that growth rate, an 
investment rate of 28.1 per cent of investment rate was necessary.  However, the domestic 
savings rate reached only 22.9 per cent and the balance of 5.2 per cent came from abroad in the 
form of loans or foreign investment.   
 
In May 1973, a promotional team was sent to the US to secure foreign capital to cover the new 
HCI plan.  The team consisted of seventeen members of the elite from government, enterprises, 
media and academia and was headed by the Deputy Prime Minister.82  They believed that if they 
failed to raise $5.8 billion in foreign capital, then the HCI plan was unachievable.  They regarded 
their mission as a ―do or die‖ operation (Nam, Dukwoo, 2009).  The promotional team tried to 
convince investors in the US and Japan to send an investor mission to Korea.  In November 
1973, the government held an international conference under the title ‗Korean Futures‘ which 
aimed at boosting investment confidence among foreign investors by informing them of the high 
levels of stability and predictability prevailing in Park‘s Youshin state83  (Kim, Hyung-A 2003a, 
                                                 
82 The members of the team included the Chief of the HCI Planning Corps (O Woncheol), Director of the Korea 
Institute of Science and Technology (Han Sangjun), Chairman of Hyundai Construction (Chung Inyoung), and six 
high-ranking economists from the Economic Planning Board. 
 
83  Youshin means ―to fix‖ in Confucianism.  In October 1972, Park amended the Constitution to ―Youshin‖ 
Constitutions which concentrated all three powers of legislation, administration and judiciary onto the President.  
Despite the efficiency of the Youshin system regarding economic planning and implementing, the concentration of 
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pp.183-4).  The Korea-American Economic Council was established in September 1973 as an 
outcome of the Conference and $3.1 billion was raised between 1973 and 1975.  Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) during the period reached $415.3 billion (Han, Sŭng-jŭ, 1974, quoted in Kim, 
Hyung-A, 2003a, p.184).    
 
Once the path of industrialisation was defined, it became more stable with fewer difficulties than 
first envisaged compared with the initial stage of setting up or changing the path.  Later, the 
fourth FYEP (1977-1981) needed another $10 billion of foreign capital to build nuclear power 
plants.  The Korean investment mission went on a 16-day visit to the US, France, Britain and 
Switzerland in May 1976 to raise the money.   The visit was a big success, raising $5.8 billion 
without any real difficulties.  This level of success was beyond the imagination of the Korean 
elites in economic diplomacy in the 1960s and in the early 1970s.   Nam Dukwoo recalls the 
success was possible because of detailed preparation by members of the mission and also 
because of the favourable international economic environment.  However, the main success 
factor was that the international community was willing to lend money to Korea which was 
already regarded as being on a stable upward path of economic growth (Nam, Dukwoo, 2009, 
p.161).   In the following year, 1977, the investment mission went on a second visit to raise the 
rest of the funds needed for the fourth FYEP, and this was another success, achieved relatively 
easily.  The Korean government secured enough capital to carry out the fourth FYEP and build a 
nuclear power plant to meet the increased power demand.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
power has been criticised for being authoritarian and supressing democracy.  
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In 2012, POSCO was producing more than 39 million tons of steel, making Korea the world‘s 
fifth largest steel producing nation (Kim, HoKyeong, 2013).  The steel produced in POSCO 
helped Korea to become the leading ship builder in the world, the second largest supplier of 
electric home appliances and the fifth largest car manufacturer (Hong, Hasang, 2005).  POSCO 
was built using technology supplied by Japan as part of the foreign aid package in 1968, and now 
POSCO is supplying technology of building steel mills to other developing countries.84  
 
 
4.3.3 Expansion: Institutionalising industrial mercantilism  
The elite in Korea saw the workforce as a critical economic resource for industrialisation or 
manufacturing.  To establish successful industrialisation, the workforce needs manufacturing 
skills.  The elite therefore focused on educating people to acquire technical knowledge and 
mechanical skills.  However, as a developing country, Korea lacked not only financial capital but 
also technology for industrialisation. The technology would be brought in from abroad along 
with the financial capital.  In the initial stage of industrialisation the elite tried to rely on the 
relatively limited skills of the workforce to run machines for light industry.   However, once steps 
were taken to educate people, they adopted higher levels of skill.  This process was encouraged 
by building technical schools and legislating a high status for technicians. 
 
1. Kumoh Technical High School 
In a New Year‘s Speech in 1973, Park announced a full-scale drive towards HCIs and said that 
                                                 
84 On 25 July 2013, POSCO signed an MOU with the Cameroonian government concerning passing down its 
technology on building a steel mill (POSCO, 2013). 
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―to accomplish a $10 billion target of annual export by 1980, we should make an utmost effort to 
learn and develop technology at a nation-wide level.  This means everyone—by everyone I mean 
children in primary schools, university students, men, women, the young and the old—should 
learn technology‖ (Park, Chung-Hee, 1980).    
 
Oh Won-chol,85 the Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry who participated in Korea-Japan 
Cabinet Meetings from the initial stage, proposed opening a technical high school with funding 
from Japan.  This suggestion was submitted to the Fourth Cabinet Meeting between Korea and 
Japan held between 21 and 23 July, 1970.  Japan agreed to send an inspection team to Korea.  
During the ten days of inspection, the Korean government representatives explained the need for 
a technical school that could offer hands-on training, focusing on mechanics, so that the 
graduates could work in that field upon graduation from the school.  As a result, a grant of $3.1 
million from Japan was assigned to build the school (Maeil Business Newspaper, 1971).  Kumho 
Technical School was duly built with training rooms, laboratories, and a dormitory.  Korean 
teachers were sent to Japan for training and eight Japanese teachers were dispatched for hands-on 
training in casting, welding, machinery, heat treatment, forge welding, and wooden modelling 
with newly imported machines from Japan.  The Japanese teachers lived in school housing until 
they produced the first graduate, after three years.  Tuition, textbooks and uniforms were offered 
free of charge and every student stayed in the student residence at no cost.   As a result, 
outstanding students from across the nation applied for the Kumoh Technical High School.  In 
1976, out of 400 freshmen of the school, 126 were middle school valedictorians with the highest 
marks in their schools.  They were poor, but very clever and eager to learn more, to become a 
                                                 
85 Oh Won-chol was later appointed as Chief of the HCI Drive Committee. 
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pillar of nation building (Park, Cheol-Seo, 1977).  Four hundred students were accepted each 
year and learned about machines, tin plate welding, metal-work, and electronics. Two years after 
the foundation of the school, some students obtained a mechanic‘s licence, and by graduation, 
every student from the first class had been awarded that licence.  Kim Chung-Yum (2006, p.415) 
remembers that it was a moment proving ―Korean boys also can be outstanding mechanics when 
trained well.‖  This success broke down feeling of inferiority towards Japan, held not only by the 
Korean elite but by Korean people in general.  After three years of education, graduates of the 
school were obliged to serve as a technical non-commissioned officer for five years, for the 
country.  
 
Inspired by the success of Kumoh Technical High School, the government opened eleven more 
technical high schools across the country.  Oh Won-chol again proposed to open more technical 
schools to secure the supply of technicians for the Middle East construction boom.86  President 
Park said that to secure deals with the Middle East,87 Korea needed at least 1 million technicians 
to send, and to meet the demand Korea needed more technical schools and training centres.  He 
believed that ―export, in the end, is what people do.  If there are more support (from big 
enterprises for technical schools), we will have great engineers and scientists in future. … They 
are the frightfully strong foundation of industrialisation and they will be the national 
                                                 
86 Korean construction companies began to enter the Middle East market in 1974 and won contracts valued at $ 260 
million.  In the following year 1975, the value increased by 226.3% to $850 million.  However, Korean companies 
lacked enough technicians in the fields of engineering construction, oil refinery, and chemical plants to send to the 
Middle East.  Kim Chung-Yum (2006, pp.415-419) notes that 1,600 more technicians were needed around 1975.  
 
87 Around that time, Korea won a number of contracts in Middle East countries because of skilled labour combined 
with cheaper bidding than Western countries. 
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power….When they go to working in the field (after graduation), they are the national power‖ 
(The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1977).  Indeed, graduates from the eleven newly founded technical 
high schools played a critical role in mitigating the impact of oil crises in the 1970s in Korea; 
this was largely because of the remittance of the oil-money they earned in the Middle East.  Kim 
Chung-Yum (2006, p.415) argues that they were the industrialising seeds planted in the industry-
free land of Korea, and without them, there would be no HCI in Korea.   
 
In addition to opening a technical school which could produce high-grade technicians, 
government opened tertiary training schools to produce entry level technicians, with one year of 
training.  Recipients of technical education and training participated in the International 
Vocational Training Competition88 which was better-known to the Koreans as the Technical 
Olympics.  Winners of that Competition took part in a car parade from the airport to the Blue 
House where the President stayed.  President Park awarded badges and had tea and snacks with 
the recipients.  They were treated like national heroes, similar to winners of the Olympic Games. 
 
2. National Technical Qualifications Testing System 
Traditionally, Koreans have held scholars in high regard and technicians were regarded as 
ranking lower than scholars.  Choi Hyeong-Sup, Minister of Science and Technology, thought 
that good engineers could not be produced in a social environment where technicians were 
looked down upon.  Thus, he proposed the National Technical Qualifications Act to place the 
                                                 
88 The International Vocational Training Competition was first held in Spain in 1950 with the aim of ―rais(ing) the 
status and standards of vocational skills and training worldwide.‖ It was held annually till 1971.  Today, the 
competition changed its name to WorldSkills Competition and is held every two years in a different Member 
Country.  Currently 50 countries/regions are members of WorldSkills International, which organizes the competition 
(Worldskills International, 2009).   
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status of engineers as high as scholars in Korea, especially in the mind-set of people.  The new 
Act took effect on December 1973 and the National Technical Qualifications Testing System was 
implemented in 1975.   President Park was especially keen on the Test and personally appointed 
the Head of the Institute for Testing.  The fundamental purpose of the new Act was to improve 
the social status of technicians.  The Act stipulated that Master Mechanic could enjoy the same 
social status as people at the top of other fields such as the professions and academia.  For 
instance, candidates who passed the Craft II Class Qualification Test were exempted from 
mandatory military service and those who passed the Craft I Test could go to a technical college 
to concentrate on improving their theory and management skills as opposed to concentrating on 
technical issues (Kim, Chung-Yum, 2006, pp. 421-422). 
 
At the beginning of 1975, eighteen fields were open for the Test.  These were machine, metal 
work, chemical engineering, electricity, electronics, telecommunications, ship building, aircraft, 
civil engineering, construction, textile, mining, information management, energy, land 
development, ocean, safety management and industrial application.  Qualification holders were 
prioritised in employment and for promotion in government.  Financial benefits and 
opportunities to learn in abroad were also given to qualification holders.  Since the Act was first 
enforced in 1975, there have been nineteen revisions to date.  Although the Test is often criticised 
for lagging behind the speed of technology advancement in the applicable fields (Lee, Sangjun, 
2006), in the beginning, the National Technical Qualification Testing System played a critical 
role not only in restructuring the national economic structure but also in restructuring people‘s 
conception of mechanics and crafts. 
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In summary, this section examined how the critical juncture of industrial mercantilist foreign 
policy change was reinforced and stabilised the path toward aid independence.  Once the critical 
juncture was made, industrial mercantilism expedited its pace and expanded to higher levels of 
industrialisation and to more people.  It took place on the reinforced path through subsequent and 
successful aid negotiations and through building new institutions which put technology and 
technicians first.  Based on this, the next section of the thesis introduces the political economy of 
industrial mercantilism.  
 
 
4.4 The Political Economy of Industrial mercantilism  
4.4.1 Industrialising Elite 
Various analyses exist regarding the main drive of Korea-Japan normalisation.  For instance, 
Kang Junman (2004) argues that modern Korean political and economic history is a result of 
opportunism.  According to Kang, Korea as a nation could not help but be opportunistic given its 
geopolitical conditions.  The opportunism was deeply seated in Park‘s foreign policy attitudes as 
well.  Kim Sundong (1987) also argues that securing political funding was a big motivation for 
the normalisation in a newly launched military regime (Yoo, Byeongyong, p.48).   However, Kim 
Hyung-A (2004) disagrees with that viewpoint.  According to her, political funding was secured 
through Japanese private sponsors and therefore there was no need to normalise national 
relations for that purpose.   According to her, the normalisation was sought to secure fund for 
industrialisation.  Findings of the thesis which were garnered from examining the background 
and development of the path of industrialisation in Korea are in accordance with Kim Hyung-A‘s 
view: elites in Korea saw foreign aid as a tool for industrialisation.  No matter whether 
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industrialisation was for building the wealth and power of a nation or for the survival or 
prosperity of the elite themselves, at the end the elite can aptly be labelled the industrialising 
elite  
 
Industrialisation is a process led by those who seek changes and gains by restructuring industries.  
The process of industrialisation cannot happen unless driven by a minority in the elite group.  
Various scholars have examined the industrialising elite and gave this group various names.  The 
term ‗Industrialising elite‘ should not give the impression that they are benevolent or nurturing.  
Thus, the industrialising elite can encourage industrialisation for their own personal greed.  
Olson (2000), in his posthumous book Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and 
Capitalist Dictatorship, suggests the notion of ―stationary bandit‖ as a type of tyrant.  Stationary 
bandits emerge in the primordial stage of an economy before the market stage.89  The stationary 
bandits encourage economic activities of people and protect them against anarchy or roving 
thieves only because they are benefited by doing so.  Even though the intention is self-greed, 
stationary bandits play the role of industrialising elite by building and restructuring the national 
economy.  
 
The ―developmental elite‖ of Johnson (1987, p. 140), who coined the term ―developmental 
state,‖ can also be the industrialising elite in the thesis.  According to his description, the 
developmental elite share the core values of the industrialising elite:  
Developmental elites are generated and come to the fore because of the desire to break 
                                                 
89 He suggests two conditions for a market, which are sufficient to bring prosperity to a society: (1) secure and well-
defined individual rights which can be generated by good governance; (2) absence of any kind of predation such as 
war, autocracy, or lobbying. 
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out of the stagnation of dependency and underdevelopment; the truly successful ones 
understand that they need the market to maintain institutionalised corruption while they 
are battling against underdevelopment.  The Republic of Korea is an excellent example. 
 
Political systems created by developmental elites are normally stable in the long run and also 
authoritarian.  The quasi-authoritarian political monopoly of the developmental elite ensures 
long-term predictability of their economic system, because of political stability.  For the 
developmental elite, authoritarianism is a means and not an end.  Developmental elites, often rig 
their political monopoly, but are legitimised not by their political processes but by their 
economic results (Johnson, 1987, pp. 142-3).  In that light, the industrialising elite share features 
of ―benevolent dictators‖ who allocate taxation for financing productive public expenditure 
under conditions of political stability (Barro, 1991a; 1991b).   Based on his study on Korea‘s 
industrialisation under Park, Kim Gwanghee (Kim, 2008, pp. 363-364) also concludes that 
authoritarianism and successful industrialisation are indispensable.  He attributes the successful 
industrialisation to Park and the technocrat elites for they did not follow American advice blindly 
and took the risk of conflict with the US in design and implementing economic policies. 
 
According to Kerr‘s explanation of the industrialising elite, industrialisation is led by a ―dynamic 
elite‖ who pushes the expansion of new technology through ―transient instruments of 
transformation‖ against a ―static minority‖ who do not wish to move in the new direction (Kerr, 
1960, p.58).  According to his categorisations (pp.58-81), there are five types of industrialising 
elite.  First, in an open market country such as England, a rising middle class, which is 
economically individualistic and self-interested can lead industrialisation.  Second, in a paternal 
country, the dynastic elite will guide industrialisation.  One example is that of the Samurai 
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during the Meiji Restoration in Japan.  The dynamic elite acknowledge the transformation of the 
economic structure and try to keep the change under their control.  Third, the colonial 
administrators can become the industrialising elite if they transform the production structure of 
the colonialized economy.  However, the industrialisation led by colonial administrators is 
commercial-benefit-oriented rather than manufacturing-oriented.  Fourth, revolutionary 
intellectuals can push industrialisation in the process of transforming toward a centralised 
country in order to gain political and economic power from traditional elites.  Here, 
industrialisation is put at the foreground of a revolution.  It is not only a means of overthrowing 
old ideas and embracing new ones but also of purging old elites and replacing them with new 
disciplined ones.  Fifth, a national leader can motivate industrialising sentiments in the 
population but this does not necessarily guarantee successful industrialising strategies and plans.  
The hereditary elite, independence heroes or military commanders can fall into this fifth 
category.   Examining these five types of industrialising elite within a historical time frame, it is 
apparent that the middle class, dynastic elites and colonial administrators led industrialisation 
before World War I.  However, after World War II, industrialisation has mainly been led by 
revolutionary intellectuals and national leaders.  
 
Although Park took power by military coup, his long personal rule provided the consistent 
commitment and predictability needed for industrialisation.  In particular, the promulgation of 
the Yushin constitution, which led to his personal demise and assassination, offered strong 
stability for the heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s.  Cumings (1984, p.29) refers to 
Park‘s regime as a ―bureaucratic-authoritarian industrialising regime‖ where ―strong states direct 
economic development.‖  Park created development oriented and autonomous bureaucrats to 
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fulfil his development goals and Kim Suweon (2009) refers to this as ―developmental 
bureaucracy.‖  Those developmental bureaucrats were selected on the basis of merit and they 
received elevated status and good salaries.  Most importantly, their autonomy in policy-making 
was secured in exchange for their loyalty and performance.  Experts were either recruited from 
elsewhere or selected through examination results but in both cases, merit was the criterion.  
Even politicians involved in making economic decision were trained by experts.  This is in 
agreement with Haggard‘s (1991, p.869) view that the development of administrative capacity 
should precede economic reforms.  In Korea, the Economic Planning Board (EPB)90 was where 
decision makers received training from the experts.  The EPB was the de facto decision making 
venue and controlled overall domestic and foreign economic policies.  It was also the centre of 
economic training for the top decision makers including Park. 91 
 
According to Kim Hyung-A (2004, pp.77-78), the elite in Park‘s regime consisted of technocrats 
and former military generals and they shared three distinct characteristics: first, they were highly 
qualified and self-disciplined; second, they stayed within their own areas of responsibility and 
                                                 
90 The Economic Planning Board was originally a creation of the second administration.  The ‗super ministry‘ that 
oversees other ministries copied the Indian Planning Commission which was in charge of planning and utilising 
resources according to the prescribed plans (Planning Commission Government of India, n.d.).   
 
91 The role of the EPB has been relatively well studied in economic policy literature.  It played a role in educating 
political decision-makers through weekly (or monthly) meetings.  As much as its political authority was centralised, 
the main feature of Park‘s government in terms of development planning was ―the centralisation of economic 
decision-making‖ (Haggard, 1991, p.857) and this was represented by the Economic Planning Board (EPB).  The 
super ministry exercised oversight taking over the budget bureau from the Ministry of Finance, the statistics and 
research bureau from the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the planning and coordination offices from the MOR.   In 
terms of efficient economic growth through industrialisation, and bearing in mind that that Korea suffered from lack 
of resources and capital, the government‘s role in securing and allocating these was critical (Kim, Jyong-Dong, 
1988, p. 212).  Therefore, the EPB which was in charge of aid relations through the Bureau of International 
Cooperation became ―the dominant bureau‖ in the early 1960s (Haggard, 1991, p.860).  
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did not encroach on Park‘s political governing territory; and third, they had a clear understanding 
of the national development agenda.  Even though this summary by Kim is fairly convincing, her 
account only focuses on their function and characteristics.  In order to understand the 
background to industrial mercantilist perception by members of those elite, one needs to look 
more deeply and include consideration of their background.    
 
When examining the general background of the elite in Park‘s regime, some common features of 
the industrialising elite become apparent.  First, the industrialising elite did not share any 
common interest with established privileged groups.  The coup members, most of whom were 
from rural areas, did not have any attachment to established interest groups from the previous 
regimes, either emotionally or practically, which was possible through land reform.  Referring to 
Kerr‘s categorisation of industrialising elite, this lack of attachment caused the elite to be a 
combination of dynastic, revolutionary and nationalistic industrializers who were eager to change 
the structure without the motivation of maintaining the status quo.  The continuous restructuring 
implied the continuous progress of the elite group and to achieve this, they, rightfully or 
wrongfully, manipulated nationalism within the population. 
 
Another common feature shaping the elite‘s perception of industrial mercantilism is that they had 
a degree of international experience that affected their world view on economic development.  
Many members of the elite were systematically recruited from abroad to work in government or 
government think tanks.  Scholars and bureaucrats shaped the concept of economic development 
in Korea, having participated in international conferences or having studied abroad.  Many 
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influential elite members92 had opportunities to participate in the Colombo plan93 and in the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; there, they learned about other 
Asian countries‘ economic development.   Most Asian countries, except Arab countries, set and 
launched ‗economic development plans‘ in the 1950s and the Korean elites were influenced by 
these.  In addition, most bureaucrats appointed to set up economic development plans in the late 
1950s had studied in the US.94  Some economists had also experienced Western education95, and 
around 6 000 high ranking soldiers had been educated in the US by the end of 1961.  In addition, 
many members of elite were influenced by Japan.  Many of the leading members of the elite 
were trained either in Japan or by the Japanese.  They felt comfortable dealing with Japanese 
books and ideas since many of them were educated during the Japanese occupation and were 
familiar with the Japanese language and the Japanese way of developing the national economy.  
Indeed, most books on economic development written in English were later translated into 
Japanese in Japan; the Korea elite imported them from Japan even when the two countries‘ 
diplomatic relations were frozen (Park, Tae-gyun, 2007, pp. 45-48). 
 
                                                 
92 In Taesik, Kim Yoochack, Lee Gihong, Song Insang, Song Jungbum, Hwang Byeongjun, Choi Gyuha, Cheon 
Byeonggyu, and Lee Hanbin. 
 
93  Right after Truman‘s announcement of Point 4 program of technical assistance in January 1949 member countries 
of Commonwealth gathered in Colombo, a capital of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon).  This meeting launched the Colombo 
Plan which in the beginning called for cooperation between developed and developing countries (van de Walle, 
2001, p. 191).   
 
94Cha Gyunhee (Wisconsin University), Lee Jaeseol (Missouri State University), Kim Dongsu (Michigan State 
University), Lee Gihong (Columbia University), Lee Hanbin (Harvard Business School),  Kim Chung Yum (the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York), Song Jungbum (the Chase Manhattan Bank), Song Insang, Cheon Byeonggyu, 
Kim Taedong, Jeong Jaeseok, Lee Heeil, Jang Deokjin, Kim Jongdea, and Song Jeongbum (Economic Development 
Institute of the World Bank) 
 
95 Tak Heejun (Oxford University), Go SeungJe (Columbia University), and Hong Seongyoo (Minnesota University) 
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The elite in Korea were not only influenced by Japan, but also by Western Germany to some 
degree.  The argument in favour of planned economy was based on the West German model.  
Intellectuals in Korea equated the ideological and physical division between East and West 
Germany with the division of their own, and thus, it was only logical for South Korea to follow 
the model of West Germany.  The West German model was viewed as a combination of free 
enterprise and a government-controlled planned economy (Kim, Hyung-A, 2003b, pp. 125-126).   
The West German model is in line with Korea‘s development plan of guided capitalism of Park‘s 
regime in the early 1960s.  The development plan which reflects the ideas and perspectives of 
elite on development and the future of nation was based on guided capitalism; i.e. government 
directly or indirectly guide major economic activities based on free and creative entrepreneurship 
(Kim, Gwanghee, 2008, pp. 124-125).  
 
Finally, there was a relatively low level of moral hazard in handling foreign aid among the 
industrialising elite in Korea.  Even though corruption and cronyism in allocating foreign aid 
were in place, the level of moral hazard among elites was relatively low compared to other aid 
recipient countries.  The elite in Korea comprised one ethnic group, which is often overlooked in 
single case studies of Korea, and this fact should be noted as a source of a high level of 
nationalism which prevented serious moral hazard.  In addition to the ethnic homogeneity and 
nationalism, a sense of crisis caused by unilateral announcement of cutting aid to Korea by the 
US also played a role in preventing moral hazard.  The US aid to Korea which was $ 383 million 
in 1973 dropped to $154 in 1961 when Korea was still utterly dependent on US aid for its 
survival, and this pressured the elite in Korea to reduce aid dependence and to develop its own 
national development plan (Kim, Jiyoung, 2013, pp. 18-19).   
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4.4.2 Industrial mercantilism 
In common with most poor countries, foreign aid was always sought after, and this applied to the 
second administration of Korea as well.  However, the search for aid in previous regimes can be 
distinguished from the search in Park‘s regime; the difference is that before Park, the aid was 
sought for distributing to the political inner circles not for industrialisation.  The politically 
connected inner circles received windfall gains because they were allocated hard currency to buy 
imported goods and they resold these goods at a higher price to the domestic market.  This type 
of ―corruption‖ was the cause of the coup by Park‘s military regime.  On the contrary, in Park‘s 
regime, foreign aid was sought for industrialisation.  Industrialisation was ―the central theme‖ of 
the Five Year Economic Development Plans from 1962 (Koh, Yong-Sun, 2010, p. 20).  One 
episode shows the search for industrialisation of the regime before the Korea-Japan 
normalisation.   Two weeks after the coup, the government arrested thirteen leading businessmen 
for accumulating wealth in illicit ways under previous regimes.  Instead of putting them in jail or 
collecting fines, the government asked them to invest the illegally earned money in fourteen key 
plants including steel, cement and fertilizer plants.   
 
Cha (1996, p.129) held personal interviews with the former Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won and 
ambassador Park Sang-yong, who participated in negotiations for the Normalisation Treaty with 
Japan, and discovered that the objective of negotiation was national economic development and 
the  Korean participants were ―single-mindedly‖ committed to that goal throughout the 
negotiations.  Park strongly believed that the mission of his generation was to reunify peacefully 
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with North Korea and that necessitated a strong nation founded on economic power (Kim, 
Chung-Yum, 2006, p.549).   
 
Support for industrial mercantilism by the elite in foreign aid policy making is essential for aid 
independence to be achieved; industrialisation is critical for sustained economic growth.  After a 
long period of despair and stagnation, the economy in Korea turned upwards from the early 
1960s.  Growth was spurred by industrialisation.  Output in the manufacturing sector grew 
annually by 17 per cent in the 1960s and 16 per cent in the 1970s (Kim & Koh, 2010) as Table 
4.1 shows.   
 
Table 4-1. Growth rate by industry in Korea 
 
1953-
1960 
1960-
1970 
1970-
1980 
1980-
1990 
1990-
2000 
2000-
2009 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2.3 4.4 1.6 3.5 1.9 1.8 
Mining and manufacturing 12.1 15.7 14.1 11.4 8.2 5.3 
     Mining 
  
4.7 -0.2 -1.3 -0.3 
     Manufacturing 12.7 16.8 15.8 12.2 8.4 5.4 
          Light industry 
  
12.7 7 1.1 -0.6 
          HCIs 
  
17.2 14.4 9.8 6.6 
Public utilities and construction 9.3 19.2 10.3 10.3 2.7 3.3 
     Public utilities 
  
15.8 17.6 10.3 5.8 
     Construction 
  
10.1 9.7 1.4 2.6 
Services 3.8 8.6 6.8 8.4 6.1 3.6 
Gross Domestic Product 3.8 8.4 9 9.7 6.5 3.9 
 
Source: Bank of Korea from Kim and Koh (2010) 
 
 
According to the renowned development political economist Chang Ha-Joon (1996, p. 57), to 
deny the importance of industrialisation is to show ―lack of understanding of the logic of long-
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term structural change.‖  Aid independence is possible in an economy experiencing sustained 
economic development.  Starting with List (1904, p. 144) who emphases that ―the power of 
producing is … infinitely more important than wealth itself‖, like numerous renowned scholars, 
such as Rostow (1960), Apter (1965), Murphy, Shleife, and Vishny (1989), Chang (2003) has 
asserted that industrialisation is both necessary and sufficient for economic development and 
self-sufficiency.  The spill-over effect of industrialisation effectively promotes overall 
development (Sen, 1984).  Exportation of raw commodities such as cocoa or cotton cannot 
provide sustained economic development because industrialised countries continue to advance 
their input-saving technology (Woo, 1990).  Exporting natural resources such as oil and gold 
does not lead to sustained economic development because this is merely the exchange of future 
capital for current capital.  Wells and Thirlwall (2003) examine the correlation between the 
growth rate of GDP and the growth rate of a manufacturing sector in 45 countries in Africa 
during 1980 to 1996 and find that Africa‘s economic backwardness correlates with the low level 
of development of the manufacturing sector.  Writers on development generally agree that 
industrialisation is a prerequisite for economic growth and has the following merits.  
 
(a) Breaking the declining terms of trade syndrome 
Raul Prebish (1950) and Hans Singer (1950) produce two independently published studies that 
put forward a similar argument for a syndrome in which terms of trade decline or become less 
favourable in the Third World.  Put simply, Prebisch and Singer argue that poor countries rely 
mostly on exporting commodities to, and importing final products from, industrialised countries.  
Poor countries have to sell increasing quantities of commodities to pay for the same amount of 
imports, due to failure to advance their own technology rapidly and also because of low elasticity 
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in demand.  Technology progresses faster in industrial products than in commodity production; 
one example is progress from the type-writer to the computer and to a better-performing 
computer.  In order to buy these increasingly advanced industrial products, commodity exporting 
countries have to sell more and more of their commodities.  In addition, consumption of more 
advanced industrial products increases in accordance with income level, which means high 
elasticity.  For example, a person starting to earn money will buy a bicycle instead of walking.  
As the income level increases, that person will upgrade to a motorbike, a car and then a more 
luxurious car.   However, more income does not mean more consumption of corn or cotton, i.e. 
low elasticity.  Therefore, in the international trade structure, the terms of trade for exporting 
commodities become worse and, in contrast, industrialised countries can demand more 
favourable terms.    Thus, in order to develop, a commodity exporting country must transform its 
economic structure from commodity-based to manufacturing, through industrialisation. 
 
(b) Externalities from coordinated investment 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) argues that if various sectors receive investment ‗simultaneously‘, 
those sectors create demand for goods from each other.  Therefore, this demand spill-over will 
yield income in every sector.   If the sectors receive investment simultaneously, they all produce 
income by supplying each other.  Murphy, Shleife, and Vishny (1989), in their analysis titled 
Industrialisation and the Big Push, claim that coordinated investment increases income and 
welfare.  A coordinated investment can be more effective when sectors share a infrastructure, 
which suggests a role for government in the process, and they cite Korea as a case of a sucessful 
and coordinated investment programme.  Until a country has established this coordination, it will 
not be easy to escape ―the underdevelopment trap‖ (Rodrigues-Clare, 1996), where both wages 
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and the rate of return on capital are low.96  Low wages cannot offset the low rate of return on 
capital, and so it is unrealistic to expect any influx of private foreign or domestic capital.  Thus, 
these writers argue that a ‗big push‘ from non-profit funding is needed in order to make the 
coordinated investment simultaneously.  The big push approach represents the pro-aid arguments 
and originates from the view that industrialisation is ―the way of achieving more equal 
distribution of income [emphasis original]‖ between poor and rich countries (Rosenstein-Rodan, 
1943, p. 202).    
 
(c) A means to modernisation 
Industrialisation is an interesting phase, according to a modernisation theory.  According to Apter 
(1965, p. 67), development, modernisation, and industrialisation are related to one another in a 
descending order.  Development includes both modernisation and industrialisation.  
Modernisation, as ―a particular case of development‖ includes industrialisation which is ―a 
special aspect of modernisation.‖  A society can be modernised without industrialisation but the 
opposite does not always apply.  Indeed, the West was the origin of modernisation through both 
commercialisation and industrialisation.  In contrast, the modernisation of Africa is mostly a 
product of commercialisation but lacking industrialisation.  Industrialisation, as ―the period in a 
society in which the strategic functional roles are related to manufacturing,‖ is so dynamic and 
powerful that it changes a traditional society to a modernised one.  
 
 
                                                 
96  Rodrigues-Clare does not use his underdevelopment trap argument to justify the need for foreign aid.  He 
introduces the concept to reconcile the automatic mechanism of a neoclassical growth model, i.e. to answer the 
question—how can the market pull all poor countries out of poverty?  
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(d) Building state capacity  
Industrialisation needs a government capable of coordinating.  Government can learn and build 
those capabilities while planning and implementing industrialisation.  Industrialisation and its 
socio-economic effects require a government to play an extended and complex role.  As many 
renowned scholars mention and as empirical evidence shows, from the eighteenth century Britain 
to the twentieth century Korea and China, no country has gone through high growth rate of 
productivity without strong government interventions during the period of industrialisation 
(Chang, 2003; Murphy, et al., 1989).97  
 
 
4.4.3 The contradictions of industrial mercantilism 
A number of pundits criticize the diplomatic normalisation between Korea and Japan in 1963 on 
various grounds.  For example, they claim that the treaty removed rights from the Korean people 
and, instead, gave them a distorted value system that claims that the end justifies the means.  The 
normalisation was against the people‘s will and confused them, leaving the perception that 
economic supremacy comes before national consciousness (Chung, Jina 2011, p.99).  Chung Il-
Joon (2005, p. 95) also states that the normalisation opened ―abnormal‖ relations between Korea 
and Japan.  It was carried out in a way similar to a military operation, without taking account of 
national sentiment.  It failed to remove the burden of colonial history and became the starting 
point of a new abnormality for Korea-Japan relations.  However, one cannot deny that the Korea-
                                                 
97 However, for the economic liberalists, states should not be involved in industrial structural transformation, and the 
optimal restructuring takes place through a market mechanism.  State intervention only deters the industrialisation 
and diminishes prosperity.  For structuralists, industrial structural transformation is a product of manipulation of the 
international and domestic core class—the owners of the means of production—in order to make itself richer. 
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Japan normalisation was a critical juncture of Korea‘s foreign policy and economic restructuring 
as shown in Figure 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-1. Aid dependence Korea 
 
 
The ratio of total ODA and Official Assistance to Gross Capital Formation 
Source: World Bank Indicators (2012) 
 
On the subject of aid negotiations by Korea, Alice (1989, p.94) notes that Korea used foreign 
credit for two purposes: first ―to finance its long-term investment‖; and second ―to borrow its 
way out of balance–of-payments crises in order to maintain its long-term growth trend.‖  What is 
obvious is that, even when the money is spent on servicing outstanding debt, the ultimate goal of 
servicing debt was to maintain a long-term growth trend instead of simply keeping a better 
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balance of payments to help in securing future loans.   
 
The first successful restructuring of the national economy was mostly funded by financial capital 
from the normalisation.  The Korean government embarked on a second restructuring to develop 
HCIs on the path of expedited restructuring and aid independence.  Despite concern about over-
investment in and over-borrowing for HCIs in a developing country such as Korea, in November 
1982, exports by HCIs accounted for more than half of Korea‘s total export for the first time 
(Maeil Business Newspaper, 1982).   With the benefit of hindsight, investment in HCIs in the 
early 1970s was a good strategy aimed at achieving a dynamic comparative advantage.  On 17 
July 2013, the world‘s biggest container vessel, which was bigger than four jumbo jet planes and 
as tall as a 20 story building, made its maiden voyage from South Korea to Poland.   Altogether 
60,000 tonnes of steel were used which was enough to make more than eight Eiffel Towers.  This 
was one of twenty of those ships exported to Mearsk in Denmark, and they cost $190 million 
each (Macguire, 2013).  The ships were made in and exported from Korea.  Without the elite‘s 
perception of industrial mercantilism in the 1960s and the tedious efforts to negotiate for 
building POSCO and developing HCIs in the 1970s, these container vessels would not have been 
built in Korea.  In 2012, HCIs account for more than 90 per cent of total exports from Korea as 
seen in Figure 4-2.    
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Figure 4-2. Korea‘s export by structure in 2012 
By Structure Share (%) 
Primary industry goods 2.7 
Industrial Products 97.3 
                   Light Industrial Products        6.4 
                   Heavy Industrial Products        90.9 
Total  100 
Source: KITA98 (2013) 
 
In opposition to the myth of Park as a leader who made the Korean miracle, Park Tae-gyun 
(2007, pp.380-381) argues that any other man in the presidential office in the 1960s in Korea 
would have devised similar policy, bearing in mind the pressure from the US and demands from 
the Korean people.  Even though his military style seemed efficient at the beginning of the 
economic growth that followed his coming into power, his assertive implementation was not 
based on concessions and yielded huge costs in the aftermath.   These included corruption and 
inefficiency in allocating projects as well as subsidies between politicians and businessmen.  In 
addition, government support for a few selective enterprises created chaebol.  Rigid and 
inflexible financial management oppressed growth of a competitive financial sector.  It is true 
that Park and his elite‘s ―unselfish‖ leadership was committed to industrialisation and hence aid 
independence; consequently Korea made enormous economic progress during his rule.  
However, it is also true that his leadership was obviously flawed (Kang, 2002, p. 62).  Park was 
                                                 
98 Available at http://stat.kita.net/top/state/main.jsp?lang_gbn=null&statid=kts#none 
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inaugurated for seven consecutive terms as president, and he ruled for nineteen years (1961-
1979).  When the Constitution limited his term in office, he amended it.  Anyone who stood 
against his will went to jail and many labour activists who fought for better working conditions 
were tortured and killed.    
 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the path of aid independence of Korea.  The elite in Korea was 
surrounded by threats that shook the legitimacy and survival of themselves such as strong North 
Korea which outpaced South Korea in terms of economic growth and industrialisation, the 
pressure from the US for economic growth, drastic aid cut from the US, and domestic demand 
for a strong state.  The elite perceived reparation money owed to Korea in exchange for 
diplomatic normalisation with Japan as a solution to these threats.  This shift to normalised 
relations with Japan became a critical juncture in Korea‘s path to aid independence through 
industrialisation.  Thus, the thesis defined the elite as an industrialising elite with an industrial 
mercantilist perspective.   The case study of Korea in this thesis does not attempt to answer the 
question whether Park was a benevolent dictator or bureaucratic authoritarian (Yoon, Bangsoon, 
1992; Choi, Jangjip, 2002/2009).  Regardless of the answer, his long rule of almost two decades 
played a positive role in Korea‘s economic development.99  When the elite have an industrial 
mercantilist perception of foreign aid, then that aid can help sustained economic growth and 
                                                 
99 The impact of Park‘s rule on the history of Korea‘s democracy is not as positive as that on economic development 
and it has been very controversial.  However, this thesis limits its range to his leadership on developing the economy 
and building an efficient bureaucracy.  
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independence from aid.  According to Barro‘s cross country examinations (1991a; 1991b), the 
elite had a positive attitude to economic growth because they could maintain political stability 
and commit to financing more productive public goods.   Foreign aid, in this situation and with 
the industrialising elite, can spur economic growth by supplying the necessary financing for 
productive goods and by reducing the taxation distortion (Boone, 1996).  Park‘s lengthy rule was 
accompanied by the like-minded elite who served beside him and who were insulated by a newly 
amended Constitution; this allowed the industrialising elite to plan, implement, evaluate, and re-
plan long-term economic development.  Repetitive and continuous economic planning cycles 
allowed Korea to pull itself out of aid dependence and to transform from agriculture to light 
industry and finally to heavy and electronic industry.     
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Chapter 5 Ghana, indebted mercantilism 
This chapter examines Ghana‘s foreign policy change towards the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in 1983.  Even though it was a dividing event in the history of Ghana‘s post-independence 
foreign policy, Rawlings‘s foreign policy redirection toward the IMF was not an unprecedented 
event in Ghana.  On the contrary, flirting with the IMF was common since the Nkrumah era due 
to Ghana‘s chronic capital deficiency (Hutchful, 1987, pp.3-19).   Nkrumah approached the IMF 
and the World Bank, but the Bank did not reach agreement with Nkrumah for he refused to adopt 
IMF policies.  The ensuing rightist Busia government enjoyed relatively cordial relations with 
the IMF and introduced a set of austerity measures to Ghana.  However such measures almost 
instantly brought in a military coup in 1972 led by Lieutenant Colonel Acheampong, who 
immediately reversed the IMF‘s austerity measures including the currency devaluation 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 67).  The dormant relations with the Bretton Wood Institutions 
were revived again between 1978 and 1979, but soon after, these were destroyed by Rawlings in 
the June 4 uprising in 1979.  The Peoples National Party (PNP), headed by Limann made an 
attempt to rebuild relations with the IMF.  However, the Limann government, haunted by the 
tragic end of the Busia regime and lacking political power, could not make breakthrough in the 
stalemate of negotiations with the IMF (Gyimah-Boadi, 1993, p. 3).  When Rawlings took 
power, the PNP‘s pro-West approach led to dissatisfaction within its leftist support base and this 
helped Rawlings‘s second military coup.  Ironically, Rawlings, despite his initial disparaging 
views and remarks on the neo-imperialist IMF, ―opened a new era of close co-operation‖ with 
the IMF (Jonah, 1989, pp. 94-95).  Rawlings‘s return to the IMF made a decisive line in 
independent Ghana‘s foreign policy since it was the first serious abandonment of ideological 
orientation in foreign policy. 
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After a brief overview of Ghana‘s foreign policy history, this chapter introduces the initial 
conditions to the critical foreign policy change toward economic pragmatism.  Alternative 
foreign policy options and domestic conditions that faced the elite in Ghana are examined in the 
section followed by an analysis of the elite in Ghana.   Then the chapter investigates the critical 
juncture of the foreign policy change and elaborates on how the path of aid dependence was 
reinforced.  Based on this examination, the thesis finally attempts to describe the political 
economy of the elite perspective of Ghana: indebted mercantilism.   
 
 
 
5.1 Ghana before Rawlings: A brief history  
The history of Ghana‘s post-independence foreign policy can be divided into two phases: from 
independence to 1983 and from 1983 up to the present.  In the first phase, the locomotive of 
Ghana‘s foreign policy was idealism.  In other words, Ghana‘s foreign economic policy played 
―second fiddle‖ to its foreign political policy (Boafo-Arthur, 1999, p.73).  If one considers 
Nkrumah‘s serious attempts to build the political kingdom as first priority, it was inevitable for 
Ghana to start with a politically biased foreign policy.  In addition, the nature of the regime after 
Nkrumah reinforced the political inclination of Ghana‘s foreign policy direction.  Throughout its 
independent history Ghana was one of the ―elite-politically unstable countries‖ (Fosu, 2009, p. 
4).  Between independence in 1957 and 1981, Ghana saw eight regime changes and five of them 
took power unconstitutionally through military coups and counter coups.  The foreign policy of a 
new regime was always counter to the policy of the previous regime to establish the legitimacy 
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of a military coup regime.  When Nkrumah, the first prime minister and president of independent 
Ghana and his Convention People‘s Party (CPP), was toppled by the National Liberation Council 
(NCL) by means of a military coup, the NCL and the successive regime of the Progress Party 
(PP) turned the course of foreign policy towards being pro-West.100  However, when the PP 
regime was violently replaced by the National Redemption Council (NRC) in 1972, the pro-West 
ideology was targeted and foreign policy was readjusted to the demands of the new military 
regime.  The NRC was toppled by a military coup by Rawlings‘s Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) in 1979, but the socialist Rawlings regime gave way to Hilla Limann‘s pro-
West People‘s National Party (PNP) through elections.  The PNP tried to win support back from 
the West after the short-live AFRC period through redirecting Ghana‘s foreign policy. 101   
Besides the domestic instability in elite politics, the irresistible dynamics of the Cold War 
exacerbated the ideological swings in Ghanaian foreign policy. 
 
Foreign policy biased toward political idealism, partly, resulted in downward economic growth 
in Ghana.  Nkrumah‘s rule sowed the seeds of future indebtedness by choosing policies calling 
for large government spending socially, monetarily, and internationally.  The so-called ―big-
push‖ policy for industrialising Ghana‘s economy, with international support for Pan-Africanism, 
and welfare oriented local policies led to huge deficits.  The foreign reserves of $269 million in 
1957 dropped to a negative level of minus $391 million when Nkrumah was ousted in 1966 
                                                 
100 The PP under Busia in 1969 undertook the Rehabilitation Programme led by the IMF.  However, it did not have 
any significant impact on spurring economic growth despite the 30 % devaluation of the currency which took place 
as part of the Programme (Boafo-Arthur, 1999, p.78).  
 
101 The AFRC was in power for three months from June to September 1979.  Despite its short period in office, the 
AFRC sent strong anti-capitalist signals.  
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(Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p. 87).  The subsequent military regimes of the NCL did not make any 
economic progress either.  Coupled with the NCL, the civilian regime of Busia‘s PP changed the 
notion of economic policy orientation away from socialism and carried out devaluation of its 
currency, based on the advice from the IMF.  However, this policy change led to economic 
difficulties and invited another military coup in 1972 (Fosu & Aryeetey, 2008).  In the 1970s, the 
end of the global commodity boom and the oil crisis led to a ―lost decade‖ in Ghana‘s economic 
history.  Ghana‘s economy which was mainly dependent on the export of commodities such as 
cocoa, mineral and timber was hit hard.102  The growth rate of the 1950s fell by half in the 1960s 
from 4.1 per cent to 2.1 per cent and deteriorating economic growth hit minus 0.3 per cent 
between 1970 and 1981 (World Bank, 2013).   
 
Rawlings was discontented with the economic situation and took office with a strong leftist 
rhetoric.  However, it did not take long for him to understand the global economic impact on 
Ghana‘s economic situation (Antwi-Danso, 2013).   The second phase of Ghana‘s foreign policy 
began in 1983 with a foreign policy shift towards the West by the Rawlings regime. Since then, 
foreign economic policy, instead of foreign political policy, has been pursued in an overly 
aggressive way as a central goal of foreign policy of Ghana.  At the start of his rule, Rawlings‘s 
foreign economic policy was ideologically similar to Nkrumah‘s.  However, in 1983, the 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) of Rawlings redirected its foreign policy and 
turned to the Bretton Woods Institutions, the initially proclaimed foe of the regime.  Since 1983 
the main objective of foreign policy of Ghana has been economic pragmatism rather than 
                                                 
102 Cocoa exports of Ghana fell to 159 000 metric tonnes in 1983 from 382 000 metric tonnes in 1974, and mineral 
exports fell by 54% in 1983 from 1975 (World Bank, 1987). 
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political ideology.   
 
 
 
5.2 Initial Conditions 
This section examines the initial conditions when Ghana had alternatives in its aid-seeking 
foreign policy, before it reached the critical juncture of embarking on a series of negotiations 
with the IMF and the World Bank.  The initial conditions should be understood from a global 
political economic context of the declining Cold War, the end of a commodity boom, the 
international oil crises, and the emerging influence of globalisation.  In addition, the regional and 
local environment should be taken into consideration; these include factors such as influx of 
more than one million expatriates from Nigeria, droughts and the consequent crop failure.  In 
addition, not only factors related to the period as such should be considered, but also historical 
factors.  Toye (1991) argues that the combination of historical factors such as a defective 
development strategy since Nkrumah, exacerbated corruption and economic mismanagement in 
the 1970s, and the external shocks in the early 1980s led Ghana to agree to the Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERP) which was introduced by the IMF.  Against this background, in 
what follows the thesis investigates local conditions facing the elite prior to the foreign policy 
change and other foreign policy options Ghana had before the juncture (foreign policy shift 
towards the IMF).     
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5.2.1 Declining popularity  
The support Rawlings enjoyed in the initial stage of his rule was from the urban population and 
the support waned as time passed.  The instant support that Rawlings won with his charisma 
during the AFRC period began to decrease (Chamlee-Wright, 1997, pp. 84-85).  There were a 
number of events that caused the fall in popularity of the Rawlings regime, including 
involvement of PNDC members in a brutal murder case of three judges; this damaged the 
legitimacy of the PNDC.  However, the main priority was the economy; socio-economic 
hardship shook Ghana‘s political stability.  In fact, the economic situation that the PNDC 
inherited was already ―acute economic insolvency‖ (Jeffries, 1990, p. 163).  When Rawlings 
took power, inflation had been as high as 150 per cent in the two previous years and foreign debt 
had reached $1.6 billion (West Africa, 1982, p. 627).  Concerns existed from the beginning of the 
coup about the record low level of foreign reserves and the high probability that international aid 
institutes could withdraw aid.  Just after the coup, the Rawlings regime wishfully announced that 
―none of the countries and agencies which have been offering aid to Ghana over the past two 
years will be so foolish as to draw back now‖ (West Africa, 1982, p. 67).   
 
Rawlings toppled the previous civilian regime citing their economic inaction and so he needed to 
show results promptly to regain lost popularity.  Ghana needed money and macro-economic 
constraints were felt harshly in the everyday life of Ghanaians.  Indeed, hunger became part of 
daily life.  Half of the urban population and two thirds in the rural areas lived below the poverty 
line.   In 1983, income per capita hit the lowest point in the history of independent Ghana, $185 
(World Bank, 2013).  In 1983, the worst droughts in Ghanaian history aggravated the situation 
(Fosu & Aryeetey, 2008).  Food production was severely affected and increased the demand for 
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food imports. Basic items such as bread and sugar disappeared from markets.  Government did 
not have money to pay their employees.  Some state-owned factory workers were offered factory 
products for payment (Shillington, 1992, p. 73).  Moreover, Nigeria expelled approximately 1.2 
million Ghanaians in the midst of the worst economic situation in Ghana.  This meant that the 
government had to deal with an influx of 10 per cent of the population adding additional stress to 
the job market.  However, the regime clearly did not have a developmental strategy for Ghana‘s 
already struggling economy.  After the six months of an ad hoc and punitive economic policy of 
Rawlings‘s regime, the situation became worse, and ―there was no money even to print money‖ 
(Hansen, 1987, p. 192).  The Rawlings regime felt that the ideological legitimacy of the regime 
was the least concern of the Ghanaians as long as the regime achieved economic results possibly 
through receiving foreign aid (Aryeetey & Cox, 1997, p. 79). 
 
Furthermore, there were five abortive coup attempts from the inauguration of Rawlings until the 
foreign policy change in 1983.  Rawlings and the ruling elite were ―in considerable danger of 
losing political control‖ from an elite politics perspective (Chamlee-Wright, 1997, p. 85).  
However, despite the threat caused by the coup attempts by the opposing political elite, Ghanaian 
civil society was tolerant with the new Rawlings regime, and there was less domestic pressure 
from this sector of society and this allowed a wider margin of policy leeway that included the 
adoption of reform programmes as a condition of aid (Jeffries, 1990, p. 162; Levitsky & Way, 
2010, p. 301).   
   
 
 
 
 
 
196 
 
5.2.2 Alternatives: The Eastern bloc 
The economic plight that Rawlings and the elite inherited put them in a constant search for 
foreign capital from the beginning of the regime.  At first, it was the Eastern bloc to which the 
elite in Ghana looked for much-needed financial support.  In fact, even before Rawlings took 
power in 1983, foreign relations in the Rawlings regime did not start smoothly, especially with 
Western countries.  When Rawlings succeeded in his first coup in 1979, he executed a number of 
former leaders of Ghana in public in the name of ‗House Cleaning‘.  These episodes gave his 
regime a bad reputation and extremely negative responses from Western countries and 
neighbouring African countries followed.  Britain was the first country that condemned the 
House Cleaning as ―an odious mix of secret trails and public executions‖, and most Western 
countries including the US, France, Canada, and Germany warned Rawlings that economic 
sanctions could be imposed if further executions took place (Okeke, 1982, pp. 55-56).  In 
addition, the neighbouring countries, Upper Volta, Togo, and the Ivory Coast raised concerns as 
well.  Upper Volta instituted a food embargo, cutting the meat supply to Ghana, and Nigeria 
stopped the oil supply.103  Nevertheless, after the second coup, Ghana‘s foreign policy theme 
under the new Rawlings regime remained consistent regarding commitment to the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) and support to the African National Congress (ANC) and South West 
People‘s Organisation (SWAPO), even though Ghana‘s foreign policy toward African countries 
or entities was not a top priority in the minds of the ruling elite in Ghana (Boafo-Arthur, 1993, 
pp. 136-7).   
                                                 
103 Shehu Shagari, the President of Nigeria, had a close friendship with Ghana‘s Limann who was overthrown by 
Rawlings.  However, Shehu Shagari was later also overthrown through a military coup by General Muhamadu 
Buhari on 31 December 1983.  The two new military leaders in Ghana and Nigeria came to share similar 
perspectives and close relations with each other. 
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The most significant change to Ghanaian foreign policy was turning to the Eastern bloc and 
away from the West.  In his second public speech after the coup on January 2, 1982, Rawlings 
announced that Ghana‘s foreign policy would be ―non-aligned‖ and the regime sought 
―friendship and co-operation with all countries regardless of ideology‖ (West Africa, 1982, pp. 
71-76).  However it was the persistent Ghanaian version of non-alignment again; his nominal 
neutrality meant leaning toward the Eastern bloc in practice.  Even though Rawlings never 
claimed explicitly that he was a socialist, his regime began by claiming to be socialist oriented.  
This orientation came from his support base.  Initially, leftist thinkers in the University of Ghana 
were key advisers to the regime.  The June Fourth Movement (JFM), of which Rawlings was 
Chairman until the December coup in 1983, was a militant leftist group inspired by the Cuban 
revolution.  Hence, it was just a matter of time before the military PNDC restored diplomatic 
relations with radical countries, once it took office from the pro-West PNP government.  
Diplomatic ties with Gaddafi‘s Libya, which had been severed by the PNP, were immediately 
restored and new diplomatic missions were opened in Cuba and Bulgaria while the Ghanaian 
government was closing down twelve other diplomatic missions due to budget constraints.   The 
PNDC expanded diplomatic relations with the former German Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, 
China, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Romania.  This expansion was not only in the political field 
but also economically and culturally, and a revolutionary cadre was sent for military training to 
Eastern European countries and Cuba (Boafo-Arthur, Kwame, 1999, pp.81-86). 
 
However, international communist comrades were embroiled in their own domestic troubles and 
the world was heading to the end of the Cold War.  Ghanaian diplomatic missions who visited 
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the Soviet Union to get financial support came back empty-handed but with advice that Ghana 
would be better off seeking help from the IMF.  Rawlings and the PNDC needed money to 
maintain political power and to resolve unprecedented economic challenges in Ghana, but the 
Eastern comrades proved to be unavailable to help.  In addition, the Ghanaian elite were 
witnessing another change.  Socialist African countries, such as Tanzania and Guinea were going 
through economic inactivity, whereas capitalist African countries such as Kenya and the Ivory 
Coast seemed to become prosperous.  In the eyes of the Ghanaian elite the latter seemed to be the 
model that Ghana should emulate.  
 
Consequently, ―the most appealing option‖ left for Rawlings was to turn to the IMF, the body 
formerly labelled neo-colonialist (Boafo-Arthur, 1999, p.83).  As there was no other obvious 
option, a Ghanaian writer argues that foreign policy change in 1983 was imposed rather than 
chosen (Antwi-Danso, 2013 ).104  However, a closer look at the process of negotiations with the 
IMF, which will be discussed in the following parts of the chapter, discloses the opposite.  
Ghana‘s foreign economic policy in 1983 was indeed a chosen direction by the Rawlings regime.  
The Ghanaian elite chose capital instead of restructuring its economy, and the choice still has a 
far-reaching effect on the path of aid dependence.  Looking at foreign aid policy of Ghana as a 
choice of the elite in Ghana, the next question to be raised in order to understand the policy 
would be who the decision-making elite were. 
 
 
                                                 
104 Senior Research Fellow, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy. Interview conducted in Ghana, 
24 May 2013. 
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5.2.3 The elite in Ghana  
This part of the thesis examines the elite who chose the foreign policy in Ghana in 1983.   In 
order to set the scene for the examination, it is of importance to understand the historical context 
of the elite in Ghana, and it dates back to the period of the Gold Coast colony.  In 1901, the 
British created the Gold Coast colony and laid the foundation of the modern state (Haruna, 2001, 
p. 113).  British colonial policy in Ghana was based on indirect rule.  Studying the elite in Ghana 
in 1966, Kerstiens (1966, p. 66) noted the indirect rule policy of colonial Britain had ―far-
reaching consequences even to our time.‖  Even today the direct and indirect consequences of the 
colonial policy are affecting political and social space not only in Ghana but also in most African 
countries which experienced British rule.    
 
In the colonial era, the Chiefs in tribal groups were invited to colonial institutions as ―advisers in 
the decision-making that affected national or tribunal affairs‖ and thereby became perceived as 
elites (Kofi, 1973, p. 97).  Based on Nadel‘s (Nadel, 1956, quoted in Kimbel, 1963, p. 139) 
definition of an elite as ―a stratum of the population which, for whatever reason, can claim a 
position of superiority and hence a corresponding measure of influence over the fate of the 
community‖, Kimble (1963, p. 137) argues that in the Gold Coast a new elite emerged in the late 
19th century.   The new elite group was ―dependent on non-traditional sources of income, set 
patterns of social behaviour in the towns, and from time to time exerted a strong political 
influence upon rural Chiefs.‖  They were educated ‗natives‘ produced by the needs of the British 
government for assistance to become clerks instead of farmers.  These educated natives 
experienced the periods of aspiration and alleviation of Africanisation in the 1920s and the 
periods of abandoned aspirations during the world economic slump, and by the end of the 1920s, 
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became a noticeable leading group with wealth and influence (Kimble, 1963, pp. 87-140) 
 
Around the time of independence, according to Svanikier (2007, pp.119-124), three new types of 
political elite emerged in Ghana.   The first was the neo-traditional elite who were close family 
relatives of traditional chiefs.105  British policy aimed to co-opt them to the British side by 
putting them in a British education system.  The second type was families of coastal merchants 
who could afford to send their children to study side by side with the children of chiefs.   As 
education and occupation became new determinants of social status, demand for education 
increased and, around this time for the first time in Ghana‘s history, educated commoners with 
university graduate degrees emerged as a political elite; they became the third type of Ghana‘s 
new political elite and was a significant and leading group around the time of gaining 
independence.  After the election in 1954, more than 50 per cent of the members of the Ghana 
House of Assembly were from this third category of Ghanaian elites: the new elite.106  
 
However, even though the new elites emerged at independence, it is doubtful that the new elites 
or the next generation of the new elites played a decisive role in Rawlings regime due to the 
chronic brain drain and the magnitude of its impact on the formation of the Ghanaian elite.  
Ghana had been suffering a chronic brain-drain since the Nkrumah era.  Many capable 
Ghanaians chose to leave the country for political and economic reasons.  Before Rawlings‘s 
                                                 
105 Rathbone (2000, p.12) explains that using the term ―chief‖ rather than ―king‖ originated from colonial convention 
which diminishes Africa and justifies British kings rule over African chiefs.  
 
106 According to Bottomore (1964, p. 100) after the election in 1954, 29 % of members in the Ghana House of 
Assemble was school teachers, 17% was clerks and accountants and 18 % held other liberal professions.  
 
 
 
 
 
201 
 
time, Ghana‘s professional upper and middle classes had left the country in a general exodus.107  
When Nkrumah decided to embark on socialism, he realised that ―you can‘t build socialism 
without socialists‖ (Rooney, 1988, p. 139).  Thus he commenced the task of indoctrinating young 
people in the party with socialist ideology.  Nkrumah appointed his ideological comrades to high 
posts in government, which was a natural move according to his logic; in order to transform 
Ghana into a socialist society, a person subscribing to socialist philosophy should take a post 
rather than more practical and qualified non-socialists.  This practice of making political 
appointments later brought about a severe brain drain that hurt Ghana‘s international 
competitiveness.  Even though the government introduced an ―Exit Permit Bill‖108 in November 
1963, a significant number of the most senior civil servants left Ghana by 1966, including the 
Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa and the Deputy Secretary-General 
of the Commonwealth Secretariat.  Some of them left Ghana because appointments to important 
government posts were based on political ideology or loyalty, and some left because they felt 
their lives were threatened by Nkrumah‘s displeasure with them (Omari, 1970, p. 107). 
 
Unfortunately the era of Nkrumah was only the beginning of the outflow of highly educated 
Ghanaians.  Ghana experienced five coups before Rawlings took power in 1981 as seen in Figure 
5-1, and those coups and counter-coups expelled many capable senior government officials.  In 
addition, political corruption, rent-seeking, and the economic plight continued and were 
sometimes aggravated in the successive regimes.  More and more Ghanaians, especially those 
                                                 
107 During 1975 to 1981, around 14,000 trained teachers left Ghana (Jeffries, 1990, p. 160). 
 
108 In order to prevent the exodus of highly educated Ghanaians, Nkrumah introduced the Exit Permit Bill which 
meant that Ghanaian intellectuals could only get out of Ghana with government permission (University of Ghana, 
1994, p. 39). 
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with skills that the international market required, sought ―exit options‖ by choosing to join the 
brain drain (Leith & Söderling, 2003, p. 35).   
 
Figure 5-1. A coup chronology in Ghana 
1957 Independence (Nkrumah) 
1966 Coup (Kotoka/Afrifa) 
1969 Return to civilian rule (Busia) 
1972 Coup (Acheampong) 
1978 Coup (Akuffo) 
1979 Coup (Rawlings, first) 
1979 Return to civilian rule (Limann) 
1981 Coup (Rawlings, second) 
      Source: Made by the author based on Ghana‘s political history 
 
Due to the chronic brain drain, in the beginning, the Rawlings regime failed to attract competent 
people into senior and critical posts in its administration.  For instance, it took many months to 
recruit for the key positions in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (Agyeman-Duah, 
1987, p. 618).   However, Rawlings, instead of reversing the trend, accelerated an already serious 
brain drain in Ghana by choosing violent populism instead of addressing fundamental political 
and economic problems.  Many activists and a number of experienced senior elite fled into exile, 
avoiding the bloody revenge that Rawlings carried out in the name of House Cleaning (Nugent, 
1995, p. 95).  When the PNDC came to power, during the worst economic crisis in Ghana‘s 
history after independence ―those Ghanaians with genuine marketable skills to offer, including 
doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers and administrators, voted with their feet‖ (Toye, 1991, p. 
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154).   
 
The expatriated professionals or elite are of importance not only because they negatively affect 
the pool of capable human capital at a high level of the economy and bureaucracy, but also 
because they became an epicentre of criticism toward the regime.  In Ghana, those drained brains 
became ―the most sustained critics‖ of Rawlings‘s regime (Brydon & Legge, 1996, p. 22).  The 
forced or voluntary exiles such as Chris Atim from the left and J. H. Mensah, a Finance Minister 
in the Busia regime formed various groups criticising Rawlings‘s regime, and one of those 
groups was the Ghana Democratic Movement (GDM) based in London.  However, even though 
the GDM advocated a return to civilian rule against Rawlings‘s military regime, it did not meant 
to be constructive in terms of the economy or politics of Ghana and, rather, most of critiques 
from the expatriated elite were ―ethnically charged and blatantly racist‖ (Brydon & Legge, 1996, 
p. 22).  This type of verbal attacks by Ghanaians living outside affected the elite perspective of 
threat; those critiques became part of constructing the enemies within. 
 
(a) Jerry John Rawlings 
Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, the coup leader and the political leader of the Rawlings 
regime, wanted to be a pilot from as young as six years old.  He finished school in 1966, the year 
when Nkrumah was ousted.  In 1967, at the age of twenty, he signed up as a Flight Cadet to 
pursue his dream and was promoted to Flight Lieutenant in 1978.  He, like most Ghanaians, 
encountered the deteriorating economic conditions in the era of the Acheampong regime when he 
was an Air Force officer; a wage of a middle ranking military officer did not match rampant 
inflation and pilots had to stop practicing due to lack of fuel and airplane parts.  Rawlings, who 
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expressed the ―desire for action to right injustice‖, became involved in planning a coup to 
overthrow the corrupted Acheampong regime as did many other middle-ranker officers around 
that time (Shillington, 1992, p. 37).  This was when he first encountered the leftist university 
students criticising the government.  Finally, in 1979, he led his first but abortive coup.   
 
The purpose of the coup, Rawlings claimed, was to create a chance for a dialogue with top-
ranking military command but this did not happen.  The coup failed and he was put on trial late 
in May of the same year.  Rawlings was still unknown to the public but the failed coup and the 
following trials made him famous.   During the trials, he emerged as a hero with integrity who 
called for the release of his men and who accepted full responsibility.  Throughout the history of 
repetitive coups in Ghana, Ghanaians had never seen a single coup leader who claimed 
responsibility and pleaded immunity for his men.  Failed coup leaders were busy blaming others 
to save their own lives.  Rawlings, on the other hand, was different in the eyes of the Ghanaians, 
and his charisma captured the imagination of Ghanaian people (Brydon & Legge, 1996, p. 13). 
 
Backed by his fame and popularity, he easily overthrew the Acheampong regime in his second 
coup attempt on 4 June 1979.  The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was formed 
with fifteen middle and lower ranking military officers, chaired by Rawlings and the AFRC 
became a de facto apex institution.  As soon as the AFRC took power, ―House Cleaning‖ began 
and the AFRC executed three former Heads of State of the country, Acheampong, General A.A. 
Afrifa (1969) and General Fred Akuffo (1978-9) and five other top ranking military officers.  A 
few months later, Rawlings handed over power to elected civilian president Limann of the PNP.  
The newly elected government offered and sponsored chances of higher education abroad to 
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members of the AFRC as an attempt to keep them at bay, but Rawlings refused to leave Ghana 
and instead spent his time getting involved with leftist groups in Accra such as the June Fourth 
Movement and the New Democratic Movement and socialist intellectuals from the University of 
Ghana.  During this period, Rawlings, who formerly disavowed any form of socialism on behalf 
of the AFRC, converted to socialist ideology (Boafo-Arthur, 2006, p. 258).  On 31 December 
1981, Rawlings came back to power with another coup overthrowing the PNP.  The second coup 
did not have significant resistance.  Rather, Ghanaians welcomed his political comeback with 
―great hopes‖ that he would be more politically trained than he was after his first coup and ―a 
well-grounded belief in Rawlings‘s personal sincerity and moral integrity‖ (Jeffries, 1982, p. 
307). 
 
(b) The PNDC and initial leftist elites 
The PNDC was formed to run the country right after the coup in 1981.109    When the PNDC was 
formed, Ghana suffered an institutional vacuum partly caused by the execution of three former 
heads of state, the collapse of the Limann administration, partly caused by chronic brain drain 
from Ghana.  Rawlings succeeded in weakening hegemonic power of the previous ruling class, 
but neither Rawlings nor the PNDC had an alternative vision (Nugent, 1995, pp. 30-42).  When 
existing political parties were proscribed by the PNDC in 1982, the PNDC became the highest 
policy-making body in Ghana, combining both executive and legislative functions.  The PNDC 
was made up as a two-tier executive: a tier with the members of the PNDC who make policy 
decisions and another tier of the Committee of Secretaries who implement the decisions.  
                                                 
109 The PNDC replaced the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) which Rawlings formed in order to deal 
with the aftermath of the coup. 
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However, the institutional set-up did not exactly reflect the balance of power since certain 
secretaries were more influential than some members of the PNDC (Nugent, 1995, p. 126). 
 
The initial selection of members of the PNDC represents the sensitivity of the political situation 
of the time. Rawlings convinced that the PNDC should include a wide range of people in order 
not to repeat the mistakes of precedent military regimes (Brydon & Legge, 1996, p. 17).  
Rawlings appointed himself as Chairman of the PNDC, and the Council consisted of seven 
members.  Four military members and three civilians were chosen by Rawlings with the aim of 
enlisting as broad a support base as possible.  Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah was chosen to 
ensure the support of senior officers in the armed forces while Warrant Officer Adjei Boadi was 
chosen to ensure support of junior officers.  Sergeant Alolga Akata-Pore would represent core 
junta members.  Amartey Kwei was a labour leader for the urban working class and Chris Atim 
was a former student leader for the young while Father Damuah represented the petty 
bourgeoisie.  According to Nugent (1995, p. 43), the members were personally connected with 
one another and ―there was a deliberate effort to achieve a rough ethnic balance.‖   
 
Nevertheless, there was one thing that the initial members of the PNDC had in common: leftist 
ideology.  Ever since the first president of independent Ghana coined the term ―neocolonailism‖, 
an African version of dependency theory and non-alignment remained a persistent intellectual 
legacy amongst the Ghanaian elite.  This legacy persisted despite ideological swings according to 
the ideological orientation of a regime.  The PNP of Limann also had its political origin in 
Nkrumah‘s socialist Convention People‘s Party.  Around the time when Rawlings was planning 
the coup, leftists of the PNP began to feel betrayed by the PNP‘s neoliberal approaches.  The 
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leftists were a political base of Rawlings‘s December coup, and after the coup, they became 
strenuous supporters of the new socialist regime of Rawlings.  In the beginning, Rawlings‘s 
regime was an offspring of the Nkrumah regime as far as Communist ideology was concerned.110  
Looking at the initial members of the PNDC, it was a coalition of neo-Marxist intellectuals, left-
wing student leaders, some soldiers, and militia trade unionists in Accra.  Again, it should be 
noted that such leftist inclination was expressed as a continuation of the non-aligned policy of 
Nkrumah rather than pure Communism.  
 
The loosely united and precariously balanced initial members of the PNDC, most of whom were 
regarded as enemies from inside and a threat to the regime, collapsed in the course of 1982.  
Among those Sergeant Akata-Pore and Chris Atim were engaged with the abortive coup on 
October 1982 against Rawlings, which led Akata-Pore and 500 members of military ranks to be 
arrested and Chris Atim to go into exile.111  Another initial PNDC member Nunoo-Mensa, who 
achieved the coup alongside Rawlings in 1981, later moved close to Akata-Pore during the 
period before the abortive coup against Rawlings and tendered his resignation a month later as 
well (Nugent, 1995, pp. 93-105).112  As a result, at the end of 1982, Rawlings and his close elites 
                                                 
110  Adoption of a set of dependencia policies can be seen in the composition of the members of the PNDC.  
Dependency theory became the basis of policy formulation in Ghana after 31 December 1981, as the Rawlings 
government introduced a number of pro-dependency theory policies such as monopolisation of importing through 
government, exclusion of foreign agencies and price controls (Ahiakpor, 1985. p.543).   Rawlings‘s PNDC 
confiscated ―ill-gotten‖ private assets including bank deposits unjustified and in excess of 50,000 cedi, houses, cars 
and factories (Leith & Söderling, 2003, p. 39). 
 
111 In the coup attempts, Akata-Pore was in charge of military mobilisation and Christ Atim was expected to rally the 
PDCs and WDCs in Accra, which led to the subsequent collapse of the PDCs and WDCs by Rawlings and his close 
advisors (Nugent, 1995, pp. 94-95).    
 
112 Among the remaining two members, Amartey Kwei was executed for his role in the murder case of judges and 
Father Damuah was forced to resign being regarded as incompatible with the spirit of revolution (Nugent, 1995, p. 
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succeeded in getting rid of inner enemies and in the beginning of the 1983, the PNDC embarked 
on a new stage of foreign policy with a new set of elites.  
 
(c) The new set of elites: technocrats and securocrats   
At the end of 1982, most original members of the PNDC were replaced.  According to Nugent 
(1995, p. 107), ―although a PNDC minus Rawlings would certainly have been like Hamlet 
without the prince, his importance did not lie primarily in his involvement in the day-to-day 
business of government‖ and ―the importance of Rawlings‘s periodic interventions in debates 
about economic reform, foreign policy and democratisation was largely symbolic.‖  Instead, he 
mapped out four different strands in the remodelled regime: technocrats, neo-traditionalists, the 
cadres with revolutionary origins, and securocrats.  However, neo-traditionalists and the cadres 
were low in their status and their influence on policy making was limited, which excludes them 
from the bracket of the elite in the thesis.  In the sense, the elite who changed foreign policy in 
1983 in Ghana were technocrats, represented by Kwesi Botchwey and securocrats, represented 
by Kojo Tsikata.   
 
Technocrats were a pillar of the new Ghanaian elite in Rawlings‘s regime.  When an Economic 
Review Committee was established soon after the coup, it comprised of economists and high 
ranking officials with different views concerning economic development for Ghana.  At first, 
they could not agree on an economic development plan and this led to a series of conflicts over 
the direction of Ghana‘s economy.  The Committee‘s role of designing the basic economic road 
map for the new regime, consequently, did not proceed very well from the beginning.  There 
                                                                                                                                                             
93).  
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were two groups with contrasting views on Ghana‘s economic policy proposals: monetarists and 
structuralists.  The monetarist group was led by Abbey who found a solution to Ghana‘s 
economic struggle in currency devaluation for boosting exports. On the other hand, structuralists, 
whose main supporting base was the People‘s Defence Committees, believed that structural 
transformation of Ghana‘s economy was the right solution to address economic peril.  Therefore, 
the structuralists, who gave little recognition to the role of the exchange rate in economic growth, 
rejected negotiations with the IMF. 
 
It was Kwesi Botchwey, a leading technocrat in Ghana, who led the negotiations with the IMF as 
a Secretary of Finance and Economic Development and finished the conflicts between those 
conflicting technocrats.  Originally, Botchwey, a PhD from the University of Michigan Law 
School and a former lecturer in Law at the University of Ghana, was an ―avowed Marxist‖ 
(Gocking, 2005, p. 194).  However, the inability of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc to 
provide much-needed financial capital converted him to a pragmatic technocrat.  Soon he 
internalised economic liberalism and became an ardent advocate of neo-liberalist reform insofar 
as he claimed that the ownership of the economic development program did not lie in the 
nationality of the authors of the program as such but rather lied in ―the conscious and deliberate 
choice by the government of the reform path‖ (Botchwey, 1997, p. 22).   
 
In the meantime, even though Rawlings tried to give a civilian veneer to his regime, the elite 
were mostly military.  Compared to the first generation of the PNDC in which four members had 
been military men, by the end of 1983 only two members, including Rawlings, had a military 
background (Gocking, 2005, p. 196).  Despite his appointment of civilians to nearly all seats in 
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the PNDC, the de facto power was in the hands of the military.  In addition, there were ostensible 
civilian heads of cabinet, ministers, state agencies and regional administrations; however, 
military officials were appointed to be second in command (Agyeman-Duah, 1987, p. 618).  The 
military elite of PNDC were ―radical, populist and violent‖ (Austin, 1985, p.96).  Originally 
Rawlings carried out the coup with a small group of junior officers, and the small military elite 
became even smaller going through a few internal coup attempts and the subsequent purges.  
After a number of internal coup attempts, Rawlings began to rely heavily on a few securocrats 
including Kojo Tsikata (Roessler, 2011, p. 310), and later, two other military elites, Brigadier 
Mensah-Wood and Major-General Arnold Quainoo also became members of the PNDC.  Those 
securocrats were in charge of not only the national security but also the security of the regime.  
They did not publicly meddle with economic policy or foreign policy but their strong presence 
was always at the centre (Nugent, 1995, pp. 128-129).     
 
In conclusion, despite Ghana‘s long tradition of educated and highly skilled elites, Rawlings‘s 
regime suffered from an insufficient pool of elites due to chronic brain drain, competitions 
among elites, and following purges within the elite group.  In fact, the elite in Ghana in 1983 
were an outcome of repetitive fights against enemies within.  This caused heavy reliance on a 
small number of military elites with Rawlings at the centre.  Even though technocrats were 
recruited for economic policy making in Ghana, their role and autonomy was limited by the ever-
present military elites whom Rawlings most relied on.  The formation of the elite, which is 
characterised by the survival against enemies within, defined the path of the nation.  In what 
follows, the thesis examines the decisions the elite made and the path shaped by the decisions.  
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5.3 Path-dependent Aid Dependence  
Even though Ghana came under the personal rule of Rawlings in 1979, in the beginning he was 
neither an active autocrat nor a single-handed captain.  Rather, at the initial stage, he was ―a 
figurehead to lend legitimacy‖ to the leftists‘ rule since he was popular enough with civilians and 
the army to maintain political stability (Jeffries, 1990, p. 159).  In this early stage, the power of 
Rawlings‘s support groups outweighed his own.  Hence, the populist Rawlings regime had to 
adopt dependency policies to please its leftist power base.   After the coup, Rawlings invited 
leftists such as the Ghanaian scholar Emmanuel Hansen, for political consultation.  Hansen 
believed that Ghana‘s economic plight could not be solved within the post-colonial structure and 
thus Ghana should sever the economic relations with the Western countries in order to establish 
economic development (Hansen, 1987, p. 170).   
 
When Rawlings took office, political opponents were divided between the liberal New Patriotic 
Party (NPP) and the fragmented Nkumahist, so that they did not make up a significant political 
opposition, which was able to call for an alternative or a transition to Rawlings (Levitsky & Way, 
2010, p. 301).  Ghana did not have significant international enemies either outside of its border, 
which could threaten the survival of state.  Although the left wing had been the power base of the 
Rawlings coup, it soon emerged as his main rival for political power and threatened the survival 
of Rawlings through a few abortive coup attempts in the course of Rawlings‘s first year in office.  
Despite his initial weak stance, Rawlings was a good politician insofar as he could make good 
use of one party to check and compete against another.   Ghana‘s critical juncture of foreign 
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policy change toward the IMF and the World Bank should be understood in the context of the 
elite perspective of mercantilism by which Rawlings and his courtiers fought enemies from the 
inside for their survival, which resulted in the added pile of expatriates from Ghana. The 
following sections focus on the fights against enemies within and, more importantly, the price the 
ruling elite chose to pay to win their fights: the abdication of national autonomy. 
 
 
5.3.1 The Critical juncture: abdicating economic autonomy for financial aid 
The Rawlings regime ousted the Limann administration claiming to uphold a cause of anti-
imperialism.  Thus, the foreign policy change towards Western states or their institutions 
contradicted the raison d'être of the regime.  At first, it was the Revised Budget Statement 1981-
82 in which the tenor of the speech was changed towards favouring the IMF, suggesting that the 
unrelenting economic crisis of Ghana asked for ―fundamental restructuring of the economy…as 
quickly as the urgency demands‖ (Ministry of Finance and Economic Plannng, 1982, p. iii, 
quoted in Folson, 1993, p.85).   However, in the meantime, the elite in Ghana still showed 
confidence in the Soviet Union for material help not only for Ghana, but also for the national 
liberation movement in South Africa and Namibia under the Apartheid regime (West Africa, 
1983, p. 236).  Later, when the deal with the IMF began to materialize, the Rawlings regime 
pronounced that the pro-West redirection of the foreign policy was a procedural means to reach 
Socialist ends.  Ghana‘s engagement with the IMF was proclaimed as an immediate expedient to 
achieve the ultimate goal of ―complete disengagement of the country‘s economy from the 
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exploitative capitalist world economic order‖ (West Africa, 1983, p. 370).113   
 
Such ambivalent attitudes were caused by the weak political grip of Rawlings‘s regime till then.  
In the beginning of Rawlings‘s regime, when secret negotiations were taking place between 
Ghana and the IMF, Rawlings did not have enough political power to disclose these negotiations 
and to face a socialist power base and therefore even during the negotiations with the IMF, 
Rawlings‘s administration affirmed its leftist ideological position.  Ghana‘s political elite in the 
PNDC, at the initial stage, were divided broadly into two factions: the June Fourth Movement 
(JFM) and the New Democratic Movement (NDM). 114   When the Rawlings government 
embarked on secret talks with the IMF behind the back of the political left, the JFM and the 
NDM were sceptical about the new foreign economic policy.  For them, negotiation with the 
IMF meant betrayal of the revolution.  Instead, the secretaries of the JFM and NDM115 suggested 
a leftist version of the developmental strategy. The core idea of the suggestion was ―autonomous 
and self-reliant development based on mass mobilisation (emphasis added)‖ (Hansen, 1987, p. 
198).    
 
                                                 
113 Some writiers find the Rawlings regime to be populist rather than Communist, because despite the strong anti-
Western rhetoric in the beginning of the regime, there was nothing revolutionary in Rawlings‘s policy (Kilson, 1987; 
Toye, 1991; Bentsi-Enchili, 1983; Chazan, Naomi 1991).  Jeffries (1990. p. 160) also argues that, based on the 
speeches of Rawlings when he came back to power in 1982, the leftists failed to convert him between 1979 and 
1982 and Rawlings was ―a populist patriot‖ who was ―determinedly non-ideological, even anti-ideological‖ 
regarding Ghana‘s economic conditions.   
 
114 Six main political organisations provided varying degrees of support for the Rawlings regime: the June Fourth 
Movement, the New Democratic Movement, the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards, the Africa Youth 
Command, the People‘s Revolutionary League of Ghana and the Pan-African Youth Movement.  However, the main 
two were the JFM and the NDM and the rest ―existed only on paper‖ (Nugent, 1995, p. 33).  Therefore the thesis 
focuses on the JFM and the NDM.  
 
115 They were Mahama Sawa, secretary of the JFM and Yao Graham, secretary of the NDM. 
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Even though most members of the JFM and the NDM were lecturers, students, or ex-students at 
the University of Ghana influenced by dependency theory, there was a critical difference 
between the two groups.  The NDM was influenced by Mao‘s ―New Democracy‖ as the NDM 
name indicates; socialism was an ultimate goal which was possible via the intermediary means of 
alliance between classes including the rich (Jeffries, 1990, p. 162).   On the other hand, the 
JFM‘s goal was rapid socialism by attacking the rich and severing international links with 
imperialist countries.  The JFM was formed in 1979 with the purpose of watching over the new 
civilian government of Limann and protecting the ‗gains‘ of the June Fourth Revolution, which 
was the first successful coup of Rawlings.  Notwithstanding the handful of militant leftist 
students who founded the organisation, the JFM became a major political group once Rawlings 
accepted its Chairmanship.  For Rawlings, who did not have a particular political base, it was an 
opportune position as well.  As a result, when Rawlings took power through the second 
successful coup, JFM regarded this as its own political success and regarded itself as the PNDC 
government (Hansen, 1987, p. 186). 
 
Thus, as the Rawlings regime got settled in, the JFM soon emerged as a threat for Rawlings to 
get rid of.  Rawlings manipulated the NMD to undermine the JFM.  In this process Rawlings 
manipulated National Defence Committees (NDCs) and Defence Committees (DCs) which were 
national organisational structures for people‘s autonomy, an aspect that will be discussed more in 
the next section.  Between October and November 1982, a number of incidents took place that 
brought the JFM to an end.  After an abortive coup on 23 November, a number of critical figures 
from the JFM were arrested.  Chris Atim went into self-exile after his resignation as co-ordinator 
of the NDC, which gave the already ailing JFM a severe blow.  Initially, the NDC was staffed 
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primarily by members of the JFM and the NDM greatly resented the dominant position of the 
JFM (Nugent, 1995, p. 45).  After the withdrawal of the JFM from the NDC, Rawlings 
approached the NDM offering newly available positions in the NDCs, and the NDM took the 
bait.  Throughout this procedure the NDM turned in favour of the new foreign economic policy 
towards the IMF (Africa Research and Information Bureau, 2000, p. 7).  The dynamics between 
the JFM and NDM, as two pillars of the Ghanaian elite, played a critical role in changing 
Ghana‘s foreign policy.  Changing foreign policy toward the Bretton Wood Institutions and 
securing aid from them should be understood along with breaking down the dominant socialist 
alliance in search of the survival of the elite.   
 
However, one should note that the leftist was not only a threat to Rawlings, but also a failure in 
securing funding.  Rawlings‘s political manoeuvring took place against the background of the 
failure of the leftists to address the short-term economic crisis as well as to provide a long-term 
economic growth strategy.   The struggling economy of Ghana needed help.  The pressure on the 
Rawlings regime came from all fronts: workers, petty bourgeoisie, rightists, and leftists.  The 
rightist group looked for a solution in a massive infusion of foreign assistance and the left in 
general favoured structural reform, but neither side had sufficient political power to proceed with 
their solutions.  The stalemate broke when a right wing economic adviser succeeded in obtaining 
substantial loans from Standard Bank116 with a promise of more future lending on condition that 
                                                 
116 Standard Bank was established in 1862 in Cape Town initiated by a Port Elizabeth merchant John Paterson (he 
became the first chairman of the bank) with financial support from South African merchants in London, and at first 
its name was ‗Standard Bank of British South Africa, Limited‘ (Amphlett, 1914, pp. 1-5).  When Ghana borrowed 
money from Standard Bank, loans were extended to many Western African countries including Ghana, Nigeria 
Cameroon, Gambia, and Sierra Leone through a merger with the Bank of West Africa which took place in 1965 
(Standard Bank, 2014). 
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Ghana‘s economic structure was not going to change drastically.  In an economically desperate 
situation of the time in Ghana, a financial contribution to the national budget was equivalent to 
obtaining political power.  Leftists, headed by Chris Atim, feeling threatened both economically 
and politically, toured Libya, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and the Soviet Union to seek financial aid, 
but came back with a promise of technical assistance without any cash offering (Nugent, 1995, p. 
92).   Therefore, the shift to the aid from the West should be understood not as a single political 
performance of Rawlings but as an outcome of elite dynamics which included him.  In the end, 
Rawlings decided Ghana‘s path to economic growth: this included negotiations with the IMF and 
the World Bank.  The failure to gain financial assistance from the Soviets led to the demise of 
leftist influence in Ghana.  No money from the East meant ―the death of radical structuralist 
options (emphasis original)‖ (Hutchful, 2002, p.39).   
 
To receive the aid, Ghana had to implement the economic recovery programme (ERP) designed 
by the IMF, which should be translated as a blow to Ghana‘s autonomy of designing its economic 
policy without intervention of entities from outside.  In the beginning, it seemed that the ERP 
and increased investment in the public sector made a positive impact on Ghana‘s disastrous 
economy.  In addition, the Western donors needed a successful case to present and they became 
more enthusiastic about Ghana, the first country which adopted the IMF package (Whitfield & 
Jones, 2008, p. 6).   As a result, donor involvement in Ghana‘s economic policy became more 
aggressive and consequently the Rawlings regime was left with less autonomy on deciding its 
own national economic path.  The IMF imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
which was ―a process whereby developing nations reshape their economies to become more 
market-oriented‖ as a condition of providing aid (Haruna, 2001, p. 111).  As part of the SAPs, 
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Ghana devaluated the Ghanaian currency, the cedi, reduced government expenditure, restricted 
bank credit, removed subsides on utility services, and widened the tax net.  The Rawlings 
government made a good effort to meet the IMF conditions and, as a result, borrowing has been 
continuing ever since the critical juncture of 1983, accompanied by ever-growing abdication of 
Ghana‘s autonomy.  Whitfield (2010, p.725) describes the situation as: 
Ghana‘s initial success with economic reform attracted much donor support, resulting in 
an expanded range of policy interventions tied to increased concessional credit. The 
economic team lost control over the pace of the reforms as the number of donors 
supporting the reform process increased. Central co-ordination of the reform process 
dissolved as donors negotiated directly with line ministries who did not know what the 
central economic team was doing. 
 
In the meantime, eventually, Rawlings succeeded in overcoming all potential political rivals and, 
according to Hansen (1987, p. 177), a former Secretary of PNDC, ―law emanated more as 
decrees from the Chairman (Rawlings) than as a result of consensus arrived at by members of the 
Council.‖  The modus operandi of the Council was secretive but one clear thing was ―its 
ideological predispositions were different from the left position articulated by the progressive 
organisation, the urban working classes and the radial intelligentsia‖ (Hansen, 1987, p. 177).  
Despite the requirement that the Chairman shall consult with the Council members and take 
advice from them, in practice, Rawlings performed with or without their advice.  Hansen (1987, 
p. 193) describes the chosen path of Ghana‘s economic development as follows:  
Once development needs were defined in this narrow way, political legitimacy for 
Rawlings and some of the petty-bourgeois right which cohered around him depended on 
the ability to attract foreign finance and satisfy the consumerism of the petty bourgeoisie 
as a whole, and this was to become the main programme of the PNDC. 
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In short, Rawlings opted for cash in exchange for Ghana‘s economic autonomy and abandoning 
technical assistance.  The leftist suggestion was not adopted for political and practical reasons, 
and instead, the Rawlings regime chose the less autonomous and less self-reliant development 
plan of the economic recovery programme (ERP) for the economic development strategy of 
Ghana.  The thesis highlighted the development of elite dynamics to explain that the path of aid 
in exchange for autonomy was not imposed from outside but chosen from inside for the survival 
of the regime on behalf of the survival of the state.  Unlike Ghana, there are some countries such 
as Botswana and Papua New Guinea which devised indigenous development programmes in 
negotiating with the IMF, even though many more recipient countries accepted the IMF‘s 
development packages (Toye, 1991).  In addition, as Aryeetey & Cox (1997) and Hutchful(2002) 
point out, negotiators from aid-recipient countries do not accept the terms of aid contracts in a 
passive manner.  In many cases their voice is louder than that of aid donors.  Ghana‘s aid 
negotiations with the IMF in 1983 were regarded as one of those cases.  In August 1982, 
Botchwey made several visits to Washington to submit a request for loans from the IMF, and the 
negotiation went on until March 1983 when the IMF and Ghana reached an agreement.  At the 
centre of negotiations with the IMF was the issue of the devaluation of the cedi.  Anti-
devaluation sentiment was high not only among unions which politically backed Rawlings but 
also among Ghanaians in general. The IMF was not welcomed by Ghanaians in response to the 
unpopular currency devaluation in 1966, 1971, and 1978.  Debates between the two groups 
continued even when the secret negotiations between Ghana and the IMF reached the third set of 
policy proposals which became the basis of the PNDC‘s Programme for Reconstruction and 
Development introduced in December 1982 (Hutchful, 2002, pp.37-38). The process of 
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negotiation was praised for the tough stance and high spirit of the Ghanaian negotiators.  Ghana 
gained some respect internationally and especially from other African countries by being able to 
negotiate forcefully with the Bretton Wood Institutions (Aryeetey & Cox, 1997, p. 79; 
Armstrong, 1996).   Pro-PNDC parties lauded Botchwey, the chief of the Ghanaian negotiation 
team, for his courage to face down the IMF (Hutchful, 2002, p.39).  Even though some concerns 
were raised by the Ghanaian counterpart on long-term structural issues, most disagreement 
occurred over ―the scale, speed and sequencing of reforms, rather than the general thrust of 
them‖ (Whitfield & Jones, 2008, p. 6).  On February 1983, agreement was reached by Ghana and 
the IMF and six months later, the IMF approved $359 million of ‗special drawing rights‘.  
Despite the prowess of Ghana‘s negotiators, they still agreed to the IMF‘s model for economic 
development. 
 
Ironically, Ghana is a country with a history of national development plans beginning with 
Nkrumah‘s the Seven-Year Development Plan from 1963117, but the tradition was abandoned 
when Rawlings and the elite chose to abdicate the autonomy of economic policy making in 
return for monetary assistance and checking their political opposition.  After the foreign policy 
change in 1983, Ghana‘s national economic development plan was formulated, to put it in a 
modest way, ―in close collaboration with the World Bank and the IMF‖ (Toye, 1992, p. 190).  To 
more critical observers, it seems that Ghana ―virtually place(d) the whole task of economic 
restructuring under the supervision of the Fund and Bank‖ (Konadu-Agyemang & Takyi, 2001, 
p. 22).  The IMF and the World Bank took a degree of control over Ghanaian economic policies 
                                                 
117 However, Aryeetey and Cox (1997, p. 86) argue that the home-grown Ghanaian development plan was boycotted 
due to the geopolitical and ideological preferences of Western donors. 
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and the pervading influence of foreign experts, consultants and advisers reached ―intolerable 
levels‖ to some Ghanaian professional classes, students and workers (Anyemedu, 1993, p. 41).  
It became common that major agreements between the World Bank and Ghana were typed 
beforehand in Washington and delivered to Ghana only for signature by Ghanaian counterpart 
(Loxley, 1988).  The elite in Ghana abdicated domestic autonomy for economic policy making 
and instead, accepted the new economic development directions designed by the IMF as a 
national economic development plan.  The decision was made on behalf of Ghanaian economic 
development; however, as seen in following sections, it only deepened aid dependence rather 
achieving economic development.  In the context of recurring coups efforts to de-seat the 
Rawlings regime, the indebted mercantilist process of surrendering economic policy autonomy in 
exchange for aid, was a way for the elite in Ghana to securing their political survival, i.e. using 
foreign policy as a tool to counter political threats from within the regime.  
 
 
5.3.2 Expansion: Abdicating people’s autonomy  
For Rawlings and the members of the coup, the events of 31 December 1981 were not a military 
coup.  It was a revolution.  That was why, as he claimed, a radio station did not air the national 
anthem after he took office (West Africa, 1982, pp. 70-71).  His intended theme of the coup was 
‗Power to the People‘ (Austin, 1985, p.95).   In his first radio broadcast after the coup on January 
4, he stated: 
This is not a coup. I ask for nothing less than a revolution-something that will transform 
the social and economic order of this country.  
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However, Rawlings‘s self-claimed revolution did not impress the Ghanaian population who were 
used to revolutionary military coups (Agyeman-Duah, 1987, p. 613).  In fact, most coup leaders 
claim revolution including previous coup leaders before Rawlings in Ghana.    Huntington (1968, 
p. 264) defines a revolution as ―a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the 
dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, 
and government activity and policies.‖   In contrast, a military coup is a change of members of 
the top echelon of governing bodies via military means.  No coup in Ghana transformed a 
society.  They were all about a take-over from the ruling power.  In every aspect, what Rawlings 
did was a military coup and not a revolution, and thus Rawlings needed something with a 
revolutionary feature.  The House Cleaning that he carried out in 1979 was not enough to make 
his regime a revolutionary one (Bing, 1984, p.91).   
 
The people‘s participation was regarded as a revolutionary trait and therefore this was insisted 
upon repeatedly in his initial speeches after the coup.  For example: ―the people, the farmers, the 
politics, the soldiers, the workers—you, the guardians—rich or poor, should be a part of the 
decision-making process of this country‖ (West Africa, 1982, p. 67)118; and ―active participation 
of the people in the decision-making process‖ (West Africa, 1982, p. 70). 119   Rawlings 
announced that ―power will not be concentrated at the top any more, and nobody at the top can 
enslave us because there is no way anybody at the top, whether he is a saint or a devil can do 
what he likes‖ (Workers Banner, September, 1981, quoted in Yeebo, 1985, p.66).  Thus, on 5 
                                                 
118This is part of the first speech Rawlings made after the coup. 
 
119 This is part of the second speech Rawlings made after the coup. 
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January 1982, Rawlings broadcasted a call for the set-up of decision-making units of the Defence 
Committees (DCs) as a vehicle to return the decision-making power to the people at every 
workplace and in every community (Nugent, 1995, p. 44).120  The response was ―immediate and 
positive‖ (Bing, 1984, p. 91). Soon afterwards, in Ghana, there was no village without a DC.  It 
is estimated that there were more than 10, 000 People‘s Defence Committees (PDCs)121 across 
Ghana (Oquaye, 2004, p.147-152). 122 
 
When Rawlings re-formed the elite around him, the Defence Committees (DCs) was used as a 
useful tool to demise one and entice the other.  The DCs were created to complete Rawlings‘s 
revolution by empowering people with more autonomy that could influence decision-making in 
national affairs.  They were ―the institutions through which their collective energies could be 
mobilised and channelled into social action in accordance with the dynamics of the 
transformation process‖ (Hansen, 1987, p. 178).   The creation of DCs was influenced by 
revolutionary countries such as Libya, Cuba, and Nicaragua 123  which also had a people‘s 
                                                 
120 The origin of the DCs was in the Popular Committees of the Police Service (PCPS) formed by junior police 
officers in 1981.  The PCPS worked closely with the June Fourth Movement under the Limann government in 
preparing for the second military coup.  As secret police groups, the PCPS carried out underground activities and 
disclosed some corruption cases in the Limann government.  In his speech commemorating the second anniversary 
of the June Fourth Uprising, Rawlings, praising the PCPS, said that Ghana needed more committees similar to them.  
Afterwards, in a spontaneous manner, similar committees began to form, but it was only after the inauguration that 
the DCs were officially set up (Oquaye, 2004, p.127).  
 
121 The DCs were a combination of People‘s Defence Committees (PDCs) in residential villages and Workers‘ 
Defence Committees (WDCs) in working places.  The structure is explained in the next section. 
 
122  This number was obtained from the author‘s interview with then legal adviser at National Headquarters. 
However, he also added that no specific statistics are available since there was no headquarters which were in charge 
of statistics regarding the PDCs. 
 
123 Among those, Colonel Gaddafi of Libya was a fervent believer in Defence Committees.  He saw the Defence 
Committees as an organ that replaces a representative parliamentary system which usurps the sovereignty of the 
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organisation like DCs, and the internal need to mobilize political members in the initial period 
after the coup also played a part.   
 
According to Workers Banner, a newspaper of the JFM, which played the role of mouthpiece of 
the JFM, the role of committees was defined as:  
Only the revolutionary institutions of the workers, poor people—Revolutionary 
Committees of Workers, Soldiers, Policemen, Farmers, Peoples Congress etc.—can 
enable all of us to take active part in government, to have a voice in the utilisation of our 
wealth, to demand which fishing nets or cutlasses should be imported… These 
committees of the ordinary people, will hold mass meetings…to debate national issues 
and to take decisions affecting the lives of the ordinary people. That is why the people‘s 
committees represent the highest form of democracy.  The budget proposals will be 
debated by the farmers in their villages, the workers in the factories, mines and on the 
shop floors, the soldiers and police in their barracks and their collective decisions will 
become the law of the day [emphasis added] (Workers Banner, 1981).124  
 
As expressed clearly above, the core idea of the Defence Committee was people‘s autonomy and 
participation.  People could take control of decision making ranging from which fish nets should 
be imported to whether the parliament budget proposal should be passed.  Thus, at least in 
theory, the DCs were institutions for grassroots democracy (arguably the highest form of 
democracy), which can complement the shortcomings of parliamentary democracy.  Rawlings 
saw that the path towards changing norms and attitudes of people in Ghana was via granting 
                                                                                                                                                             
masses (Oquaye, 2004, pp.144-5).  Indeed, the Libyan jamahiriyya system became a model for Ghana‘s CDs.  In 
theory, the  jamahiriyya system replaces obsolete national politics (Mohan 1996, p.80).  
 
124 Workers Banner, vol. I, no. 1, 20-27 October 1981, re-quoted from Hansen, 1987 pp. 180-1. 
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autonomy to people.  As Oquaye (2004, p.152) notes, what made the DCs blossom were 
―autonomy, self direction, personal initiative and spontaneity (emphasis added).‖ 
 
The Defence Committees were formed in response to the Ghanaian elite‘s intention to have a 
revolutionary façade.  However, once the elite then turned its foreign aid policy in an anti-
revolutionary direction, the revolutionary DCs became a burden.  People with a revolutionary 
mind-set and autonomous power were expected to be a big obstacle in implementing the IMF-
guided economic policies, which would hardly please donors.  Thus, the elite decided to get rid 
of the DCs.  In order to gain a better understanding of path reinforcement and the destruction of 
the DCs in it, one needs to understand the structure of the DCs.  
 
The Defence Committees consisted of Workers‘ Defence Committees (WDCs) and the People‘s 
Defence Committees (PDCs).  The WDCs were set up in work-places such as mines and 
factories, and the PDCs were set up in residential areas in villages and towns.  As a higher organ 
which coordinated the activities of the PDCs and WDCs, the National Defence Committee 
(NDCs)125 was formed with a self-appointed head, i.e. Rawlings.126  The ultimate task of the 
NDC was ―to educate the nation on the objectives of the revolution‖ (Bing, 1984, p.98).  The 
NDC issued the National Defence Committee Guidelines for the formation and functioning of 
                                                 
125  The Interim National Coordinating Committee (INCC) was the organ preceding the National Committee.  
However the INCC (headed by Chris Bukari Atim, a member of the PNDC) did not operate effectively because of 
political checks, conflicts between groups over ideologies, and various suspicions in competition with the PNDC; it 
changed to the National Defence Committee (NDC) in July 1982 (Nugent, 1995, p. 45).   
 
126 The head of the NDC was Rawlings, even though he attended NDC meetings only once during his rule, despite 
his initial encouragement in setting up the DCs (Oquaye, 2004, p.155). 
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the Peoples Defence Committee in 1983, in which neo-colonialism was strongly criticised for the 
economic plight of Ghana.  Figure 5-2 shows the structure of the DCs.  According to the 
Guidelines, between 40 and 100 people are needed to set up a DC.  Its functions entail: data 
collection on population, economic activities, and infrastructure; ensuring maximum production 
and storage for self-sufficient and efficient marketing; establishment of People‘s Shops 127 ;  
education and training for raising political awareness; health and sanitation; village layout and 
housing; afforestation; and, defence and security.  The DCs had to finance themselves and the 
members had to pay dues for this purpose (Gocking, 2005, p. 190; Nugent, 1995, pp. 110-116).   
Even though DCs started as a way to spread Rawlings‘s revolutionary spirit beyond the coup 
members and towards grassroots, at a later stage Rawlings reshaped the DCs in economic terms.  
The ultimate goal of the DCs became to establish a country where ―everyone can say I have my 
house, I have my small belongings, I have my co-operative, I have food and medical attention‖ 
(Tsikata, 1968, quoted in Oquaye, 2004, p. 114). 
 
When Kwesi Botchwey, the Secretary of Finance, announced that Ghana re-opened negotiations 
with the IMF on 20 October 1982, it was translated as ―intolerable deviation from the Marxist 
view of the world‖ by Ghana‘s left wing elites most of whom were holding influential posts in 
NDCs (Folson, 1993).  Almost instantly, there were coup attempts on 29 October in a rather 
peaceful manner this time, and on 23 November, more violently.  Rawlings responded to these 
                                                 
127 According to the Guidelines, a People‘s Shop has multiple purposes such as distribution of commodities, and co-
operation for production, marketing and obtaining inputs for farmers.  The creation of a People‘s Shop originated 
from the scarcity of commodities in previous regimes in Ghana.  Private shops yielded high profits due to that 
scarcity and the PNDC attempted to control the supply by introducing People‘s Shops where the PNDC distributed 
supplies (Nugent, 1995, pp. 110-116). 
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opponents with an attack on the PDCs and WDCs in a speech.  He criticised the basic character 
of PDCs and WDCs.  His criticisms targeted the Interim National Co-ordinating Council, the 
leading organ of DCs which Rawlings regarded as the stronghold of radical leftists.   
 
Figure 5-2. Structure of the DCs 
 
 
Along with the PNDC‘s political check on the NDC which was the highest organ in the DC 
structure, there are a few more factors that brought on the demise of the DCs system such as 
unstable leadership of the NDC and lack of guidance for members of DCs.  However, despite the 
other contributing factors, the decisive reason should be found in political tension between the 
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DCs and Rawlings as reflected on a few critical occasions.  On 28 October, a rumour of 
Rawlings‘s exile confused Accra, and it later transpired that the announcement was originally 
made in a meeting in the Accra Zone Defence Committee.   Following this event, in November, 
the co-ordinator of NDC, Chris Atim, went into exile in response to a failed coup attempt which 
led to the arrest of several key members of the JFM.  These incidents left the NDC and the JFM, 
directionless (Gyimah-Boadi, 1993).  
 
The break-down of the NDC coincided with the increasing need for the Rawlings regime to 
implement the IMF conditions for securing foreign aid.  The ERP needed to abide by not only 
economic but also socio-political preconditions.  The IMF and the WB were suspicious of DCs.  
They were regarded as ―uncertainties and perceived or real threats of coercion and interference in 
their (Ghana‘s) economic pursuits which are mandatory for eliciting a quick response from the 
private sector‖ (World Bank, 1983, p. 51, quoted in Oquaye, 2004, p. 164).  The DCs‘ common 
cry against the West or multinational enterprises was typically ―they (PDCs) should particularly 
watch and deal ruthlessly with multinationals who are cheats, exploiters and blood suckers, 
engaged in nefarious activities which have shattered our economy‖ (Minutes of East X'Borg 
Zone B PDC, 1982, quoted in Oquaye, 2004, p. 185); this attitude did not win any friends at the 
IMF.   
 
The Rawlings regime agreed with the Bretton Wood Institutions on how to deal with the DCs.  
The IMF conditions attached to the loans were unbearably harsh to most people.  Rawlings 
needed to have an iron grip on power to impose the ERP.  The autonomy of working-class people 
and the acclaimed decision-making power of the people were not conducive to implementing the 
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harsh ERP and, more importantly, not conducive to securing the potential financial capital that 
would come with the ERP.   The DCs therefore had to be demolished.  In the beginning of 1983, 
the Rawlings government embarked on dismantling the DCs and other organs for people‘s power 
to undermine their limited autonomy which was granted and upheld by the same leadership.  
Eventually, in 1985 Rawlings dissolved the whole DC system of the NDC and DCs, alleging that 
they were ―infiltrated by counter-revolutionaries‖ and he replaced them with the Committees for 
the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) (Agyeman-Duah, 1987, p. 620).  The CDRs did not have 
any ideological orientation.  The CDRs were placed under the political direction of the PNDC 
and its autonomy was circumscribed to none (Gyimah-Boadi, 1993, p. 7).  Instead of having 
autonomy, CDRs were controlled by the district administration.  The NDC was also replaced by 
the Secretariat for the CDR.  The CDRs had very little autonomy and were ―virtually labour 
brigades‖ (Hansen, 1987, p. 200). 
 
In short, the foreign policy change and the demolition of the DC system can be summarized as 
the abdication of people‘s autonomy.  The elite in Ghana decided to dismantle people‘s autonomy 
in search of foreign aid which coincided with the elites‘ fights for survival against enemies 
within.  As a result, Ghana came to settle on the path of abdicating autonomy in exchange for 
foreign aid through abdicating a big part of its economic autonomy and people‘s autonomy as 
examined in the previous and this section.  In the subsequent section, the thesis examines the 
reinforcing path of abdicating economic autonomy: political autonomy.  
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5.3.3 Reinforcement: Giving up political autonomy  
In 1992, abandoning a decade of authoritarian rule, Rawlings regime returned to democracy.  The 
democracy in Ghana was regained neither by popular revolt against the authoritarianism nor by 
the international influence of the collapse of the Eastern bloc.  Although Rawlings consistently 
mentioned and promised a return to elected government, he did not feel any need for a return to 
democracy; his political opponents were virtually non-existent since 1986 and foreign aid was 
flowing in without interruptions by the end of the 1980s.  The Rawlings regime had ―a fairly 
high degree of political authoritarianism‖, such that he did not need political transformation to 
democracy (Jeffries, 1982, p. 316).   In this aspect, Rawlings was the prime example of ―the 
basic paradox of democratisation‖, which means ―those who have power tendentially have no 
interest or inclination to democratize, for democratisation entails the redistribution of power 
against those who are in power and those who are privileged‖ (Ake, 2000, p. 70).  Such people in 
power are not willing to move towards democratisation unless there is a ―countervailing 
compulsion‖ (Ake, 2000, p. 70).  For Rawlings and the ruling elite in the regime, the 
countervailing compulsion was foreign aid.  Here, the thesis is not focusing on whether 
democracy is conducive to aid independence.  Leaving aside the normative value that is 
sometimes automatically attached to democratic transition (especially in the period after the end 
of the Cold War), in Ghana‘s case political transformation reflects the ultimate abdication of 
autonomy, political autonomy.    The process of democratisation in Ghana in the early 1990s was 
a barter between foreign aid and political autonomy.   
 
In fact, Ghana‘s extreme aid dependence which started from the 1983 left the elite in Ghana few 
options but to return to democratic government.  However, as Boafo-Arthur (2006, pp. 263-264) 
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points out, the return was possible only after the elite realised that they could still protect their 
interests within the transformation.  As part of the process of changing political institution to 
democracy, first, the elite amended the Constitution, the Transitional Provisions of the 1992 
Constitution.  However, democracy was not the only aspect secured in the new Constitution.  
There was another thing which was enshrined in the new Constitution even before the 
democracy: security of the ruling elite of the PNDC.  The constitutional amendment was made 
with an intention to secure the interest and survival of the elite in the PNDC against 
democratisation.  Section 34(1) and 34(3) of the new Constitution reflect the elite intention 
evidently:  
34(1) No member of the Provisional National Defense Council, Provisional National 
defence Council Secretary, or other appointees of the Provisional National Defense 
Council shall be held liable either jointly or severally, for any act or omission during the 
administration of the Provisional National Defense Council [emphasis added] 
(Government of Ghana, 1992) .  
 
34(3) For the avoidance of doubt, it is declared that no executive, legislative or judicial 
action taken or purported to have been taken by the Provisional National Defense 
Council or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or a member of the Provisional 
National Defense Council or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person 
appointed by the Provisional National Defense Council or the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council or by any person appointed by the Provisional National Defense 
Council or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in the name of either the Provisional 
National Defense Council or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council shall be 
questioned in any proceedings whatsoever and, accordingly, it shall not be lawful for any 
court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any 
such act [emphasis added] (Government of Ghana, 1992). 
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Of course, Rawlings ostensibly asserted that his decision on democratisation was dependent on a 
growth of people‘s consciousness, but it is generally agreed that the good governance as new 
criterion for aid pushed him to hold elections (Brydon & Legge, 1996, p. 23).  In the 1990s, the 
donor societies asked for new political system as a condition for more aid.  Thus, Rawlings gave 
up the PNDC and became a leader of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), a new civilian 
party replaced the PNDC.  However, the NDC was ―little more than military government in 
civilian clothing‖ comprised with former elites of the PNDC (Boafo-Arthur, 2006, p. 264).  Even 
though there was denouncement by opposing political parties claiming that the election was 
fraudulent, Rawlings won the presidential race with a 58.3 per cent victory and became a 
democratic leader of Ghana in November 1992 (Frempong, 2007, p. 136).     
 
When the interest and survival was kept in the political transformation in the name of democracy, 
what was lost was political autonomy and what was obtained was more foreign aid.  The political 
autonomy was lost because the political transformation was not from inside of the regime or 
from grassroots.  It was a part of the conditionalities of aid and the elite in Ghana accepted and 
implemented it to secure their own survival and the continuous inflow of funds from outside.  
Even though the World Bank claims that the 1992 political reform was ―clearly owned by, not 
forced on, the government‖ (Armstrong, 1996, p. 1), Rawlings and the PNDC had basically 
abdicated the autonomous right to policy formulation by the late 1980s (Loxley, 1990).  After the 
elections, the democratic Fourth Republic of Ghana continued to receive substantial amounts of 
foreign aid as part of the SAPs since 1992 (Brydon & Legge, 1996, p. 25).  This political reform 
was another event of reinforcing the path of giving up autonomy, a path which was brought 
about by the indebted mercantilist elite perspective. 
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The abdication of political autonomy resulted in a few more negative outcomes in Ghana‘s 
economy.  Before the political transformation, there was, at least, one good sign in the midst of 
growing aid dependence.  Post-independent Ghana always received foreign aid, but under 
Rawlings aid dependence rose to record highs.  The debt to GDP ratio, which was less than 5 per 
cent in 1982, skyrocketed to more than 80 per cent in 1992 (Leith & Söderling, 2003, p. 50).  
Nevertheless, in the midst of growing debt and aid dependence, fiscal indexes was showing an 
upwards trend giving hope for recovery of the Ghanaian economy.  The inflation rate of 122 per 
cent in 1983 was down to 10 per cent in 1992 (Leith & Söderling, 2003, p. 51).  It was in part 
due to the political stability and the strong grip of Rawlings and his elite.   
 
Unfortunately, after the election in 1992, the positive signs of the fiscal indicators stopped.  It is 
generally agreed that the deterioration in economic growth was the result of political reform, 
which was imposed by the IMF as part of their conditions (Whitfield, 2005; Iddi, 2013128). The 
political transformation negatively influenced Ghana‘s economy in a few ways.  First, after the 
democratisation, policy priority was switched from economically driven projects to politically 
driven spending.  Development strategies also became politicised.  According to Whitfield 
(2005, p.656), ―the Task Force leader, the group took a conscious decision to keep a low profile 
in the context of the approaching national election, so that Ghana‘s Paper would not become 
identified with the Rawlings government and thus risk being terminated if there was a change of 
government.‖  Secondly, Ghanaian businesspeople associated themselves with a particular party 
                                                 
128 Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana at the second interview on 24 May 
2013. 
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and whenever that party won, they were awarded deals in preference to people associated with 
other competitive parties. Businesspeople in Ghana prefer to forge informal relations with 
ministers instead of joining pressure groups, and Booth (2005, p.6) notes that this is ―a telling 
indictment of the new political economy of Ghana.‖   Thirdly, imposed political reforms brought 
about sudden changes in public administration.  Ghana‘s decision-making process under the 
PNDC was centralisation in an authoritarian bureaucratic manner.  This centralised, secretive and 
―institutionless‖ style of aid negotiation did not leave a lot to learn for the following NDC 
administration.  Up to date, the NDC lacks ―the organisation, personnel, skills and motivation to 
negotiate effectively with a myriad of donors‖ (Whitfield, 2010, p. 726). 
 
The democratic NDC was as aid-driven as the PNDC, under which Ghana became the most aid-
dependent country in Africa in terms of per capita-aid ratio (Boafo-Arthur, 1999, p.87).  
According to Toye (1991), the IMF and World Bank were able to dominate policy bargaining 
after 1982 because their Ghanaian counterparts did not push their own policy agenda.  Without 
an effective economic planning and aid coordinating system, the NDC, just like the PNDC, 
struggled to take the initiative in aid negotiations, regarding the economic development plan.  A 
new department (International Economic Relations Department) to promote aid negotiation was 
set up in the Ministry of Finance for more systemised and centralised aid negotiation and 
management; however, it was not effective and the donor agencies continued to contact line 
ministries.  Of course, those line ministries welcomed the old routines as well, since they could 
get more leverage and privileges (Aryeetey & Cox, 1997).  In 1994, the NDC established another 
administrative organ of the National Development Planning Commission for long-term economic 
development, but this understaffed Commission still does not have sufficient authority within 
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government (Whitfield & Jones, 2008, p. 8).129    
 
In conclusion, the loss of political autonomy, which came after conceding economic autonomy 
and people‘s autonomy, reinforced the path of aid dependence in Ghana.  The path of Ghana‘s 
aid diplomacy since 1983 aggravated the process of abdicating autonomy on behalf of survival of 
elites against internal enemies.  This allowed ever-increasing donor involvement in Ghana‘s 
national policy making.  Whitfield (2005, p. 643) argues that the expanding degree of donor 
intervention in Ghana in the 1990s has three different causes.  First, increasing aid-dependence 
since the 1980s, second, increased donor coordination, and third, broadened donor agendas from 
good governance and to civil society.  By the examination of the reinforcing path of growing 
indebtedness in Ghana, the thesis argues that the growing aid dependence and donor intervention 
was possible only because the elite in Ghana chose to receive more aid in exchange of abdicating 
national autonomy.  In what follows the thesis examines the political economy of the path of 
indebted mercantilism. 
 
 
 
                                                 
129 The Ghanaian government is working on the draft of the principles of aid negotiation, (provisionally titled Ghana 
Aid Policy and Strategy) for line ministries at present (2013 May), which is not open to the public yet (Mamudu, 
2013).  
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  5.4 The Political Economy of Indebted mercantilism 
5.4.1 The debt elite 
Armstrong (1996, p. 1), in an external report for the World Bank, praised the role of the elite in 
Ghana in the implementation of the World Bank conditions and stated that the most decisive 
contributing factor of the structural adjustment between 1984 and 1992 was ―continuity and 
competence of the core group‖ of Ghanaian officials.  The core group, i.e. the elite, however, led 
Ghana to the path of aid dependence based on their perception of foreign aid as indebted 
mercantilism.  Hence, this thesis refers to them as ‗the debt elite‘.   
 
For the debt elite, the goal of aid diplomacy is to receive as much as possible aid.130  Therefore, 
for the debt elite, what to do with the aid matters less than how to win the aid.  Looking at the 
process of economic planning and aid negotiation between 1982 and 1983, Ghana did not have 
any concrete economic plan before the aid agreement was reached.  Rather, Ghana‘s economic 
plan was the product of aid negotiations.  Ghana‘s Economic Recovery Plan, which became a 
backbone of Rawlings‘s national economic plan, was based on the proposal that Ghana had to 
submit to the IMF to receive as much aid as possible.  Since the credit itself was the ultimate 
                                                 
130 The definition of foreign aid by the DAC also motivates the debt elite to focus less on economic development and 
more on staying aid-dependent.  The DAC delimits the list of countries eligible for ODA.  These include all low and 
middle-income countries based on GNI per capita categorised by the World Bank and all Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) defined by the UN.  The LDCs are 33 African countries, 14 Asian countries, and one Latin American 
country.  However, the national categorisation which is convenient for donors does not motivate recipient countries 
to grow their economies.  Rather, it perpetuates aid dependence.  When a country in the LDC list meets the 
conditions for graduation from that list through sustained economic and social growth, the country loses the 
beneficiary status of ODA, which is a big blow to its still fragile growth and to its economy.  Indeed, when the 
government of Laos showed a commitment to graduate from LDC status and announced a plan for its graduation, a 
UN official explained it as a unique and unprecedented move when ―our experience is that all of those countries so 
far who have been identified as potential candidates for LDC graduation have resisted this‖ (IRIN, 2012).  This 
explains why there are only three countries (Botswana, Cape Verde and Maldives) to date which have graduated 
from the LDC list.   
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goal for the debt elite, they perceived the long-term national economic plan amendable 
depending on the amount of aid Ghana would receive as a result of the negotiation.  In other 
words, instead of aid being a tool for economic development, for the debt elite economic 
development became a tool to secure more aid.  The vicious cycle of aid dependence starts at aid 
negotiation of the debt elite lacking concrete economic plans; the debt elite accept whatever 
economic development plans are imposed as long as the plan provides the most aid; the 
economic development plan which has already done its job of attracting foreign aid is poorly 
executed; the poor performance leads to aid ineffectiveness and perpetual aid dependence; and 
again, the debt elite enter into the next round of aid negotiations to ease the increased debt 
burden, in other words, to obtain more foreign aid. 
 
To prevent the vicious cycle, at the end of the 1990s, the IMF and World Bank introduced the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which aimed to encourage ownership of aid 
management programmes and economic development plans in recipient countries and asked 
recipient countries to come with their own PRSP to receive more aid or to get debt cancelled.  
The new initiative aimed for recipients to produce country specific, result-oriented, and long-
term development plans which were focused on partnership between donors and recipients.  
Even though PRSP has an intention of ―made by recipients on their own‖, the Bretton Woods 
Institutions are involved with the whole process of preparation of the PRSP and there is no 
substantial change in respect of absence of ownership or autonomy of recipients (UNCTAD, 
2002; Whitfield 2005; Abrahamsen, 2004).  In Ghana, the National Development Planning 
Commission (NDPC) is dealing with the PRSP, and ministries were not eager to cooperate with 
the NDPC regarding PRSP until they learned that it was directly related to future funding (Woll, 
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2008, p.76).   
 
In a similar context, Hutchful (2002, pp.40-41) claims that bureaucrats work only to please the 
eyes of bosses in Ghana.  As soon as the boss turns his back, they begin to skive.  According to 
him, the ―eye service‖ of bureaucrats originates from ―policy rent‖ in the Rawlings 
administration.   The national budget was inadequate and salaries were not high enough to 
motivate state functionaries.  They were not the ones punished or rewarded by the economic 
policies imposed by the donors.  However, incentives and disincentives are critical in ensuring 
the loyalty of bureaucratic elites (Weber, 1968).   According to Weber, the motivation for the 
Ghanaian state elite was the award of projects funded by foreign donors.  Instead of a small 
salary, the state elite in Ghana sought the incentives of getting access to foreign credit from aid 
projects.  In the process, policy reforms turned to the ultimate form of rent-seeking, and state 
elite work only as much as they needed to meet the minimum requirements to keep access to 
foreign credits.   Consequently, the main emphasis was on accepting foreign aid projects 
wherever possible.  Instead of long-term government development plans, short-term projects 
with results that satisfy donors became more important.  Whitfield and Jones (Whitfield & Jones, 
2008, p. 4) argue that these dynamics gave rise to the ―default program‖ where a ministry 
negotiates to win, not because it is particularly necessary or in line with a ministry‘s policy, but 
because it comes with foreign financial resources. 
 
Other than a simple lack of interest of the elite in projects that are not directly related to foreign 
funding, there are a few more reasons for the limited aid diplomacy in Ghana.  Whitfield and 
Jones (2008, pp. 20-21) suggest three reasons: (1) the ―lack of strong, unified party position‖ of 
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NPP; (2) ―systemic factors‖ such as poor working conditions and consequent lack of motivation 
and high reliance on special advisers, and (3) ―imbalance of resources‖ between donors and 
Ghana.  Government officials involved in aid-negotiation say that there always have been 
government attempts to ―systemize our (Ghana‘s) relation with donors‖ (Kyeremeh, 2013).131  
The Government Partnership Compact is one of those attempts in which the Ghanaian 
government aims to set up a baseline for the aid negotiations which have taking place 
sporadically in line ministries (Government of Ghana, 2012).  However, the Ghanaian 
government, at this time, does not have a firm blueprint for aid negotiation for line ministries.  At 
present, the provisionally titled Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy is at draft level (Mamudu, 2013).  
 
Today, the Ghanaian government does not question what Rawlings did to Ghana (Iddi, 2013).132  
Ghanaian government officials dealing with aid negotiations seem to have transformed the 
concept of ―autonomy‖ in their minds.  Lender conditionality imposed ―de facto dependency‖ as 
they circumscribed the recipients‘ decision-making autonomy (Corbridge, 1993, p. 186).  
However, the Ghanaian elite propagate the abdication of autonomy as ―the legitimate areas of 
mutual interest‖ between the Bretton Woods Institutions and Ghana (Botchwey, 1997, p. 23).  
Ghanaian aid negotiators not only take conditionality for granted but even welcome it and feel 
that conditionality is sometimes necessary, as one Ghanaian aid negotiator said: 
Conditionalities are there for reasons. It looks bad. Conditionalities are bad. But 
sometimes they are there for good purpose, especially in our part of the world where 
                                                 
131 Ghanaian government schedule officers for France, Germany and the Netherlands Unit, the Ministry of Finance, 
Interview conducted at the Ministry of Finance, Accra, Ghana on 24 May 2013. 
 
132 Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana at the second interview on 24 May 
2013. 
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corruption can be something that can be done easily….Sometimes it also helps stem the 
persistence of corruption in projects. However, like I said, our aid policy is making 
preference for budget support which gives government in determining which sector to be 
supported how we want to do it.133 
 
In conclusion, the debt elite find the highest priority in obtaining foreign financial capital and 
thus, they are willing to abdicate national economic development or autonomy if they can 
receive more funding.  For the debt elite, securing foreign funding is the ultimate tool for their 
mercantilist survival, hereby the thesis named it indebted mercantilism.  In what follows, the 
thesis discusses the political economy of indebted mercantilism. 
 
 
5.4.2 Indebted mercantilism 
Indebted mercantilism came from a sense of being threatened by enemies within.  There were at 
least twenty small and big coup attempts between 1983 and 1986 including the plot to 
assassinate Rawlings in January 1985 at Kumasi134, and in December 1985, three members of the 
Ghanaian Democracy Movement, an exile opposition group based in London, were arrested in 
the US for buying missiles and other weapons to overthrow the PNDC (Akonor, 2006, pp. 90-
91).   The enemies were within the regime and they were perceived as a threat by the ruling elite.  
However, instead of defining them as a threat to the ruling elite themselves, they borrowed 
mercantilist interpretation.  To elite in Ghana, protecting their security and advantages meant 
                                                 
133  Ghanaian government schedule officers for France, Germany and the Netherlands Unit, the Ministry of Finance, 
Interview conducted at the Ministry of Finance, Accra, Ghana on 24 May 2013. 
 
134 Kumasi is the second largest city in Ghana located in 270 km north of Accra. 
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protecting national security and wealth.  Three variables thus connected to form a political 
economy of indebted mercantilism in Ghana.  These are:    
 
(a) National security  
For Rawlings and his close elites, their own security against potential enemies from inside was 
the top priority.  In the Rawlings‘s regime, the security personnel served as a modern-day variant 
of praetorian guards protecting the elite security instead of national security (Ansah-Koi, 2007, 
pp. 188-189).  The prime example is the Force Reserve Battalion (FRB).  The FRB was 
established to protect Rawlings and his close courtiers from potential military coups by regular 
armed forces.  These praetorian guards were trained in Cuba and always well-equipped even 
when ordinary Ghanaian troops were deprived of live ammunition especially in the mid-1980s.  
In addition, the size of the FRB was too small to repel a full-scale attack to the regime, but big 
enough to counter rebellious sections of the regular armed forces  (Nugent, 1995, pp. 122-123).   
In short, the FRB was not established and maintained for the national security of Ghana.  It was 
set up to protect the security of the a few elites against their potential enemies within the regime.    
 
However, in order to keep the special unit of the FRB, the elite needed to propagate the concerns 
for security of the elite as a matter of national security to be legitimate in the public eye.  In order 
to transform the elite security to national security, the elite needed a threat to national security 
instead of a threat to the ruling elite so that the elite can justify their preoccupation with their 
own security as mercantilist concerns for national security.  However, unfortunately to the elite, 
Ghana did not have a significant national threat, like China was to Taiwan or North Korea to 
South Korea.  Therefore, according to Nugent (1995, pp. 123-124), the Ghanaian elite fabricated 
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a conspiracy theory by making the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the US a threat to 
Ghana‘s security.  For instance, Kojo Tsikata, the representative military elite in the Rawlings‘s 
regime and then Special Advisor to the PNDC appeared on television and ―released information 
of alleged activities of senior foreign diplomats and intelligence agencies against the Ghana 
government‖ arguing that ―there was abundant evidence of such activities in writings of former 
CIA employees‖ (West Africa, 1983, p. 872).  In the end, this incident ended in demanding 
apologies without proving any serious links.  In conclusion, the elite in Ghana used the 
mercantilist concern for national integrity and the revolutionary spirit of grassroots, but what 
they were committed to was their own security from enemies within the regime; the conflation of 
the two is key to Ghana‘s indebted mercantilism. 
 
(b) National wealth 
The goal of indebted mercantilism is aid in itself and so the development agenda became 
politicised.  As a result, instead of restructuring national industry, a regime will choose measures 
that can bring them more monetary benefits.  In the Rawlings regime, in the initial period of his 
rule, politicisation took place with the urban population which was the regime‘s support base.  
However, in common with most countries which export commodities and import manufactured 
products, the rural areas of Ghana were the source of national income.  Therefore, the political 
elite exploited rural producers to support urban residents and to relax trade deficits.  The elite 
elsewhere in tropical Africa exploited the rural population in the same way and ultimately 
hindered national economic growth (Bates, 1981).  After Nkrumah passed the Cocoa Duty and 
Development Funds Bills in 1954, government froze the price of cocoa from farmers and sold it 
on the international market at a much higher price.  The large margin from the cocoa trade was 
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used to subsidize urban residents who were the political power base of politicians in Ghana.  
Since the rural agricultural industry was supporting urban residents, industrial restructuring was 
not an option for the debt elite to take.   
 
The politicisation of development plans became aggravated when Ghana turned to a new 
political system in 1992.  Government, instead of putting money and effort into economic 
structural reform, put its efforts into (aid-funded) high profile projects (Booth, 2005, pp.4-5).  As 
a result, Ghana‘s economic growth was not from restructuring national industries.  Ghana‘s 
economic structure has barely changed since its independence in 1957 as shown in Figure 5-3, 
manufacturing ratio to GDP.  In fact, according to World Development Indicators, the ratio in 
Ghana decreased from 10 per cent at independence to below 8 per cent in 2012.  Even though the 
African continent, including Ghana, has been enjoying attention as a new frontier market with 
more than 5 per cent annual economic growth, double the world‘s growth rate, this does not 
necessarily signal any real structural change.135 Ghana‘s economic growth, without restructuring 
cannot alleviate high unemployment.  Also, the export of raw commodities, without 
manufacturing, fails to bring in technology transfer, jobs creation, and value addition 
(Schneidman & Westbury, 2013, p. 21).  
 
                                                 
135 In order for an industrial structure to transform, ―distance diversification‖ is necessary. Nearby diversification, 
e.g. when a factory producing shirts expands its product line to overcoats, is neither costly nor risky.  On the other 
hand, distant diversification from shirts to steel goods demands large investment including more social 
infrastructure.  This high risk distant investment is, in many cases, more efficient and feasible through government 
intervention (Wade, 2007, p. 5).   
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Figure 5-3. Manufacturing ratio to GDP 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2014) 
 
The indebted mercantilist foreign policy change in Ghana delivered a different type of industrial 
transformation.  A by-product of policy change which lacked long-term planning and a sense of 
ownership led to ―pathological de-industrialisation‖, and it consequently undermined long-term 
economic growth potential (Dasgupta, 2006).   Today, Ghana set a long term development goal 
of a per capita income of $3,000 by 2020 but its economic structure is not particularly different 
from that in the early 1960s.  Main sources of foreign currency are still gold, cocoa, timber, 
diamonds, bauxite and manganese. Agricultural commodities still account for 30 per cent of 
exports and subsistence agriculture accounts for 35 per cent of GDP and 55 per cent of the work 
force (Senadza & Laryea, 2012).   
 
Instead of restructuring the national economy, indebted mercantilism meant that Ghana became 
the African darling of foreign investors.  Ghana showed a notable degree of compliance with the 
IMF conditions insofar as the IMF praised Ghana as the most successful African adjuster 
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(Akonor, 2006, pp. 88-89).  This outstanding level of compliance made Ghana one of the 
attractive places to do business for foreign companies.  Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) in 
Ghana found that Ghana‘s macroeconomic and political environment was the most attractive 
factor that made them locate to Ghana.  According to a survey conducted in 2008, representatives 
of nineteen out of 54 MNEs in Ghana reported that they decided to locate to Ghana for that 
reason (Barthel, et al., 2008).  As Ninsin (1991, p.54) argues, the structural adjustments that 
Rawlings accepted as conditionalities in 1983 met the interests of external capitalists.  If the IMF 
had not imposed macroeconomic and political reforms, theses survey results would not have 
been quite unlikely.  In addition, instead of restructuring of the national economy, mere change 
of ownership of assets from local people to foreigners took place.  Consider the example of the 
mining sector: here, the Ghanaian government controlled at least 55 per cent of mining 
enterprises before the SAPs, but now Ghana‘s mining ownership structure is pyramidal with 85 
per cent in the hands of foreigners leaving the remainder of 15 per cent to the Ghanaian 
government small-scale local miners (Ahiadeke, et al., 2013, p. 35; Akabzaa, 2001, p.25).136   
 
However, local businesspeople tell a rather different version of the business environment in 
Ghana.  While the business environment created or readjusted by the Bretton Wood Institutions 
was favourable for MNEs or foreign investors, it is less so for local Ghanaian industries.  Instead 
of setting up a favourable macroeconomic and political environment conducive for growing local 
industries, the external conditionality and indebted mercantilism of the Ghanaian elite generated 
                                                 
136 The major foreign players are from Canada, Australia, and South Africa followed by the US, UK and China.  The 
Ghanaian government has a 10 % share in every enterprise and an optional right to buy an additional 20 % at market 
price (Akabzaa, 2001, p.25). 
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a friendly economic and political atmosphere for foreign companies.  Today, access to financial 
credit is still the biggest obstacles that local businesspeople face in Ghana (Ayim-Darke, 
2013).137  According to results of a survey conducted by the Association of Ghana Industries 
(AGI), in the fourth quarter of 2012, small and medium enterprises found access to credit to be 
their biggest challenge whereas large firms stated that poor electric power supply was their main 
obstacle (AGI, 2013). 
 
(c) Growing aid dependence 
Even though foreign policy has been driven by economic goals since 1983, many observers 
contend that 1983 was a year marking the origin of Ghana‘s aid dependence (Whitfield & Jones, 
2008).   However, that does not mean that Ghana was economically independent or viable before 
the Rawlings era.  As shown in the Figure 5-4, Ghana remained in debt since the 1960s, but from 
the early 1980s, Ghana fell into the trap of serious aid dependence due to the character and the 
amount of debt provided by the IMF and the World Bank.  Rawlings‘s foreign policy change in 
1983 was a critical juncture that led Ghana to aggravating aid dependence and Ghana fell in the 
vicious spiral of servicing and borrowing.  Based on World Development Indicators from the 
World Bank, Ghana has been receiving ever growing foreign aid: from $90 million in 1977, $213 
million in 1984, $878 million in 1991 and to $1.8 billion in 2011, while paying back $37 million 
in 1977, $108 million in 1984, $293 million in 1991 and $344 million in 2011.  The debt service, 
as a consequence of extensive borrowing, reached up to 45 per cent of total export of goods and 
services in 1987 from 3.7 per cent in 1977 as shown in figure 5-5.  The debt to GDP ratio, which 
                                                 
137 Interview with Humphrey Ayim-Darke at his office in Association of Ghana Industries, Accra, Ghana on 13, May 
2013. 
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was less than 5 per cent in 1982, went up to 80 per cent around the time when Rawlings changed 
the Constitution for democratic political reform.  In 2000, the ratio reached 160 per cent and in 
2002 Ghana finally came to sign up to become one of Highly Indebted Poor Countries (Leith & 
Söderling, 2003, p. 50).   
 
Figure 5-4. Total ODA and Official Assistance Received, Ghana 
Unit: $ Million 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2014) 
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Figure 5-5. Debt service ratio to export of goods and services (%) 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2014) 
 
Indebted mercantilism in Ghana opened an era of abdicating autonomy and growing debt to 
foreign entities.  The dismal annual economic growth rate of 1.5 per cent between 1970 and 1983 
went up to consistent 4 per cent to 6 per cent growth for more than two decades as shown.   
However, apart from severe socio economic damages to the Ghanaian population which was 
caused by neo-liberal adjustment programs, the structural dependency of the Ghanaian economy 
was not improved and external debt grew (Gyimah-Boadi, 1993, pp. 9-10).  Moreover, the 
positive effect on the macroeconomic position did not lead to the sustained inflow of foreign 
exchange.  As a result, Ghana had to return to the original donor-recipient cycle with increased 
and broadened donor intervention.  The growth contained much borrowing insofar as Ghana was 
listed as a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC).  Even though debt cancellation of the HIPC 
programme eased Ghana‘s debt profile temporarily, Ghana‘s economy is still regarded as risky 
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and it is still suffering ―sizeable fiscal and external imbalances‖ created by high government 
spending such as wages and electricity subsidies, and ―high interest payments on public debt‖ 
(IMF, 2013).   
 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
When Ghana changed its foreign policy direction, its economic situation was indeed grim as it 
had only $33 million in disposable foreign exchange which was merely enough to cover two 
weeks of imports.  Facing such an economic conundrum, the Rawlings regime had to deal with 
other challenges such as its declining popularity, and lack of financial support from international 
communist states due to the Cold War coming to an end.  Against this background, Rawlings and 
the elite in Ghana redirected its foreign policy towards pragmatism and toward the West in 1983.  
The foreign policy change in 1983 reflects indebted mercantilism as constructed by the Ghanaian 
elite.   
 
Rawlings‘s foreign policy was a critical juncture in Ghana‘s path to aid dependence in two ways.  
First, following the foreign policy change, Ghana‘s economy became aid-dependent on a full 
scale.  Much of the foreign aid earned from the redirection of foreign policy was not spent on 
relieving its severe economic conditions.  Most aid left Ghana almost as soon as it arrived, as it 
was used for debt repayment.  Ghana had to pay off the old loans (thereby meeting the imposed 
condition of its donors, mainly the Bretton Woods Institutions), in order to solicit new foreign aid 
or credit and to reschedule its debts.  The vicious spiral of robbing Peter to pay Paul, by paying 
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back previous debts with newly earned foreign aid, has been a key aspect of Ghanaian foreign 
policy (Shillington, 1992).   
 
Secondly, Rawlings‘s foreign policy shift opened the path that allowed a foreign entity to dictate 
domestic affairs in exchange for foreign capital.  This offset between money and autonomy is 
more fundamental and irreversible than simple fiscal deficits.  In an effort to meet the standards 
demanded by the creditors as a condition for more aid, the Ghanaian government conceded its 
autonomy on domestic economic policy.  Ghanaian economic policy came to conform to the 
demands of the international creditors and the conditions attached to the loans.  The abdication of 
national autonomy did not end there.  It also extended to conceding political autonomy in 1992.  
Being devoid of economic and political autonomy, the elites and bureaucrats in the country 
lacked a sense of ownership in the economic development plan.  Instead of being motivated by 
making and managing the necessary long-term economic policies, the elites in Ghana indulged in 
patron-client politics which replaced motivations and rewards in a bureaucratic system.   
 
The critical juncture was made by the debt elite in Ghana who chose to adopt a neo-liberal 
economic development strategy.  The decision came from the fights against enemies within, and 
in the course of the fights, the elite decided to choose foreign aid and their own security in 
exchange for national autonomy, ironically, on behalf of national economic development.    The 
ultimate end is money itself despite the fact that fancy words were employed: financial capital 
for economic development, youth education, gender equality, poverty alleviation, and the like.   
Thus, autonomy of domestic affairs can be foregone as long as foreign financial resources are 
secured in order to secure the interest and security of the elite.  In the process, the elite invoked 
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mercantilist applications to serve their interest.  The military coup to obtain the power of the elite 
was dubbed a people‘s revolution.  A small praetorian guard was established to protect the elite 
in the name of national security against imaginary international threats.  Democracy was claimed 
to be adopted because Ghanaian people were ready but indeed it was a mere transformation of 
the ruling elite with their power and interest intact.  Nationalism was asked from Ghanaian 
people, but ―all his (Rawlings‘s) calls for national unity is (was) a hoax‖ (Ampadu, 1992, auoted 
in Nugent, 1995 p.214).  Instead, in every mercantilist decision seemingly made on behalf of 
strengthening the state, national autonomy was abdicated and foreign currency was received.  
Hence, the thesis coins the term indebted mercantilism to label this process. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
6.1 Summary of the argument and main findings 
New states that became independent from colonising powers after World War II suffered the 
daunting task of making the transition from nominal to real independence both politically and 
economically.  To fulfil this task, most new states chose an idealistic foreign policy in the 
beginning.  However, at some point, it became apparent that political independence did not 
guarantee economic independence, and most countries, at some point, made their first foreign 
policy shift from an idealistic to a pragmatic one focused on economic gains.  In most poor new 
states, the economic gains meant foreign financial capital or foreign aid since their domestic 
financial capacity was too limited to encourage sufficient economic growth.  As with strong 
countries, small countries also seek economic gain for survival.   In this sense, this thesis 
borrowed the framework of mercantilism to understand the foreign policy shift toward economic 
gains in aid-recipient countries.    
 
Nevertheless, mercantilism has rarely been used to account for the foreign policy of aid-
receiving countries and instead, ideas of two dominant schools have mostly been used: a 
consensus model and a compliance model.  The latter highlights the role of aid as a reward given 
by rich countries in order to influence the policy of recipients.  The former focuses on the 
common interests of the bourgeois class in both the donor and recipient countries.   However, 
these two schools of thought do not fully explain the complexity of foreign policy of aid-
recipient countries; in addition to international factors, domestic factors play an important role in 
foreign policy making. 
 
 
 
 
 
252 
 
However, the thesis does not apply the simple understanding of mercantilism as a philosophy of 
‗beggar they neighbour‘, which mostly applies to developed states.  Instead, the thesis focused 
on the duality of mercantilism in order to explain ‗why beggar nations beg.‘   As Foucault 
(1991b, p. 97) notes, mercantilism is ―rationalisation of the exercise of power as a practice of 
government.‖  In other words, despite the fact that mercantilism is used as a principle of state 
behaviour, in fact it is only a tactic of the ruling elite and the ultimate advantages of the 
mercantilist policies go to the elite.  Thus, the thesis approached mercantilism as having two 
dimensions: first, the conventional notion of mercantilism, namely as state behaviour intended to 
maximize the wealth and power of a nation, and second, as a tactic of the elite aiming to 
maximize the wealth and power of the elite. 
 
The thesis also looked at what factors would make one nation stop begging while another nation 
carried on.  To do this, the thesis examined the expenditure side of foreign aid.  Excluding the 
issue of quantity of aid, aid can affect the economy of recipient countries through three different 
routes: government procurement, the exchange rate, and expenditure (Choi, Sang-oh, 2005).   
Among those three, despite its critical impact on aid management and economic growth, 
expenditure of foreign aid has been less studied and this is partially due to difficulties in 
measuring.  The thesis argues that the expenditure of aid is decided by the state‘s elite based on 
their perception of foreign aid: what is foreign aid, why do we need it, and what are we going to 
use it for?   The elite‘s perception of foreign aid affects expenditure, and as a consequence, it 
shapes a path of aid management through repetitive expenditures and through spill-over effects.  
The process of repetition and reinforcement leads a country either to aid independence or to 
perpetual aid dependence.  In short, elite perceptions of foreign aid results in path-dependence. 
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The thesis studied two countries to examine the path of aid dependence: Korea and Ghana.  
When Korea ended the Korean War in 1953, it was the second poorest country in Asia with only 
Bangladesh being poorer.  It was also poorer than Cote d‘Ivoire and Congo.  In comparison with 
the unpromising start of Korea, the situation in Ghana was far better.  Ghana was a beacon of 
African hope and a bright future not only because it was the first independent country in Africa, 
but also because it had the biggest economic potential in Africa excluding South Africa.  Since 
then, sixty years have passed by and today, Korea is the 9th largest exporting country and the first 
and the only nation which has transformed itself from a significant aid beneficiary to an aid 
donor.  In contrast, Ghana, one of the most Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), has been 
running on foreign aid up to today. 
 
Many observers were intrigued by the disparate paths of economic growth and these two case 
studies have been examined from various perspectives.  In examining the economic growth of 
Korea and by extension East Asia, economic liberalists emphasises the free market while statists 
see strong government intervention as a source of that growth.  Some observers see culture as a 
decisive factor (Tu, 1988; Nam, O-yul, 2011).  In contrast to the East Asian region, which has 
been examined in a search for factors contributing to economic growth, Latin America and, more 
frequently, Africa have often been approached to find out what hinders economic growth.  
Werline (1994) have compared Korea and Ghana and see commitment of political leaders as a 
key factor that made for economic growth.  Dependency theorists found the root of economic 
backwardness in the colonial legacy and a perpetual post-colonial link between the industrialised 
world and former colonies (Baran, 1957; Frank, 1969).   
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However, as many development writers point out, one single factor is not sufficient to explain 
such a complex process as economic growth or aid dependence.  Aid dependence is a product of 
interactions among various societal, historical, geographical, political and international factors.   
This complexity is well understood and so this thesis does not aim to explain the multi-factored 
phenomena of aid dependence by using only the one dimension of elite perception of foreign aid.  
Rather, the thesis highlighted an overlooked role of foreign aid policy in recipient countries and 
the elite perceptions behind it, in the context of aid dependence.  In addition, the thesis did not 
aim to take lessons from one case and apply them to the other case since, as mentioned above, 
aid dependence is an outcome and, at the same time, a cause of complex factors of a society and 
history.    
 
Instead, by examining the cases of Korea and Ghana, this thesis focused on how elite perception 
of foreign aid contributes to path dependence of aid (in)dependence and pointed to some historic 
events as illustration.  The thesis shed light on the overlooked dimension of elite perceptions of 
foreign aid that allowed for a drastic change in foreign policy and a path with respect to aid 
dependence.  In order to examine the elite‘s perception of foreign aid and its path, the thesis 
focused on the time of the first foreign policy redirection from ideology to pragmatism.  A 
foreign policy which is changed, then adopted and implemented has a stronger binding impact 
than a domestic policy since it is an agreement between more than one state or international 
actor.  The role of foreign policy was examined in the context of the literature on path 
dependence.  Despite its decisive influence, literature that seriously questions the path between 
foreign policy and economic growth or, more specifically, the path between foreign aid policy 
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and aid dependence is lacking.  In Korea and Ghana, the respective foreign policy changes were 
the fulcrum on which subsequent economic policies were built.  Foreign economic policy, 
especially in developing countries, has a critical impact on subsequent political and economic 
policies.  It locks in or locks out relevant domestic economic policies.   A foreign policy change 
becomes a critical juncture of a subsequent path of aid dependence because it narrows down 
future policy options.  The thesis, therefore, examined the historic events from foreign economic 
policy change to economic growth within the theoretical framework of path dependence: initial 
condition, critical juncture, self-reproducing sequences, reactive sequences, and historical lock-
in.   
 
In order to examine the paths, the thesis started from the critical juncture of foreign policy 
change of Korea‘s Park and Ghana‘s Rawlings.  The two regimes share a few significant 
similarities and disparities.  Both Park and Rawlings took power by military coup.  They took off 
their army uniform, got elected as civilian leaders and remained as heads of their respective 
states for nineteen years.  More significantly, during their rule, they both changed the foreign 
policy of their respective countries radically and embraced previously perceived enemies in 
search for economic aid.   
 
Indeed, Park and Rawlings were the first political leaders to redirect the basis of foreign policy in 
Korea and Ghana from an ideology oriented foreign policy to a pragmatic one.  When Park took 
power in 1961, Korea, which had been invaded by North Korea and had gone through the 3-year-
long Korean War, was still under the threat of its invader.  The North economically outperformed 
South Korea and was far more industrialised than the South.  The elite in Korea needed a 
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financial source to reduce the threat of North Korea.  In Korea, pragmatic foreign economic 
policy rarely existed in the first two Republics.  It was Park‘s regime that made a drastic foreign 
policy decision based on pursuing economic gains.  Likewise in Ghana, the history of its foreign 
policy can be divided into two phases, distinguished by Rawlings‘s foreign policy change: from 
independence to 1983 and from 1983 to now.  In the first phase, ideology determined Ghana‘s 
foreign policy.  The foreign economic policy of Ghana had been ―the by-product of formal 
political interactions of Ghana with the international system‖ until 1983 when ―the pursuit of an 
overly aggressive foreign economic policy‖ was first put in place (Boafo-Arthur, 1999, p. 73).   
The Rawlings regime initially declared ‗war‘ against the West and the US in particular and 
maintained strong ties with anti-US countries such as Nicaragua, Cuba and Libya.  However, 
when facing an unprecedented economic plight, Ghana realised that the Eastern bloc was not a 
reliable aid source.  This coincided with the demise of the strong leftist elites in Rawlings regime 
which was becoming a threat to the survival of Rawlings.  At last, Korea normalised its severed 
diplomatic relations with Japan, a historic foe of the Koreans, and Ghana turned to the West, the 
former rhetorical enemy of Rawlings and of his political support base.   In both cases, the 
redirection toward foreign economic policy was driven by mercantilism: the need for survival of 
the state and the elite.    
 
However, even though the foreign economic policy in Korea and Ghana are ostensibly 
mercantilist, fundamental differences are evident.  The elite in Korea saw ‗industrial 
mercantilism‘, which emphasised the supremacy of manufacturing over agriculture or wealth 
itself to be a tool to their survival.  On the other hand, the elite in Ghana found inflow of foreign 
aid itself as their way to survival in which the government‘s choices were driven by the pursuit 
 
 
 
 
257 
 
of more aid to pay down or to reschedule outstanding debts.  Thus, the thesis named such elite 
perspectives in Ghana ‗indebted mercantilism‘.  With indebted mercantilism, aid in itself 
becomes the goal of foreign policy.   
 
In Korea, before Park took power, the two previous regimes were not strong enough to control 
and to take the lead in restructuring the national economy.  The Korean population were still 
living in dire poverty and its economy was dependent on foreign aid.  In 1957, aid accounted for 
27 per cent of GDP and there was no significant manufacturing base.  In contrast to the 
struggling South Korea, North Korea was making relatively good progress in economic growth, 
especially in manufacturing.  Park‘s regime, which took power by military coup in 1962 saw 
industrialisation as a national strategy for the survival the elite that could legitimize the military 
regime and began its search for financial capital for industrialisation.  Park‘s regime first 
approached the international consortium for rebuilding Korea‘s economy for the funding to cover 
the first Five Year Economic Development Plan (FYEP).  However, no country readily offered 
the much-needed capital to the poverty-ridden and war-torn South Korea.   
 
Park‘s regime found the breakthrough in diplomatic normalisation with Japan.  The steps towards 
normalisation had been made since the first Republic but without much progress due to the 
personal and emotional legacy shared by the two populations.  Instead of adhering to the nominal 
term of ‗compensation‘, which became a stumbling block since the Japanese government resisted 
the term, Park‘s negotiation team suggested receiving Japanese monetary aid in the name of 
‗economic cooperation and development.‘  At last the two countries signed a treaty of diplomatic 
normalisation with $300 million of economic cooperation in the form of grants and $2 billion in 
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low long-term, low-interest loans.   
 
It is generally agreed that the success in the Korea-Japan negotiation was an outcome of shared 
interests.  Besides the strong will to reach agreement from the Korean side, there were some 
critical international factors such as the role of the US.  The US government recognised the 
necessity of rebuilding the economy of Korea which was adjacent to Communist North Korea.  
The US wanted to share the burden of resuscitating the Korean economy with Japan whose 
economic power was already on the increase.  The Japanese elite did not want to lose favour with 
the US because of the threat of growing Communism in the neighbouring Chinese mainland and 
North Korea.  In addition, they felt that Park‘s regime, which was desperately seeking money, 
would be a good partner to complete the negotiations at the lowest price.  Park was searching for 
foreign capital for industrialisation and economic growth that could make his shaky political 
ground more solid and legitimate (Chung, Il-joon 2005, p.70).  For Park, reaching economic 
goals meant more than just pledges declared to justify the coup.  Fast economic growth was ―the 
most attractive carrot‖ that the new military regime could offer to legitimize itself to the aspiring 
people (Kim, 1988, p. 212).  Given those international situations, a number of scholars still point 
out the commitment of Park‘s regime as the most critical independent variable inasmuch as other 
international variables including the influence of the US had been constantly present since the 
first Republic of Korea (Yoon, Tae Ryong, 2008).   
 
The path initiated by the critical juncture of Korea-Japan diplomatic normalisation was 
reinforced by some later events and institutionalisations of the elite‘s perceptions of foreign aid.  
The monetary support from Japan for the first FYEP was expanded to entail the support for 
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building a steel mill in the second FYEP.  Korea was seeing a decrease in terms of trade in 
exporting light industry products created by the First FYEP.  The path of restructuring was driven 
toward heavy and chemical industries.  The commitment and will of Park‘s regime 
notwithstanding, the international creditors in western countries were not optimistic about 
building a steel mill in Korea partially due to the previous failures in India, Turkey, Mexico and 
Brazil; those creditors finally refused to fund the steel mill plan.  However, in Park‘s regime, 
most of the elite in Korea believed that the way out of poverty was to apply the Japanese model 
of developing heavy and chemical industries (Kim, Chung-Yum, 2006, p.396).  Lacking any 
other lenders, they turned to Japanese cooperation again.  The imbursement of financial capital 
from the normalisation treaty was re-negotiated by the two counterparts and Japan agreed to 
offer technical support to build a steel mill and to reverse the expenditure of the money from 
agriculture to building that steel mill.  There were annual meetings between Korea and Japan 
regarding the imbursement of the money and economic cooperation.  These meetings extended to 
offering support for producing engineers and technicians by founding the first technical school in 
Korea.  The status of technicians was secured by newly adopted laws and a system of national 
examinations.    
 
The industrial mercantilism which shaped diplomatic normalisation between Korea and Japan 
was repeated and reinforced in following an aid-oriented foreign policy.  Looking at each event 
of aid diplomacy and related policy development, one can observe some characteristics of the 
industrialising elite and industrial mercantilism in Korea.  The elite in Park‘s regime comprised 
mainly of two groups: military and technocrats.  First, the military group had experience in the 
Japanese army before independence and after independence they became one of the most 
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modernised professional groups in Korea, having developed advanced management and 
administration skills through fighting side by side with the US army during the Korean War.  
Among the military elite, the core group that led the coup with Park was the 8th class, and they 
shared an exceptional sense of unity and pride since they were the class who had the most 
casualties in the Korean War.  More interestingly most of them were from poor rural areas.  
Korea at the time did not have any significant landed ruling class due to Korean War and 
subsequent land reform, and thus, the military elite did not have a vested interest in the old 
economic structure.   
 
The other pillar of the elite in Park‘s regime was the technocrats who were recruited from abroad 
through the reverse brain drain project of the military government.   PhD holders in Economics, 
Science and Engineering were recruited through concerted efforts by the regime which lacked 
the skills to draw up national economic plans or to implement them.  The positions and 
autonomy of these recruits was secured.  Instead of working for administrators, many of them 
were offered decision-making positions and others were offered research positions in a newly 
built national think-tank.    
 
In addition to the composition of the elite, the type of nationalism of the elite is a key factor 
determining the path of industrialisation in Korea.  Korean people are known to have strong 
nationalism.  However, even though, the military elite made a big sacrifice during the Korean 
War, the nationalism of the military elite seems like a metamorphosis of opportunism of the time.  
Given the personal history of Park before he took power notably as an aspirational Japanese 
soldier and as a member of the secretive North Korean Communist party, the sincerity of his and 
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the military elites‘ nationalism is questionable.  However, the opportunistic military elite saw 
industrialisation to be their way to survive in relation to the Korean populace and to the US, and 
they needed money and educated technocrats for their survival strategy.  Ironically, in 
repatriating professionals from abroad (reversed brain drain), the military elite ―appealed to their 
nationalism and patriotism‖ through individual persuasion (Yoon, 1992, p. 7), and the 
nationalistic repatriated technocrats became the foundation of the subsequent economic 
development path. 
 
Nevertheless, the interesting combination of the two types of elites as a whole produced a typical 
―developmental elite‖ (Johnson, 1987, p. 140) in Korea who were created by a stable 
authoritarian regime.  Cumings (1984) refers to Park‘s regime as a ―bureaucratic-authoritarian 
industrialising regime‖ where ―strong states direct economic development‖.  The industrialising 
elite in Park‘s regime, as any developmental elite does, proceeded to legitimize themselves not 
by their political processes but by their economic performances.  In the same vein, the 
industrialising elite in Korea were loyal and committed to a ―benevolent dictator‖ (Barro, 1991a; 
1991b). 
 
The path that the debt elite shaped in Ghana from the point of the critical juncture is rather 
different even though both foreign policies were redirected to secure foreign aid.  The foreign 
policy change in 1983 in Ghana is critical since it became a starting point of aid dependence.  It 
is relatively easy to use numeric indicators to examine how the aid-directed foreign policy drew 
Ghana into a state of aid dependence.   The 1983 foreign policy change, however, is more critical 
than changes in numbers on the fiscal balance sheet.  The change became the critical juncture of 
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the path of aid dependence as it started a spiral of future deals that in effect exchanged autonomy 
to formulate and implement local policies with foreign aid as its aim.  Boafo-Arthur (1999, p.74) 
argues that ―the unprecedented cordial relations with the IMF and the World Bank‖ were ―the 
outcome of political pragmatism or opportunism at the expense of traditional foreign policy 
concerns.‖  The loss of autonomy and its resulting impact is hard to trace since these outcomes 
are not easy to quantify in numbers.  This explains the scarcity of literature dealing with loss of 
autonomy in a framework of aid dependence.  In the case of Ghana, the thesis examined the 
overlooked trade-off between money and autonomy and the consequent path dependence of aid 
dependence.  Abdicating autonomy started with domestic fiscal policies but soon expanded to 
economic planning and finally reached the political arena.  Each event of abdicating autonomy in 
favour of foreign aid reinforced the path of aid dependence of Ghana.   
 
Borrowing money from the IMF and abdicating economic autonomy was not Ghana‘s post-
independence leaders‘ intention in the beginning, not even Rawlings‘s.   In 1981, Rawlings 
toppled the PNP of the Limann administration through his second military coup with the newly 
formed Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and reversed the West-friendly foreign 
policy of the previous regime.  The PNDC expanded and rebuilt diplomatic relations with 
political comrades such as Cuba, North Korea and the Soviet Union and soon diplomatic 
missions seeking financial help were sent to the comrade countries.  However, they were busy 
with their own domestic troubles and the dispatched missions came back home empty handed but 
with the advice that Ghana should seek help from the IMF.  
 
Thus, Rawlings turned to the West in 1983 and this became the critical juncture of Ghana‘s aid 
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dependence, and it was driven by Rawlings‘s tactic to survive against the enemies within the 
regime.  When Rawlings took power he was a chairman of the JFM and thus, when he succeeded 
with the coup, the JFM regarded the coup as its own victory.  However, a militaristic leftist JFM 
became a threat to Rawlings‘s political life, and he removed the JFM by manipulating the 
moderate leftist NMD, the other pillar of the leftist group.  Later, Rawlings encouraged 
competition between the right and left to dissolve the NMD and other leftist residuals; the 
outcome was that the negotiation with the IMF was completed.   In the process of eliminating his 
potential political threats, the leftists‘ economic development plan suggesting ―autonomous and 
self-reliant development based on mass mobilisation‖ was totally superseded.  Rawlings and his 
―small boys‖ chose monetary aid at the price of abdicating autonomy in economic policies in 
1983 (Hansen, 1987, p. 198).   In the course of the fight against enemies within, the Rawlings 
regime abdicated the autonomy of making national economic plan to donors and accepted money 
and a new set of economic policies given by donors. 
 
The loss of economic autonomy marked the beginning of the new path of aid dependence and the 
loss of ‗people‘s autonomy‘.  Rawlings claimed that his military coup was a revolution and he set 
up the National Defence Committees (NDCs) as operating revolutionary units.   The NDCs were 
encouraged to perform as decision-making units for grassroots and regarded as ―the highest form 
of democracy‖ (Workers Banner, 1981).  As Rawlings intended, soon there were almost no 
villages and working places in Ghana without NDCs, thanks to the encouraged ―autonomy, self-
direction, personal initiative and spontaneity‖ (Oquaye, 2004, p.152).  However, the people‘s 
autonomy was soon abolished by its creator.  There were various reasons for the premature 
demise of the NDCs and these included the uncontrolled and destructive activities of their 
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members and a power struggle between the heads of the NDCs and Rawlings.  However the 
main reason, as the thesis pointed out, was the fight against the enemies within the regime and 
the uneasy attitude of the IMF toward the NDCs swayed the balance as well.  Rawlings needed 
to secure a tighter grip on the population in order to implement the harsh IMF package which 
accompanied aid; the people‘s autonomy that he once encouraged became an obstacle to that.  
 
The exchange of people‘s autonomy for foreign aid was later expanded to include giving up 
political autonomy in 1992.  Ghana decided to receive more aid in exchange for altering its 
political system, but only after they amended the Constitution protecting the advantages of the 
existing ruling elite first.  Moreover, putting aside the normative discourse on democracy, since 
democratisation in Ghana was not a response of the regime to the demand of grassroots but a 
choice of the elite in exchange for financial aid, the thesis argued that democratisation of Ghana 
was abdication of political autonomy.  The imposed change of the political system toward 
―democracy‖ shifted the focus of the state elite towards politics and elections.138  Ghana had 
been enjoying improved fiscal conditions since 1983, even though that did not mean Ghana was 
escaping aid dependence.  However, even the fiscal progress stopped in 1992 when elections 
took place.  Hutchful (2002, pp. 221-3) also notes that when elections took place in Ghana, 
politicians and their financial supporters made decisions on economic policy in lieu of 
technocrats and then, fiscal progress stops.   
                                                 
138 Even though democratisation process was not a subject of the thesis, Park‘s regime did not open up Korea‘s 
political system.  Korea went through to political transformation to democracy in 1987 and Burton and Ryu (1997, 
p. 194) explain that ―consensual elite unity‖ was the most critical determinants of the democratisation in Korea 
which was facilitated by a number of contextual factors such as a growing economy, a substantial middle class, a 
highly educated mass, the spread of democratic values, the absence of ethnic cleavages, the presence of North Korea 
as a national threat and an international climate accepting only the democratic state as a legitimate state . 
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When observing the characteristics of the debt elite in the Rawlings regime who made those 
decisions, one outstanding feature is the chronic and exacerbated brain drain.  It began in the 
Nkrumah era and was aggravated by subsequent political conflicts and settling of scores.  The 
economic plight also played a role and there was no systemic effort to attract the highly qualified 
expatriates back to Ghana.  The Rawlings regime also suffered the effects of the brain drain in 
trying to appoint competent people, and it took months to fill key positions in the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning (Agyeman-Duah, 1987, p. 618).  The expatriated professionals 
influenced the elite in Ghana not just by limiting the pool for the Ghanaian government, but also 
by becoming a source of critique of Rawlings regime abroad, which affected the threat 
perception of the elite inside Ghana.  
 
The thesis made an attempt to understand the elite perspectives in the context of elite nationalism 
in Ghana.  Nationalism was a creation of the new elite who emerged around independence.  In 
order to gain political power in relation to the colonial elite and the traditional elite, the newly 
educated elite who were mostly from relatively wealthy families propagated nationalism in order 
to build the legitimacy of their political power.  Even though, due to the chronic brain drain, the 
new elite or the off-spring of the new elite did not significantly influence the elite of the 
Rawlings regime, the debt elite in Rawlings regime seemed to have similar attitudes in 
interpreting nationalism in Ghana, which led to indebted mercantilism.  The debt elite in Ghana 
politicised foreign economic policy to check political competitors and were highly motivated to 
obtain projects funded by donors.  This brought about the rise of a ―default program‖ which 
ministries actually pursued, not because it was necessary, but because it would come with foreign 
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aid (Whitfield & Jones, 2008, p. 4).   
   
In conclusion, the thesis attempted to account for the marginalised subject of foreign economic 
policy of aid-recipient countries, using a framework of path dependent aid dependence, and 
introduced ‗industrial mercantilism‘ as a framework to understand the ‗industrialising elite‘ 
decisions in aid independent Korea and ‗indebted mercantilism‘ to understand the ‗debt elite‘ in 
aid dependent Ghana.  By examining two disparate paths of aid dependence in Korea and Ghana, 
the thesis presents the following important findings regarding industrial mercantilism and 
indebted mercantilism, as well as the industrialising elite and the debt elite.   
 
First, behind the foreign policy change of Korea in 1963, there was the change of a whole elite 
group.  As mentioned above, unconditional surrender of Japan, the Korean War and land reform 
effectively destroyed the colonial or landed elite in Korea.  When Park took power with a 
military elite and when they recruited a new set of elites, they were, as collectively a new elite 
who did not have vested interests in the previous or existing economic system, and there was a 
consensus among the elite regarding industrialisation as a national strategy for survival.  In short, 
in Korea, the newly united elite emerged with the coup and the unity drove the foreign policy 
change.   On the other hand, in Ghana‘s case, there were conflicts, disharmony, distrust, and 
changes within the elite as far as the foreign policy change was concerned.  Ghana‘s foreign 
policy choice was a product of inner conflict that resulted in the Rawlings regime always being 
wary of enemies from within.   Here, there was a military coup producing the new, but 
vulnerable elite, and conflicts within the new elite became the driving factor for foreign policy 
change.  For instance, some parties opposed foreign policy change, notably the JFM and NDM, 
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but the change was completed in parallel with the demise of those parties.   The elite‘s perception 
of industrial mercantilism had been unified among the elite in Korea.  In contrast, the elite 
perception of indebting mercantilism was an outcome of the elite conflict in Ghana. 
 
Secondly, regarding technocrats, even though both countries employed technocrats as decision-
makers in foreign economic policy, while Korea had a sufficient pool of trained modern elites, 
Ghana lacked it.  It was in part due to the different legacy of colonialism and previous regimes 
and in part due to brain drain or government‘s attempts (or lack of) to reverse it.  In Korea, 
systematic government practices were carried out to repatriate professionals from abroad.  
However, in Ghana, the Rawlings regime aggravated already serious brain drain resulting in 
vacancies of critical posts in government.  Repatriated professionals in Korea were patriotic and 
directly involved in decision-making in national affairs.  They supplemented and taught the 
military elite.  On the other hand, expatriated Ghanaians became critics against the Rawlings 
regime that defied Ghanaian nationalism by being unconditional and racist.  In response, this 
helped shape the elite perspectives on threats against their survival.  
 
Thirdly, the donor community was eager to make a success story of both Korea and Ghana.  
Korea was at the centre of competition in the Cold War.  North Korea was a proxy that showed 
how good the USSR was at nurturing allied poor countries and South Korea was a proxy of the 
US.  Japan also needed an economically strong Korea as a buffer between itself and China/North 
Korea in order not to have Communists within an hour‘s range of Japan.  However, the donors to 
Ghana did not have such desperate reasons for establishing aid independence or sustained 
economic growth in Ghana.  The donor community was eager to make a success story of Ghana 
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too, since Ghana was the first African country to accept a Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAP) in the early 1980s.  However, the donor intention was less political and less desperate in 
Ghana (low politics as opposed to security politics).  Ghana became a ‗star pupil‘ of the SAPs 
with noteworthy progress in economic and political transformation.  However, the excessive 
efforts to make a success story led to aid dependence in Ghana.  The more money donors put into 
Ghana in fear of failure, the more aid dependent Ghana became.    
 
Fourthly, the industrialising elite in Korea had an economic plan before they went to the aid 
negotiation table.  There were development plans and an anticipated amount of funding to cover 
the plans was in the mind of negotiators when they embarked on aid negotiations.  Negotiations 
duly were based on the plans and the necessary funding.  In contrast, the Ghanaian elite 
negotiated first and then worked on planning national economic development afterwards, based 
on the result of negotiations.  Indebted mercantilist aid diplomacy places ‗more credit‘ at the top 
of the negotiation agenda.  Thus, negotiation aimed towards ‗getting-as-much-as-possible.‘  
Ghana‘s ministries negotiated donor-initiated aid programmes ―under the strategy of maximising 
aid inflows‖ (Whitfield & Jones, 2008, p. 4).   
 
Finally, in Korea, industrial mercantilist elites used autonomy to achieve their goals, whereas 
indebted mercantilist elites in Ghana abdicated autonomy to achieve their goals.  In Korea, 
industrial mercantilist elites, not only used, but fought for national autonomy to restructure 
national industry through active domestic policy, whereas indebted mercantilist elites in Ghana 
yielded the autonomy of formulating and implementing domestic policies to gain more financial 
resources.  In other words, industrial elites rely on national autonomy within which they can 
 
 
 
 
269 
 
formulate and implement policies in order to establish what they plan and they pursue legitimacy 
in their establishments.  On the other hand, debt elites rely aid (and hence, debt) for their survival 
and abdicate national autonomy if it is necessary to receive foreign capital. 
 
 
 
6.2 Contribution and future research agenda 
The findings of this study may prove to be useful for aid policies of donors and recipients.  The 
recent efforts of the UN to promote industrialisation in Africa are one such a policy approach that 
could benefit from a deliberate investigation of how path dependence and the elite‘s role in that 
process can derail or promote industrialisation (Economic Commission for Africa, 2013, p. 9).  
However, those effective industrial policies or industrialisation cannot arise without 
industrialising elites.  This thesis infers that in order to get more aid-receiving countries out of 
the trap of aid-dependence, scholars and policy-makers working in the area of overseas aid need 
to shift their attention; from a donor-centric view of who gives aid, how aid is given and for what 
purposes to a recipient-centric vies of who the elite in aid recipient countries are and what they 
want to do with the aid and why.   
 
Although the thesis aimed to fill a gap in donor-centred studies on aid by employing the lens of 
mercantilism in a novel way, the findings of the thesis can in future research be expanded to add 
more significantly to theory in this field.  The thesis already contributed the concept ‗indebted 
mercantilism‘ and ‗industrial mercantilism‘, but both these concepts can be theorised more 
thoroughly innovative qualitative and quantitative studies that consider the longitudinal nature of 
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the path dependence approach across more cases. 
 
 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the thesis set out to investigate the link between elite perspectives of the purpose 
of foreign aid and the consequent economic development paths in recipient countries.  As was 
summarise above, it achieved this by looking at the cases of Korea and Ghana, employing a path 
dependence lens that included a focus on elite perceptions.  The thesis provided concrete findings 
that not only contributes to close the gap in current literature, but that open up an exciting future 
research agenda in this area.   
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